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Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-187
Wednesday
27 September 1995

Daily Report

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Belgrade TV: Details of B-H Constitution Proposal

AU2609200595 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 26 Sep 95

[Report by Borislav Lalic from New York]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the contents of the paper discussed today in New York, the Muslim-Croatian [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Federation and the Serb Republic [Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] are required to hold democratic and free elections as soon as possible in both state entities. For these elections to be held as soon as possible, the two governments in Bosnia—the Croatian-Muslim and the Serb—are required to immediately give full freedom of movement to people, guarantee the rights of refugees and displaced people to return to their homes and to receive compensation, and guarantee freedom of speech and of the press.

In 30 days, when the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] observers determine that the conditions for the elections are met, the two state entities would organize the elections with the full cooperation of international monitoring teams. Following these democratic elections and on the basis of the results, two consequent institutions would be formed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as was proposed today by the constitutional principles: a joint parliament or assembly, two-thirds of whose members would be elected by the citizens of the Muslim-Croatian federation and one-third by the citizens of the Serb Republic. All of the parliament's decisions would be made by a majority of votes, but under the condition that this majority include at least one-third of the votes of each of the state entities. This in practice means that the parliament will not be able to make a valid decision unless as many as one-third of the deputies from the Serb Republic vote for it.

Joint Command in Bosnia With Russia 'Unlikely'

AU2609164895 Paris AFP in English 1620 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Sept 26 (AFP)—NATO is extremely unlikely to grant Russia joint command of a peace implementation force in Bosnia, alliance sources said Tuesday [26 September].

Although the alliance is keen to see Russia play a full role in any peace implementation mission, the complexity of the task precludes "sloppy command structures," one said.

"This will not be classical peacekeeping. We are talking about peace enforcement in a very difficult situation with the UN pulling out, local warlords still active and a generally very confused situation," one NATO diplomat commented. "The alliance cannot take that on with one hand tied behind its back."

Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev on Monday proposed a joint Russian-NATO command for the multinational force that is expected to replace UN forces.

A senior Russian diplomat on Tuesday said NATO acceptance of the proposal would augur well for future relations between Moscow and the West, which have been badly soured by NATO's bombing campaign in Bosnia and its plans for enlargement into eastern Europe.

NATO is also anxious to rebuild broken bridges and this is a key element in its desire to see a considerable Russian contingent take part in the Bosnia operation.

Russian participation would also give the force a less partisan look in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs, NATO diplomats believe.

NATO's military planners were last week asked to produce detailed plans for a peace implementation force involving 50,000 men including contingents from Islamic countries and Russia. The United States has promised to provide up to 18,000 troops.

NATO ambassadors will meet Friday to discuss the exact relationship of troops from other countries to the overall NATO commander. Diplomats acknowledge that Russia cannot be offered a completely subordinate role in the operation.

"We do recognise that if we want Russia to be associated with this we will have to come up with some new and imaginative arrangements," one diplomat said, underlining that the "more substantive the Russian contribution, the more influence she can expect to have on the operation."

NATO sources also underlined that Grachev's statements did not necessarily represent Russian Government policy.

Grachev's warning that Russia would create a new military bloc if NATO offered the Baltic States membership of the alliance was seen as sabre-rattling that did not reflect Russia's real position.

"There have been so many of these kind of statements," a diplomat said. "One asks oneself who Russia is going to form a military bloc with."

EU Mediator on Situation in Kosovo, Refugees

AU2609160795 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 13 Sep p 4

[Interview with Carl Bildt, cochairman of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia (EU), by Nefail Maliqi in Geneva; date not given: "Kosova Under Discussion in the Framework of the International Conference"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Maliqi] Mr. Bildt, thanks to the U.S. initiative, the belligerent parties reached an agreement in Geneva last Friday that leads to the establishment of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What can you say further on an international diplomatic level regarding the crisis in the former Yugoslavia?

[Bildt] Yes, the agreement reached in Geneva several days ago was welcomed not only by the international community, but also by the opposing parties themselves, something that obviously testifies to a good start leading to resolving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, there is still a lot of work to do in this direction—a permanent and intensive commitment by the international community to establishing integral peace in the region.

At the same time, I would like to say that the Geneva agreement has its own symbolism and significance because, from now on, doors have been opened to resolving a series of other leftover problems in the former Yugoslav areas.

[Maliqi] How do you assess the situation in Kosova?

[Bildt] The factual situation in Kosova is dramatic and distressing to the world public. It is precisely for this reason that we are committed to resolving the Kosova issue in a successful way, by protecting the rights of the Albanians.

[Maliqi] To what extent is the Kosova issue incorporated into the Geneva conference?

[Bildt] I said that everything that happens in Kosova preoccupies the officials in the international bodies who are committed to resolving the crisis in former Yugoslavia. We follow the question of Kosova continuously, a very serious issue that is incorporated into the global solution of the crisis in former Yugoslavia. That is why Kosova is under discussion in the framework of the international conference on peace in the former Yugoslavia.

[Maliqi] How would you comment on Belgrade's behavior regarding the settlement of the Serb refugees from Croatia due to the Croatian offensive, despite who these refugees are?

[Bildt] As you know, over 700,000 Serb refugees from Krajina have been settled inside Serbia, precisely in the area of Belgrade, Vojvodina, and a considerable number in Kosova. The settlement of the Serb refugees in Kosova, where they currently number 7,000-8,000, is supervised continuously by the international community.

[Maliqi] What happened to a certain comparison of Kosova with the old Knin?

[Bildt] I would not like to answer that.

New UN Human Rights Rapporteur in Balkans Named

AU2609212395 Paris AFP in English 1654 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Helsinki, Sept 26 (AFP)—Finland's former defence minister Elisabeth Rehn is to take over as UN human rights rapporteur in the former Yugoslavia, the foreign ministry said in a statement on Tuesday [26 September].

She takes over from Poland's Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who resigned in protest on July 27 after two enclaves in eastern Bosnia supposedly under UN protection as safe areas, Srebrenica and Zepa, were captured by Bosnian Serbs.

Mazowiecki said their fall made a mockery of the United Nations.

SP Parliament Members Criticize Antigenocide Law

AU2709094995

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian on 24 and 26 September carries on pages 2 and 3 discussions of Socialist Party [SP] group parliament members at the present legislature against the antigenocide law, presented to the legislature for approval.

In his discussion, Dritero Agolli says that, "The order, under the form of a bill, that a category of people who are free citizens are not allowed to be elected in the central and local entities, is anticonstitutional and runs counter to the main provisions of our Constitution, the UN charter, and the Human Rights Charter. It runs counter to civilization itself. This bill gives the lie to the propaganda and demagogy that allegedly the rule of law has been established in Albania." He continues: "This law is trying to ensure but one thing only: to crystalize the dictatorship of right-wing extremism through collective punishment of political adversaries. Today it is threatening the opposition, and at the same time it is warning the adversaries within the party in power to keep their mouths shut and say yes to the boss."

In his discussion the legislature's Deputy Chairman Shaqir Vukaj said, "Whom did you assign the task of compiling this law? Immoral people, with a doubtful reputation, who as they sold out their former bosses, so will they sell you out tomorrow." He continues: "You think that by depriving 10, 15, or 30 people of their right to be elected in the legislature or the local power, you will weaken the SP. You are wrong, gentlemen. We have thousands of party members organized in an excellent way, from Vermosh [northernmost part] to Konispol [southernmost part]. Hundreds of them can be elected tomorrow and perform their duty even better." He goes on: "With such antilaws you will make them more popular, more politicians, just as you did with Fatos Nano, who three or four years ago was at the beginning of his political career, and now, keeping him in prison as a political prisoner, I repeat, political prisoner, you made him very popular. You turned him into a real politician, whose reputation surpasses Albania's borders. You made him known in Europe and even in the White House."

In his speech, SP Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi said that nothing has remained from the slogan Berisha used during the 1992 elections, "fellow culprits and fellow sufferers." Now he said "political revenge is in its stead."

He continues, "The bill presented to us is nothing but the escalation of this revenge. It aims at putting the electoral campaign into the framework of 'the struggle against communism.' But they forget that it is no longer the year 1992. There is no political force in Albania to think, much less to act, to return the past. As a consequence, the Democratic Party [PD], facing no alternative and showing almost total incapacity, is thinking that through this bill it will succeed in convincing the electorate that the SP is allegedly the Worker Party, and that allegedly neither Shkoder nor Tropoje loves the communists, neither does the United States nor the West in general." Pellumbi thinks that though crimes were perpetrated under the communists and a fierce struggle was waged against the political adversaries, "still it cannot be called genocide if we bear in mind the meaning of the concept 'genocide.'" He goes on saying, "Neither the internal circumstances nor the situation in the region justify a new political revenge in Albania," adding that "the clashes between the winners and the losers would turn into a threatening and absurd fatality."

In his speech SP Deputy Chairman Namik Dokle, after mentioning that this antigenocide bill "has forgotten the real servants" of the past genocide, says: "The bill aims at excluding from the political life not the collaborators of the dictatorship, but the PD adversaries, of those who will ask them to render accounts: for corruption; for selling fuel to criminals Mladich and Karjadgic; for selling arms to Rwanda; for selling Albanian children throughout the world; for the one who awarded a false medal to the president and stole state money; for making owners out of those who have never had property but the PD document; for the misuse of millions of dollars of public funds for roads, water pipelines, and other communal services; etc."

For Deputy Ndre Legisi, the bill aims at "drawing the attention of Albanian public opinion away from the greatest evil that has taken place after the overthrow of the communist dictatorship: the elimination of the legal power," adding that "it aims at increasing the political tensions so necessary for the survival of Berisha-type transition politicians."

FRG's Kinkel on EU vs NATO Membership

AU2609155495 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 23-24 Sep 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Kinkel Told Zhelev To Look More Toward EU Than NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For Bulgaria it now is more important to become a full-fledged member of the EU rather than NATO, FRG Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said.

On 22 September he told a BTA representative that Bulgaria must utilize all its possibilities afforded by its status as an EU associated member. Kinkel spoke at the first Berlin meeting of the Friedrich Naumann Liberal Policy Foundation, at which Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev read a lecture entitled "Is Communism Coming Back?"

The German foreign minister pointed out that the FRG is prepared to support Bulgaria in the future in accordance with the Bulgarian readiness to become a regular EU member.

At the 30-minute meeting, after the reception Klaus Kinkel gave for the participants in the forum, Zhelyu Zhelev demanded Germany's categorical support for Bulgaria's efforts to become a regular NATO member. He complained that Bulgaria has been slighted as a founder of the "New Forum" Organization that replaces COCOM [Coordinating Committee on Export Controls], something that might hinder its access to modern technologies.

Klaus Kinkel promised that Bonn will help to take Bulgaria's name out of the negative lists related to the Schengen agreement. According to Kinkel, Bulgaria will find its place in the architecture of the European security; however, for the time being, economic integration into EU should take priority, because, according to the German foreign minister, nobody intends to attack our country.

Pirinski on New Elements in Policy Toward FYROM

AU2709094295 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 23 Sep 95 p 2

[DUMA PRESS report: "We Are Prepared To Sign 23 Agreements With Macedonia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 22 September Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski gave a news conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He said that the basic part of the discussion of the Commission on Foreign Policy on 21 September dealt with the Yugoslav conflict and the stabilization of the Balkan region. In his report to the commission, he presented the updated position of the cabinet on the Yugoslav conflict. The new element in this position is Bulgaria's participation in the postwar stabilization of the region.

A large part of the commission's meeting was devoted to relations between Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Mr. Pirinski said, describing those relations as a priority of the Bulgarian Government. Noting the new elements in Bulgaria's position toward Macedonia, Minister Pirinski said that Bulgaria adheres to developing bilateral relations in the most rapid manner. We confirm our readiness to sign the 23 agreements with Macedonia that have been coordinated, the foreign minister said. At his meeting with the Macedonian ambassador, the Bulgarian foreign minister proposed to sign the agreements in the official language of each of the two countries. If necessary, the Macedonian side should make a statement as to what the official language of the republic is in accordance with the Constitution, Mr. Pirinski said. According to him the Bulgarian formula is neutral and it does not commit any of the sides. Bulgaria has travelled its part of the road and we hope that this formula will be accepted by Macedonia, the foreign minister pointed out.

He confirmed our interest in developing transportation and infrastructure relations between the two countries. We expect all countries bordering Macedonia to normalize their relations with Macedonia by establishing interstate diplomatic relations, Minister Pirinski said.

BSP Official on 'Enriching' Contacts With FRY

AU2609145495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] has always had a clear position on the events in Yugoslavia and Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations, Krasimir Premyanov, BSP deputy chairman, said at the BSP's regular weekly news conference today. Now, when the party is in power, it continues to express its positions through international contacts, Mr. Premyanov said in the context of commenting on the visit of a BSP Supreme Council delegation to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY].

Conditions have been created for enriching and diversifying the contacts with that country, Mr. Premyanov said and added: Now is the moment to create a good foundation for Bulgarian-Yugoslav and Bulgarian-Serbian relations, because ours are two exceptionally important countries in the Balkan region, which could be the nucleus of a policy that would turn the Balkans into a zone of peace, stability, and cooperation among all states in the region.

During the upcoming parliamentary week the Democratic Left will insist on voting on the Defense and Armed Forces Bill and the Higher Education Bill at second reading, Krasimir Premyanov said.

Pirinski Confirms Decision To Recall Ambassadors

AU2709095295 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 23 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by Miroslava Badzheva: "Pirinski Admitted Recalling Nine Ambassadors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday Foreign Minister Pirinski admitted that nine ambassadors from the so-called president's men will be recalled. At a secret meeting on Thursday 21 September, the government decided to recall Slavi Pashovski from New York, Lea Koen from Brussels, Elena Kircheva from Bern, Vladimir Filipov from Lisbon, Svetlozar Raev from Strasbourg, Kiril Marichkov from the Vatican, Yani Milchakov from Budapest, and Stefan Naumov from Tirana. President Zhelev has to sign the decrees relieving them from their posts.

"The nine ambassadors completed their three-year term of service long ago, and this is the main reason why we are replacing them," Pirinski said. He added that most of them had been in foreign service for four years, and Veselin Filipov had even completed five years. It is true, Pirinski said, that most of the ambassadors to be replaced had openly distanced themselves from the Socialist cabinet. "However, the list does not include some of their other colleagues who have also come out against the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] government. We did not propose their names for replacement because they were appointed more recently," Pirinski explained.

The group does not include our ambassadors in Bonn, Paris, and Madrid, whose regular term of service also expired long ago. According to Pirinski, the BSP and Zhelev reached a compromise on them. "It was considered, for example, that we should not change our ambassador in Madrid as long as Spain continues to chair the European Union," Pirinski explained. He said that Mikhail Petkov is well received by the top circles in Madrid, he has committed no blunders, and will stay on for a further year, although his three years are up.

Pirinski also declared that the Council of Ministers has not violated the Constitution by excluding our permanent representative at the UN, Slavi Pashovski, from the official delegation to the 50th session of the UN General Assembly. On 21 September President Zhelev said in connection with the "Pashovski affair" that the Foreign Ministry was employing "commissar methods."

"Only the Foreign Ministry can decide on the membership of official delegations, and the government has committed no juridical deviations or violations of the law," Pirinski declared.

Informed sources claim that Dr. Zhelev and Pirinski had an understanding that Slavi Pashovski should be recalled. This was supposed to happen after the end of the UN General Assembly session, but not prior to the session and not in such a manner. The president may now delay signing the decree to relieve Pashovski to show his displeasure with the Socialists' failure to keep their side of the bargain.

Parliament Chairman Discusses Perry's Visit

AU2609153695 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 21 Sep 95 p 3

[Interview with Chamber of Deputies Chairman Milan Uhde by Nikola Nikolova in Prague on 20 September: "The Gates to the North Atlantic Alliance Are Wide Open"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A government of the Czech Republic that does not ensure security of this state against the conceivable repetition of the danger of occupation cannot expect permanent support from the citizens. The Czech citizens have more understanding for spending on the Army than citizens in other countries.*

[Nikolova] Could you, to begin with, at least briefly explain why admission into the North Atlantic Alliance is so important for us?

[Uhde] In my introductory explanation at the meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, I emphasized that two aspects of the security issue are important for us. Above all, because we ourselves have experienced two occupations—the occupation by Nazi Germany and the occupation by the Soviet Army—we put much greater emphasis on the questions of future security than do states that have not had such experiences, did not go through any occupations, and are a little more careless in this respect.

I said that a Czech government that does not ensure security of this state against the conceivable repetition of the danger of occupation cannot expect permanent trust of the citizens and, on the contrary, that the Czech citizens have greater understanding for spending on the Czech Army, for instance, than citizens in other countries. I believe that in this country it is easy to explain to the citizens why we need an army, and I would go so far as to say that one does not even need to explain it to a significant majority of citizens and that they would not object to spending on reequiping the Czech Army—within reasonable limits, of course.

The second aspect is that, while Nazi Germany ceased to exist and was replaced by a neighbor that is dependable, stable, and democratic, rather unpredictable things are happening on the other side, on the territory of the former Soviet Union. That is why we are so interested in joining the North Atlantic Alliance or, rather, getting an assurance that the gates are open. Therefore, we follow the conceivable Russian attempts at veto more closely than the states, for instance, that have never been occupied.

Secretary Perry commented on this in several points, which I am reiterating freely: In the first point, he emphasized that Americans are not losing their sense of responsibility for peace and security in Europe, that 100,000 U.S. soldiers will remain in Europe, and that this contingent is reckoned with in the plans and ideas of the U.S. executive for the next six years.

[Nikolova] Could you specify where these 100,000 troops are at this time?

[Uhde] They are deployed on the territory of the traditional North Atlantic Alliance member countries. Deployment on the territory of NATO nonmember states is not expected, and it remains a question how it will be in the future, when some of these states are admitted to NATO. A discussion of these specific questions and answers did not take place. Nevertheless, Secretary Perry assured us that we should not fear the United States' withdrawal of its soldiers and, so-to-say, leaving Europe to the Europeans, or worry that the idea that U.S. involvement in Europe is not necessary would win out.

Another point is the deep conviction of the U.S. executive and legislature that NATO should expand and should not be declared a hermetically sealed entity. Secretary Perry also answered the criticism that has occasionally appeared on this issue and that has also been heard in the Czech Republic, namely, that this process is too slow. He acknowledged all that the Czech Republic has done and expressed his satisfaction with the course of development and the cooperation between the Czech Defense Ministry and the U.S. Department of Defense but, of course, also pointed out that the compatibility of arms and army equipment in general must be achieved between the Czech Army and the NATO Army and that there is still a lot left to do.

[Nikolova] Have the arms been discussed in concrete terms—the much-discussed F-16 fighter, for instance, or other arms?

[Uhde] There was no detailed discussion of arms, neither F-16 fighters nor MiG-21 modernization. That is a matter for experts to judge. Of course, I believe that such steps should be taken that would not counter future compatibility. What precisely they are to be, however, depends on the concrete talks between the Czech Defense Ministry and the U.S. Department of Defense. It also depends on consultations with our Polish neighbors because it is coming out that certain coordination here is possible, even desirable.

[Nikolova] Has there been even a mention of at least an orientation date for our admission into the North Atlantic pact?

[Uhde] Not at all. On the contrary, we all acquiesced when Secretary Perry asked for understanding that this process would be slow, that it is not a question of the year 1998 or 2001. Nevertheless, we have never tried for a specific date because it depends also on us. We know and will learn even more from the so-called internal study that is being prepared by the U.S. party what the criteria are to be; and, for our part, we must have the opportunity to say whether we satisfy these criteria. I believe it would not be wise to specify the date today. For us politicians, it is extremely important to know that the NATO gates are open. That was quite clear from the entire discourse by Secretary Perry and from his answers to questions. He was building directly on the idea that we are to consult on how to achieve compatibility and join NATO.

The question of whether yes or no, whether to expand or not expand NATO, whether the NATO gates are or are not open did not at all emerge here, and that is always mollifying and important for us. A year or two does not matter.

We emphasized the plan, and the U.S. secretary praised us a lot, expressed an appreciation for our activities, and encouraged us not to hesitate with other activities. He pointed out that there are $10 million on the way, earmarked specifically for the support of these activities of the Czech Army within the framework of the Partnership for Peace plan, and acquainted us with specific figures that the U.S. budget will provide for cooperation with the countries of Central and East Europe within the framework of the Partnership for Peace plan.

Communists Unhappy About Visit

AU2609155595 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 21 Sep 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "The CSSD and ODA View Perry's Visit Favorably, While the KSCM Does Not"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—From the point of view of the endeavors of the Czech Republic to integrate into NATO, the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] views the visit by U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry as a positive act. The Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] considers it an important step toward incorporation into the West European security structures. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM], however, assesses Perry's visit as a continuation of a policy, the objective of which is a limitation of the sovereignty of the Czech Republic. The CTK was told this by representatives of these parties.

At the same time, the KSCM insists on its negative stand regarding the possibility of integration of the Czech Republic into NATO without a referendum.

The expansion of NATO not only should take place quickly but also a declaration should be made as to when and who will be admitted, President Havel told Secretary Perry on 20 September. Presidential spokesman Ladislav Spacek released this information.

Klaus Recounts Talks With Shalikashvili on NATO

LD2609143895 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus today met with General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces. Following their talks, Klaus told Czech radio the following:

[Begin Klaus recording] As Shalikashvili himself said, he came bearing good news. He has not come to complain or to say that something is not going well. On the contrary, he senses enormous progress in the implementation of the Partnership for Peace program and in the integration of our Army into the Western security system. I think he is genuinely happy with this development.

We did not raise with each other any particularly important single issue. Let us not look solely and exclusively at the final, formal step when we sign up for NATO membership or membership in any other organization. The integration process is under way constantly, and each joint exercise and every visit like this, each time soldiers are sent to study at a foreign military school, all constitute an ongoing process of integration. [end recording]

Parliament Adopts Currency Law

LD2609191295 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Thanks to the Currency Law passed by deputies at the 34th Session of parliament today, the Czech Republic should take its place among the economically developed countries of the world. With details of the parliamentary proceedings, here is Vladimir Hruby:

[Hruby] Existing legislation is based on the fact that the Czech koruna does not circulate abroad. In reality, however, the Czech koruna is in fact in circulation in both cash and noncash forms. That is why parliamentary deputies began their session today with a debate on the foreign exchange bill. Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik supported the government-sponsored bill with the following assessment of the present economic situation in the Czech Republic:

[Begin Kocarnik recording] The economy is definitively on the way up. We are expecting economic growth of almost 5 percent next year; inflation is under control and gradually decreasing; our state finances are healthy; we are not burdening future generations with debts; and the Czech Republic's prestige, based on our results, has seen an exceptional rise. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Comment: Perry Visit Shows SR Being Considered

AU2609160095 Bratislava SME in Slovak 20 Sep 95 p 6

[Commentary by Michal Havran: "Why the United States Is Also Continuing To Reckon With Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At your meeting with Slovak politicians, did you also discuss the beating up of a parliamentary deputy and the kidnapping of the president's son? This was more or less what a reporter from the British REUTER agency asked U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, who also visited the Slovak Republic [SR] within the framework of his tour of Central European countries.

The question would have bewildered disinterested and impartial participants at the news conference at Bratislava Airport. Not, however, the journalists monitoring, following, and commenting on the Slovak political scene. William Perry gave a diplomatic answer, emphasizing in particular the need for a variety of views, the observation of constitutional rights, and the importance of the transparency of government measures. He responded briefly and objectively, although it was obvious from his expression that he would have preferred to answer questions concerning Slovakia's entry into NATO or the situation in Bosnia. Unfortunately, in Slovakia not even a senior U.S. Administration official can avoid the burning issues of the day. We are convinced that he was not asked and would not even be asked such a question anywhere else in Central Europe.

Events of the kind we are witnessing below the Tatras have not occurred in Slovenia, the Czech lands, or Hungary. Under each Vladimir Meciar government, however, everything is possible in Slovakia. It is just a tragedy that this situation is considered to be a normal, everyday one. Some people, in this context, do not even hesitate to use the word "democracy." And, as an aside, let us take the liberty to make an observation: What would have happened if, in a truly democratic country such as the United States, some suspicious individuals kidnapped the president's child? In Bill Clinton's case, his daughter Chelsea... It is a thousand pities that the security elements in Slovakia cannot keep an eye on the safety of the country's most senior constitutional official and members of his family.

This country, through other officials, continues to acknowledge democratic principles and even wants to become a valid member of the European Union and the North Atlantic pact. In our current development, we have a mixture of bad fortune and good fortune. Bad fortune because, if it were not for the somersaults and extravagances on the domestic scene, Slovakia would already be considerably further ahead, and they would be speaking appreciatively of us in the world. We have good fortune because, despite the tragic somersaults, the West—the United States, in particular—still views us as a region that, when the fermentation process is over, may in the end give a suitable boost to democratic values in Central Europe.

The West knows everything about us. William Perry smiled benignly from time to time. And, when he spoke about the five points that the countries aspiring to membership in NATO have to fulfill, it was not a coincidence that, of them, he highlighted, in the positive sense, points three and four, in particular—that is, Slovak progress on the road toward civilian control of the Army and achieving compatibility of the Slovak Armed Forces with the Alliance's forces. Slovakia has room for improvement when it comes to the first, second, and fifth points—that is, progress toward democracy, a clear orientation toward a market economy, and friendly relations with our neighbors. Although, to be fair, in the fifth point, Slovakia scored positive marks for signing the agreement with Hungary.

So, our entry into the club of democratic countries is still being reckoned with, despite all of the rough jostling on the domestic political skating rink. The West knows that the transition from the postcommunist era to the democratic scene takes time—less time in some countries, more in others. It is especially important to realize that Slovakia is being reckoned with for the future, for the young generation that will definitely not reject democracy as its model. One day, it will learn about this difficult transition period only from the yellowed pages of history books. And the children of the future president will not be kidnapped.

Comment on Perry Concern Over Political Culture

AU2609172395 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 20 Sep 95 p 4

[Commentary by Jan Skoda: "To Change Political Culture"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is not every day that Bratislava hosts three prominent international personalities in a single day as happened on Friday. Among them, the 24-hour visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, one of the creators of the current foreign and security policy of the Clinton Administration, deserves special attention. So, we can infer that Slovakia does not remain unnoticed. There undoubtedly is interest on the part of the advanced West in the happenings here. The question that we ourselves must answer is, however, whether we can use the attention of our partners to our benefit.

Try as they might, neither William Perry nor Miguel Angel Martinez, chairman of the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly, could avoid comments that again (which time is it over the past months?) cannot leave us indifferent. The U.S. official diplomatically, yet clearly, indicated that there was a lack of tolerance for the views of the opposition in the policy of the government coalition in Slovakia, that some constitutional rights have been violated, and that the work of the government has not always been transparent to the public.

A sincere friend of Slovakia, Martinez, who witnessed an unfortunate dispute in the Foreign Committee over the representation of the Hungarian coalition in the Slovak parliamentary delegation to Strasbourg and peculiar ideas of democracy as the exclusive right of the majority, pointed out that the present institutional tension damages the name of Slovakia abroad.

Both politicians were aware of what they are saying and would be ill-advised not to draw a lesson from their comments. After all, it is not the first time this has happened, and those who bear most responsibility for this situation know this only too well. Our Western partners are not interested in the details of our disputes or in which side is right. They are only concerned with the violation of the principles that make up the structure of the Western political system. If we state our irrevocable interest in becoming a part of it, it is understandable that we are required to observe the fundamental conditions now.

Regarding Slovakia's joining the North Atlantic pact, Perry spoke about the conditions unequivocally at all meetings with our state and political officials. For those who have difficulties with arithmetic, there were five of them, and, if they did not listen carefully enough to the words of the U.S. secretary, it is necessary to recall that, in connection with Slovakia as a candidate for NATO membership, he expressed his definite satisfaction only on two counts: progress in achieving compatibility of the Slovak Army with the armies of the pact members and with civilian control of the Slovak Armed Forces.

The public, too, wishes to trust the assurances that the "disputes will soon be resolved in a democratic and intelligent manner." In fact, however, it is not just a matter of resolving the disputes; there are disputes in every healthy society. What must be changed is really the political culture, which is just as important in resolving conflicts as their object and which, to tell the truth, most concerns the foreign partners. Therein lies the kernel of what we are really talking about: democracy.

Shalikashvili Discusses NATO With Kovac, Meciar

LD2709085795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] General John Shalikashvili, chief of staff of the U.S. Armed Forces, discussed with President Michal Kovac in Bratislava on 26 September, among other things, the strategy, principles, and criteria governing new members' admission into NATO. In this respect, the two sides agreed that, in addressing this issue, special consideration had to be paid to the Russian Federation.

During the meeting with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, Shalikashvili praised our government's activities in promoting the implementation of the Partnership for Peace program.

Investigator: SIS at Border During Kovac Abduction

AU2709083695 Bratislava SME in Slovak 22 Sep 95 pp 1-2

[Report by "(pt)": "M. Lovich Was at the Border During the Kidnapping; P. Vacok Has Asked That He Be Relieved of His Oath of Silence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The presence of a Slovak Information Service [SIS] officer, Milan Lovich, at the Slovak-Austrian border during the abduction of M. Kovac, Jr., has been proved. This statement was made at a press briefing held yesterday by the case's new investigator, Peter Vacok, in reply to a question from SME. P. Vacok said that he has asked Secret Service Director Ivan Lexa to relieve Milan Lovich of his oath of silence. According to him, this request has been "processed," but Lovich has not been questioned yet. In reply to a question on whether a request has been submitted to the SIS director to relieve other secret service officers of their oaths of silence, the director of the Interior Ministry's Investigation Department, Vladimir Lamacka, said: "No comment." In reply to another question from us on whether the secret service's involvement in the abduction of the president's son can be ruled out, V. Lamacka said: "So far, we have no evidence that would indicate this."

V. Lamacka denied the statement made by Police Corps First Deputy President Peter Manak, who had claimed that the secret service's counterintelligence director, Jaroslav Svechota, is also a member of the team investigating the abduction of Michal Kovac Jr. Lamacka said that there is cooperation between the police and the SIS only on the basis of an information exchange. In this context, P. Vacok declared: "Mr. Svechota is not a member of the investigative team. He has not been on the team during my presence, I have not contacted him, and I will not contact him. I will not allow anyone except the bodies involved in criminal proceedings to be on the investigative team. That was my condition."

So far, the police have not been able to ascertain the identity and owner of a white Mercedes 208D van that was parked in front of M. Kovac Jr.'s home before his abduction. According to V. Lamacka, the police have an idea how many of these vehicles there are, but, despite carrying out a check among state bodies, "they did not come to the requisite conclusion." Peter Vacok added: "We are also going among our own ranks and checking whether we have such vehicles at the Interior Ministry." He also said that certain state bodies may, under the law, refuse to provide information on whether they own such a vehicle. According to some reports, a white Mercedes van should be found in a building on Kakucinova Street that, according to the former investigator, J. Simunic, "does not belong to anyone." V. Lamacka said that he only knows about this from the press.

Police representatives have denied that political circles could attempt, during the investigation, to influence the course and outcome of the investigation.

SIS Head Complains to Prosecutor General

LD2609181595 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ivan Lexa, head of the Slovak Intelligence Service [SIS], today wrote to Prosecutor General Michal Valo about the suspicion of criminal acts committed by investigators of the Regional Investigation Office, Peter Vacok, Jan Jonata, and others.

These facts stem from service reports by SIS officers and other documents that demonstrate that these investigators are committing serious offenses including, above all, misuse of power of a public official and incitement to give false testimony. They allegedly committed this activity by repeatedly inciting secret meetings with SIS members as from 14 September, while exerting psychological pressure on them and inciting them to give false testimony about the activities in the case of Michal Kovac Jr.

Ivan Lexa concluded in his letter to the prosecutor general that the SIS has other incontrovertible evidence that will be submitted to the General Prosecutor's Office during investigations.

Ivan Lexa has filed an application with the General Prosecutor's Office to investigate the fact of committing an offense of jeopardizing official secrets. It concerns Vladimir Lamacka, the head of the section of investigation and criminal expertise activities of the Ministry of the Interior, and investigator Peter Vacok, who, at a news conference on 21 September, in connection with the case of Michal Kovac Jr., gave the names of SIS members Milan Lovic and Jaroslav Svechota. Ivan Lexa further filed an application with the General Prosecutor's Office to investigate information witnessing crimes allegedly committed by Jaroslav Simunic, the previous investigator in the case.

Economy Minister Espouses Free Trade With Russia

AU2709083995 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 21 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "An Agreement on Free Trade With Russia Is, According to J. Ducky, in Slovakia's Fundamental Interest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Economy Minister Jan Ducky has not yet read the proposal from the Russian Federation to resume trade and economic relations between the Commonwealth of Independent States and the seven countries of Central and East Europe (the former CEMA), but, as he said in an interview for NARODNA OBRODA, "Slovakia has a fundamental interest in having such an agreement with Russia." In reply to a question on whether the fact that the Slovak economy is far more advanced than the economies of the CIS countries would not have a disproportionate affect on such cooperation, Ducky said that "we have nothing to lose. Our customs protection is so nominal—just under 3.0 percent—and Russia also has market restrictions—200 percent in some commodities—that, if the agreement were mutually fair, we could only gain by acquiring such a large market as Russia." In connection with the fact that the Czech Republic and Poland have reacted to Russia's offer skeptically and almost dismissively, Ducky commented that he is not yet familiar with the contents of the agreement, so he cannot express a view about it. The economy minister is not concerned that, from a political point of view, and also with regard to the Slovak Republic's efforts to integrate into the EU economic and other structures, such agreements could be perceived as orientation in the opposite direction. He added that he could also ask why the countries of Western Europe get more than 30 percent of their gas from Russia. "On the other hand, I have up-to-date information that we should turn in this direction because they do not want us to turn to them," concluded J. Ducky.

MOS Leader: SR Heading Toward 'Russian Model'

AU2709105295 Bratislava SME in Slovak 22 Sep 95 p 3

[Report by "(rej)": "MOS: The Slovak Republic Is Oriented Toward the Russian Model"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—According to Hungarian Civic Party (MOS) Deputy Chairman L. Gyurovszky, the current governing coalition is trying to establish a system in the Slovak Republic [SR] similar to the one in Russia. The fundamental traits of this system are, according to him, the linking of economic and political power; the incapacitation of the opposition; the attempt to create a market controlled by the state; and the unrestrainable secret service. He also sees confirmation of this trend in the positive acceptance of the Russian initiative to establish a free trade zone between the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the former CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] countries, behind which, according to him, is concealed Moscow's attempt to influence development in these states. In this context, L. Gyurovszky described the statements made by U.S. Defense Secretary W. Perry during his visit to Bratislava as an emphatic warning from the United States that Slovakia is not meeting the standards necessary for admission to Western structures.

Kovacs: Conference on Bosnia Could Be Revived

LD2709090895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Croatian, Serbian, and Bosnian foreign ministers have agreed in New York on the constitutional principles of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On this basis, the former Yugoslav republic will not be divided up, but a dual Muslim-Croat, and Serb federation will emerge. Miklos Martin Kovacs has the following details: [passage omitted]

Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs met the indefatigable Bosnian foreign minister directly after the talks on Bosnia on Tuesday. The Bosnia settlement was an important subject at other talks held by the Hungarian foreign minister, about which Laszlo Kovacs told Hungarian radio the following, on the basis of information from New York.

[Begin Laszlo Kovacs recording] The Bosnia settlement will have elements such as the return of refugees, getting a democratic system of institutions up and running—for example holding elections in Bosnia, the enforcement of human and minority rights, economic reconstruction, and arms limitation.

The negotiating partners were in agreement that this process will entail not only the possibility, but the need, for a role to be played by the OSCE in Europe and by Hungary. The Hungarian proposal for there to be a peace conference could again be revived; however, the topic now would not be reconciliation, but the arrangement after peace is made. [end recording]

Editorial Views Romania's Reconciliation Proposal

AU2709084895 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Sep 95 p 3

[Unattributed editorial: "Reconciliation?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Iliescu documents are currently being studied in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. The Romanian president, who will soon be the guest of the White House, made sure that his American hosts also learn that he wants reconciliation with Hungary. Iliescu also gave an interview to MAGYAR NEMZET last week, and it transpires from this that the ethnic Hungarians in Romania are the only obstacle to reconciliation.

President Iliescu used the German-French reconciliation as an example, and he mentioned the fact that, at the time, De Gaulle and Adenauer agreed to put an end to their historical confrontation and to settle their relations, and they also agreed to hold regular high-level meetings. Thus, according to the Romanian position, it is necessary to declare the historical goodwill and to hold representative meetings.

However, Hungarian-Romanian relations cannot be improved this way. Hungarian-Romanian relations are full of so much historical burden that they cannot be settled with a few documents and red-carpet meetings. But this is what the prevailing Romanian policy wants, so that, as Iliescu explains in the aforementioned MAGYAR NEMZET interview, they can "freely handle" their citizens after this "reconciliation" and eliminate the disturbing elements of ethnic separatism. Could Hungary agree on any reconciliation on such basis?

The Hungarian side will probably come up with its own proposals. Historical reconciliation is a great idea and it must be accepted. So, let us point out: Hungary recognizes the present borders and wants to live in good-neighborliness with Romania. History and myths cannot disturb relations between countries. So let us agree that the state schools in both countries refrain from teaching things that hurt the other nation (no matter in which country they live), things that declare national superiority. Historical reconciliation also includes mutual respect toward memorials and the right to stick to local names and traditions. The free use of one's language is like the free use of air. There can be no reconciliation if attempts are made to vent domestic policy tensions through symbolic antinational minority acts.

Historical reconciliation means acknowledging historical facts: The ethnic Hungarians living in Romania are citizens in their homeland, but their language and cultural identity connects them to the whole of the Hungarian nation, and their homeland is part of the Romanian state. Their loyalty to their state is diminished if they cannot feel at home because they are hindered in the use of their culture and language and the practice of their religion. So, there is no reconciliation, if the right to speak and learn in their mother tongue on all levels is regarded as a special privilege, rather than a natural state. President Iliescu regards the current state of affairs as ideal.

In popularizing the noble idea of reconciliation, the Romanian president pretends to speak about a deal between two homogeneous national states. The German-French analogy is misleading. The Romanian politics threw in this idea precisely before Iliescu's trip to the United States because it does not desire the basic treaty in the aforementioned sense and, at the same time, it wants to present Romania as a state striving for peace and agreement. We must admit that this is the practical course of action.

The Hungarian foreign policy is in a trap today. It is hard to reject this initiative from Bucharest while also avoiding Laszlo Tokes's latest accusations. Essentially, the bishop from Nagyvarad [Oradea] accuses the ready-to-talk government in Budapest of betraying the Hungarians in Transylvania. Bishop Tokes wants the declaration of an "educational state of emergency," and he would urge the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], as well as the Horn government, to embark on confrontation if he had his way. Bishop Tokes is a prophetic figure, but this vocation will hardly improve the situation of ethnic Hungarians in Romania and the international evaluation of the Hungarian case. This time, they would not confront the Ceausescu regime. The Hungarian politicians are also rightly concerned about the fact that they cannot win over the Romanian opposition either. At the time, also Romanians in Temesvar [Timisoara] formed a living chain to protect Laszlo Tokes's home. Where is such solidarity today?

The Hungarian Government cannot allow holding regular Arad-type meetings under the pretext of Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation. Likewise, efforts of confrontation, or everything or nothing, are equally useless and do not lead to any results. Besides, no matter what the Horn government will do, the opposition will attack it and will accuse it of national betrayal, because there is no consensus in Hungarian policies on this issue either. In the Hungarian public life, the affairs of Hungarians living beyond our borders have become the subject of party policy. This issue can lead to the fastest rhetorical successes.

In the meantime, the world and Europe are rather indifferent in this matter. The nice words of reconciliation can count on success, but the eurocrats do not get involved in details gladly. Perhaps the practical political steps and measures that facilitate businesses, border crossing, transportation, and trade might count on support. This is also something. This is where we stand now.

HOVET's Discussion of Armed Forces Bill

95CH0338A Budapest MAGYAR HONVED in Hungarian 4 Aug 95 p 6

[Article by Istvan Harsasi: "HOVET's Interpretations—A New Law for the New Year?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The process of the Armed Forces reform is making the urgent necessity for a law on legal status more and more apparent. It is also becoming apparent that not only professional soldiers but the entire profession of national defense would benefit from long-expected legal guarantees. For some measures are self-degrading, destroying moral values, and wasteful.

There seems to be no precedence for legislators to take such a long time in legislating a statute that they themselves have declared as important. But now the bill on the legal status of the professional personnel of the Armed Forces and law enforcement is one step closer to being legislated. According to the optimistic calculations of Jozsef Feher, Defense Ministry administrative state secretary, this long-titled bill will be put before the House in October and will become a legally binding statute in January 1996.

This encouraging statement was heard at the 27 July meeting of the Reconciliation Council of the National Defense Forces [HOVET], where the bill was discussed. The state secretary was the [main] speaker, and Lieutenant General Sandor Nemeth, Chief of Staff, as well as Lt. Colonel Jozsef Tian, chairman of CSESZ [expansion unknown] (which is demanding a place in HOVET), were also present among the usual participants.

This time the subject of the debate went beyond principles, intentions, and personal differences of opinion. It was a prolonged exercise in interpretation and occasional nit-picking, significant in that both employers and employees interpret [the law] the same way; that one or another definition covers all organizations, personnel categories, and situations; and that—to use the words of a BEOSZ [National League of Veterans Associations] representative—the new law should be timely and "administration-proof."

The more than three hundred paragraphs cover four or five basic issues, and the state secretary hopes that no supplementary statutes will be needed after the law takes effect. The soldiers' legal status will be clearly and unequivocally spelled out.

Above all, [the law] will reconcile service status and the legal system, which went through dramatic changes during the past years. It will provide an indisputable and relatively liberal framework for the institution of interest representation within the armed forces, it will resolve the anomalies of qualification and promotion, making the latter more objective. It will set clearly defined limits and at the same time it will give indisputable rights to professional soldiers. Salaries will be in line with those of public employees, and retirement regulations will be put in order.

"What does political activity mean?" asked Mihaly Volonter, deputy chairman of KESZ [Military Interest Representation Alliance], trying to clarify this seemingly simple term.

"I would also like to know," admitted State Secretary Feher. For no definition is to be found anywhere for "engaging in politics," which soldiers are forbidden to do, but since it is included in the law on national defense, it cannot be left out of this law either.

"Can a superior officer criticize an order issued by a subordinate?" inquired Lt. Col. Istvan Soros who, as HOVET's present chairman, was serving at the debate as moderator.

"Not in public," was the answer from the other side, and the generals around the table nodded approvingly.

Other confusing issues were: when can a soldier express his personal opinion, what is considered an "official matter," and how can limiting the expression of one's opinion be reconciled with interest representation.

"We also have an interest in having this bill enacted as soon as possible," said Dr. Imre Zsiga, HODOSZ [National Federation of Defense Workers] secretary, offering professional support to the soldiers through his comments that were to the point. For instance, he proposed that unions in the military be given agreement rights at least in those areas which have already become traditional for civilian unions. He also thought that it was necessary to have the law compel lower-ranking officers as well to set up forums for interest reconciliation whenever there is an initiative to that effect.

Union representatives objected to the fact that financial regulations and the legal system will not take effect simultaneously and that the salary system, which is beneficial for the professional personnel, is not expected to take effect until 1 January 1998.

Brigadier Gen. Janos Karasz, chief of the army's finance department, noted in this connection that "any law for which there is no money is nothing but empty words." "It will be technically impossible to implement it, and it will take months to restructure the personnel categories," added Major Gen. Imre Keczer, chief of organization and recruitment.

"We must rethink the issues of organization and finance," agreed the union council members in closing, and then the presiding chairman adjourned the meeting after a few "minor issues" and one or two more important issues were left open. The HOVET will continue the discussion of the bill in August.

Around mid-August the reconciliation of state administration must also take place in order to corroborate State Secretary Feher's calculations. However, corrections will still be possible when the bill will be brought before parliament.

But let us be optimistic. As a result of long preparation, an evaluation on a relatively broad social basis, innumerable comments, and detailed interest reconciliation, a good law is in the making.

Planned Capital, Currency Liberalization Detailed

AU1609142495 Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 14 Sep 95 p 33

[Report by Zsuzsa N. Vadasz: "Foreign Exchange Code—Being Loosened and (Still) Tightened"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The use of bank cards abroad attracts most attention in the draft foreign exchange bill that has already been approved by government and will soon come before the National Assembly. However, this is only a small, although spectacular and almost symbolic step in the liberalization that, according to plans, is to be introduced at the beginning of 1996.

If it is passed, the law will allow free convertibility in running financial transactions both for Hungarians and for foreigners. Capital transactions will not be liberalized to such an extent.

Although they will have an obligation to report, domestic citizens will be completely free to set up companies abroad or to buy part ownership in foreign companies, but other capital transactions will continue to require authorization from the foreign exchange authority (according to the intentions, only temporarily and not in all areas). Long-term capital investment in Hungary by foreigners does not come under foreign exchange restrictions, while short-term investment and financial-type capital export can usually be done after acquiring permission from the foreign exchange authority.

The draft foreign exchange code includes many changes that will affect the general population. For example, contrary to previous practice, the requirement of having to offer foreign currency acquired abroad for purchase by the state would be abolished. Instead, the acquired money will have to be brought home or transferred home.

It is also in connection with this that we can store the foreign currency in our possession according to our wishes: We can either exchange it for forints or put it in the bank, but we can also keep it at home in a cupboard if we like. It is also a change that, contrary to the current limitation, we can keep any amount at home. However, the rule will be maintained that, above a defined sum, convertible currency can only leave the country accompanied by a permit to take the foreign currency abroad, in other words, if we keep our money at home, it will first have to "take a walk" to the bank and back. Taking nonconvertible currency in or out of the country is unrestricted. As for the forint, bringing it in and taking it out will both continue to be limited, although the amounts will be defined more flexibly than at present (in the case of bringing it in, mainly adjusted to the needs of tourism).

Access to convertible currency will also be liberalized significantly. The forint will be fully convertible for the foreign trips of private persons because the draft bill—which actually pays special attention to foreign exchange purchases for tourism purposes—will actually free access to foreign currency for all tourist purposes.

Private persons will also have ample possibilities to buy foreign currency in other cases. For example, to mention but a few, people will be able to buy foreign currency freely for foreign newspaper subscriptions, for medical treatment abroad, for lawsuits, and for payments after a possible conviction. Private persons will also be able to use foreign currency to advertise abroad. We will also be free to exchange forints for the required foreign currency for studying abroad, the membership fees of international organizations, and solicitors' fees. The tax payment obligation that arises from working abroad during a year is an exception to this.

Although the draft foreign exchange bill still does not allow the purchase of property abroad for Hungarian citizens (except for companies in connection with their business), it will be possible to freely buy convertible currency for forints in Hungary to pay for the duty on inherited foreign property or on property received as a present.

The possibilities of people moving abroad will be changed greatly. The draft makes it possible for emigrants to freely exchange their forint income from the sale of their fixed assets and personal effects and their long-term fixed forint income. Entrepreneurs and organizations will also be free to buy foreign currency for maneuvers in connection with their activity. In addition, they can also have foreign currency accounts from which they can withdraw money for various purposes.

It is a characteristic of the draft that investment-type capital imports (the purchase of company shares, bonds, and fixed assets) is only possible in a convertible currency, or forints that can be exchanged for convertible currency. However, the invested capital and its yield can be exchanged back to convertible currency and taken out of the country. The draft recognizes the reinvestment of forints gained in a form exchangeable for convertible currency as capital import. Capital exports by citizens treated as Hungarian by the foreign exchange code will continue to need authorization from the foreign exchange authority.

Hungarians will only be able to set up companies, increase capital, and buy and sell shares abroad under certain circumstances. In addition to this, due to the expected deficit of the current account, share transactions—apart from direct investment—and other investments and various forms of financial type capital outflow will only be possible with a wide ranging authorization from the foreign exchange authority.

Taking on foreign loans will also require a permit: In the interest of being able to plan and regulate the foreign exchange expenditure and to filter the capital movements, entrepreneurs and other people treated as domestic citizens by the foreign exchange code will only be able to take on a loan of less than one year after foreign exchange authority authorization and the financial institutions will have a reporting obligation on the same.

Results of Bosnia Peace Talks in New York

Peace Accord Details Reported

AU2709084695 Paris AFP in English
2144 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Sept 26 (AFP)—Here is the text of the Bosnia accord reached Tuesday [26 September] in New York.

The clauses are in addition to the three-point agreement reached on September 8, 1995, in Geneva:

4. Each of the two entities will honor the international obligations of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so long as the obligation is not a financial obligation incurred by the one entity without the consent of the other.

5. It is the goal that free democratic elections be held in both entities as soon as social conditions permit. In order to maximize the democratic effectiveness of such elections, the following steps will be taken by both entities.

5.1 Both governments will immediately pledge their full support, starting immediately for (a) freedom of movement, (b) the right of displaced persons to repossess their property or receive just compensation, (c) freedom of speech and of the press, and (d) protection of all other internationally recognized human rights in order to enhance and empower the democratic election process.

5.2 As soon as possible the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] (or other international organization) will station representatives in all principal towns throughout the Federation of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina and publish monthly reports as to the degree which (a) the obligations listed in all of the Agreed Basic Princples have been fulfilled, and (b) social conditions are being restored to a level at which the election process may be effective.

5.3 Within 30 days after the OSCE delegations have concluded that free and democratic elections can be properly held in both entities, the governments of the two entities will conduct free and democratic elections and will fully cooperate with an international monitoring program.

6. Following the elections, the affairs and prerogatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be vested in the following institutions, in accordance with all of the Agreed Basic Principles.

6.1 A parliament or assembly, two-thirds of which will be elected from the territory of the Federation, and one-third from the territory of the Republika Srpska. All Parliamentary actions will be by majority vote provided that the majority includes at least one-third of the votes from each entity.

6.2 A presidency, two-thirds of which will be elected from the territory of the Federation, and one-third from the territory of the Republika Srpksa. All presidency decisions will be taken by majority vote, provided, however, that if one-third or more of the members disagree with a decision taken by the other members and declare that decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity or entities from which the dissenting members were elected, the matter will be referred immediately to the appropriate entity's/entities' parliament. If any such parliament confirms the dissenting position by a two-thirds vote, then the challenged decision will not take effect.

6.3 A cabinet of such ministers as may be appropriate.

6.4 A Constitutional Court with jurisdiction to decide all questions arising under the Consitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it will be revised in accordance with all of the Agreed Basic Principles.

6.5 The parties will negotiate in the immediate future as to further aspects of the management and operation of these institutions.

6.6 The foregoing institutions will have responsibility for the foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The parties will negotiate further to determine the extent to which these institutions will also have responsibility for other matters consistent with all of the Agreed Basic Principles.

Joint Statement Issued

AU2709081795 Paris AFP in English
2227 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Sept 26 (AFP)—Here is the text from the joint statement from participants in the Bosnia peace accord reached Tuesday [26 September] in New York:

For the second time in three weeks, the foreign ministers of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have met under the auspices of the Contact Group. The meeting was held at the US Mission to the United Nations and co-chaired by US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and EU Special Negotiator Carl Bildt.

The Contact Group and EU Special Negotiator announce today that the three foreign ministers, speaking for their governments—the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which also represents the Bosnian Serbs in a joint delegation—have authorized us to issue the attached Further Agreed Basic Principles. All three governments—and their presidents—agree that these principles will govern additional negotiations. Moreover, the co-chairmen reiterated that the issues of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srijem will be a top priority in an overall peace settlement.

The principles issued today take us one more important step on the road to peace. As important as this step is, we remain a long way from peace.

Although we still have a long and difficult path ahead of us, today's agreement does mark another important step forward for several reasons.

First and foremost, it establishes clearly that both sides agree that Bosnia and Herzegovina will have a parliament or national assembly, a presidency, a constitutional court, and makes provisions for free and democratic elections under international supervision. In our view this means direct, free and democratic elections would be held as soon as possible when the necessary conditions exist.

These are obviously significant, if incomplete, achievements, which must be fleshed out in much greater detail in the next round of negotiations. For example, what are the "other matters" referred to in the second sentence of Paragraph 6.6? Although this must be negotiated, in our view they should include such important matters as foreign trade, customs administration, international financial affairs, currency administration, citizenship and passports, protection of borders, and other matters. These issues must be solved before we can achieve the settlement we seek.

There are many other important issues not resolved, or even addressed, in today's document. Above all, the territorial issues are still unresolved, and will be the subject of very tough negotiations. In this connection, the Contact Group reiterates is strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states of the region.

We are also committed to insuring that, at the end of the negotiating process, the above institutions and their manner of operations and decision-making, will be fully consistent with democratic principles. We shall continue to avoid mechanisms that could make the governmental institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina un-democratic or non-functioning in their operations.

We must also address the presence of several different military forces on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in such a manner as to ensure that their presence and activities are consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The American negotiating team will return to the region, starting in Sarajevo, on Thursday. The EU (European Union) Special Negotiator, Carl Bildt, will continue work also on the constitutional and reconstruction efforts which will be addressed by the EU Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg October 2 before he proceeds to the region. Russian negotiator, First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, will return to the region next week.

The attached Basic Principles have been agreed upon today by H.E. Muhamed Sacirbegovic, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, H.E. Mate Granic, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Croatia (Croatia), and H.E. Milan Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), and witnessed by Representatives of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and by the European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia. New York September 26, 1995

Sarajevo Radio Covers Accord

AU2709103495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 27 Sep 95

[Report by Envera Selimovic from New York]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia last night reached an agreement in New York on defining constitutional arrangements in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here is a report by our correspondent Envera Selimovic:

[Selimovic] There are many new things after the end of this round of negotiations, but the old practice of everyone interpreting one agreement in different ways will certainly be repeated.

Although he did not explicitly say so, the head of the U.S. negotiating team did not hide his pleasure after the end of talks, as he has crossed yet another hurdle. He has removed the danger of the peace talks slowing down or being disrupted. This is another important step on the long road to peace, stated [words indistinct].

The Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation has expressed restrained satisfaction, saying that this round of negotiations [words indistinct].

The representative of the Belgrade regime, whose back was watched by Nikola Koljevic and Aleksa Buha—and this is a topic for some other time—said that this represented the continuity of the peace policy of Belgrade and Serb Republic, which resulted in open sneers of journalists.

In brief, these negotiations have expounded the constitutional principles. Territorial demarcation and the status of Sarajevo were not discussed. Regarding the war criminals, this was not a topic of the talks, Holbrooke said. This is a matter for the court and does not constitute part of negotiations, he repeated the earlier stand of the U.S. Administration.

Regarding the points that have been agreed, Holbrooke said that the future setup will involve a parliament or a national assembly, a collective presidency, and a constitutional court. Both sides will create conditions for free and democratic elections under international supervision. The Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation insisted on this in particular.

It has not been decided on how many members the parliament and presidency will have. Two thirds of representatives will represent the Federation and one third the so-called Serb entity. This ratio gives rise to the fear that this is opening up chances to block the work of both the assembly and the presidency. The Contact Group is also aware of that.

The joint statement says, however, that in creating constitutional solutions efforts will be made to avoid all mechanisms that could block the work of the government organs or jeopardize the democratic character of the authorities. This is without any doubt the impression of the Bosnia-Herzegovina negotiating team. [words indistinct]

The question of various military formations on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was also broached in principle. The government in Sarajevo had also insisted on this. [words indistinct] the view of the Contact Group is that all military formations must be in consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity.

During future negotiations [words indistinct] the final agreement, a number of other issues need to be defined. These are: the protection of Bosnia-Herzegovina borders, citizenship and passports, international financial transactions, customs administration, and so forth.

Richard Holbrooke and his negotiating team are traveling to Sarajevo tomorrow. This will be our first stop, in contrast to the past when we went to Belgrade first, Holbrooke said. [words indistinct] everyone interprets in his one way. [words indistinct] that they are going with the intention of reaching an agreement on a ceasefire.

TANJUG Coverage of Accord

LD2709003995 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2346 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Sept. 26 (TANJUG)—Foreign Ministers Milan Milutinovic of Yugoslavia, Mate Granic of Croatia, and Muhamed Sacirbegovic of the Bosnian Muslim Government adopted a document on the constitutional organization of the future Bosnian state in New York late Tuesday.

The document, adopted through the mediation of the Contact Group, says two states will coexist as completely equal entities—the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb state, Republika Srpska.

The agreement is extremely important for the future of the peace process, Yugoslav foreign minister Milutinovic said after the meeting.

A significant step has been made toward achieving definite peace in Bosnia, U.S. Negotiator Richard Holbrooke said after the meeting, which he chaired together with co-chairman of the conference on former Yugoslavia Carl Bildt.

The meeting was held behind closed doors at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York.

Bosnian Serb Republic Vice-President Nikola Koljevic and Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha were also on the Yugoslav delegation.

The main topic of Tuesday's meeting was to determine the constitutional principles regulating the structure and functioning of the future state in which two entities should co-exist—Muslim-Croat Federation and the [words indistinct], the state of Serbs in Bosnia.

The paper adopted on Tuesday formulates the most basic constitutional principles, while all other less significant questions were left to be negotiated and resolved by the two entities.

The document demands and expects that democratic and free elections in both entities be held as soon as possible.

In this context, the two governments were asked to immediately enable the freedom of movement of people, to secure the right to refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes or to be reimbursed, that freedom of speech and press be secured as well as respect for internationally-recognized human rights.

It also envisages that the Organization of European Security and Cooperation (OSCE) to send its observers to all principal towns of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic.

Within 30 days, after the OSCE monitors determine conditions have been created for elections, the two entities would organize voting with full cooperation from the international monitoring teams.

On the basis of the results of democratic elections, a parliament would be formed and a state presidency.

Two-thirds of the deputies would be elected from the territory of the Muslim-Croat Federation and one-third from the Bosnian Serb Republic.

All parliament decisions would be adopted by a majority of votes, but on condition the majority included at least one-third of votes from each of the entities.

In a similar way, a state presidency would be formed. Its decisions would be adopted by a majority vote. However, if one-third of the members assessed that an adopted decision was aimed against the vital interests of one entity, then the entire case immediately goes to the parliament of the entity whose representatives were dissatisfied with the outcome of the voting in the presidency.

The government would function in much the same way.

The state would have a constitutional court which would decide on questions from the domain of the constitution.

Foreign policy of the joint state would fall under the competence of the presidency, but the two sides were left to negotiate how it would function, but must adhere to the above mentioned constitutional principles.

Bosnian Government, Serb Leaders View Accord

Guarantees Sought

AU2709110095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 27 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has stated that the agreement reached in New York last night will protect Bosnia-Herzegovina democracy. However, at the same time he has invited the United States to give guarantees that would prevent Karadzic's Serbs from seceding from Bosnia-Herzegovina and acceding to Serbia.

Conditions Still Not Met

*AU2609214595 Paris AFP in English
2125 GMT 26 Sep 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Sept 26 (AFP)—Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic poured cold water on Tuesday's agreement [26 September] among the warring factions in Bosnia, saying it was only "on paper" and must be subject to stiff conditions.

The agreement enshrines the concept of an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina and calls for "free and democratic elections," but Sacirbegovic said this depended entirely on conditions being met for holding those elections.

Sacirbegovic maintained that suspected war criminals among the Bosnian Serbs, including top military and political leaders, must be handed over to the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague before elections can be held.

"Until these war criminals are delivered to justice in The Hague, we will not have the basis for free elections, for democratic processes," Sacirbegovic told journalists after the agreement was announced.

He specifically cited Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and army commander Ratko Mladic.

"As long as they're around there is no freedom ... (and) no conditions for free elections," Sacirbegovic said. "These people are a threat to any peace agreement that will be signed."

But top U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke stressed that the question of war criminals had not been covered in the pact.

"We made it clear that that was not a part of today's discussions," Holbrooke said.

Sacirbegovic said conditions in which to hold elections "will take a long time." Nonetheless, he said he welcomed the agreement to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state.

"This is an accomplishment because at least it envisages on paper (that) ... there will be democracy," he said. "One positive point clearly on the basis of these documents is that we are establishing the institutions which will hold Bosnia-Herzegovina together rather than dissolve it," he said.

"Ultimately the most telling moment will be when it comes time to implement the agreement."

Karadzic Generally Positive

LD2609232795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2245 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 26 September (TANJUG)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, has stated that the agreement on the constitutional setup of the future Bosnian state, which was approved in New York this evening, represents "a step further in the direction of peace and is confirmation of the existence of the Serb Republic, as well as of the equality of the Serb people with other peoples in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

SRNA reports that Karadzic assessed in his first official reaction that the New York agreement represents "the further affirmation of the principle adopted in Geneva on 8 September which is based on respect for realities and the equality of the Serb Republic and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, as well as respect for the fact of the existence of three nations in this area."

The Serb Republic president added that "it will not be easy for all those who are for the continuation of the war to annul the results of the conference up to now."

Karadzic assessed that very soon a political solution was to be expected which would perhaps be painful for all three sides in the conflict but that the values that peace would bring with it would prevail.

Issues Regarding 'Authority'

AU2709085395 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The chairman of the Assembly of the Serb Republic, Momcilo Krajisnik, has stated that the framework of today's meeting in New York was coordinated in the diplomatic contacts with international and U.S. mediators and that the Serb side will not let any surprises happen.

In the statement for Serb Radio and Television, Krajisnik specified that in these consultations constitutional principles were elaborated on the basis of the principles established by the Geneva Agreement. In the elaboration of internal organization, special attention should be paid to the issues regarding what will come under the competence of the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what the authority of republics—the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim Federation—will include, said Krajisnik, and added that, in the diplomatic contacts, the Serb side insisted on the observance of the basic Geneva Agreement.

Regarding the reproaches about the Serbs accepting the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a compromise for a favorable territorial solution, Krajisnik said that the position of the Serb side is clear, and that this compromise serves the interests of the Serb people.

We believe that a peaceful solution can be reached only through negotiations, and there have to be some compromises in negotiations, said Krajisnik, emphasizing that the situation is being complicated by the increasing dissatisfaction of the Croats and Muslims and their offensive against the Serb Republic. The Assembly chairman stated that this is why the possibility of a continuation of the war [words indistinct] has become dangerously close. However, Chairman Krajisnik stated that he believes the peace process will not fail.

Concern With 'One' Government

MS2709093995 London BBC Television Network in English 2130 GMT 26 Sep 95

[Interview with Misha Gavrilovic, Bosnian Serb spokesman at the London Serbian Information Center, by presenter Peter Snow in London; from the "Newsnight" program—live]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Snow] This certainly doesn't look, does it, like any kind of really independent Serb republic that the Bosnian Serbs will have?

[Gavrilovic] No it doesn't. We have to be quite clear where the objectives, however, of the Bosnian Serbs are. It is quite simply physical preservation in a state where they're the indigenous population and they know what had happened in neighboring Croatia. A quarter of a million people ethnically cleansed in the most massive operation, and those by the way, by the United States, and that was called a move to peace. The critical aspect for the Bosnian Serbs is quite simply to preserve themselves in Bosnia, to have guarantees to be able to have their own institutions. That is going to be the critical aspect of this.

[Snow] But one central government, one parliament, one all-Bosnian parliament, one foreign policy, one constitutional court, one Bosnia within it's existing international borders, all that is compatible, is it, with the kind of Bosnian Serb republic that you want?

[Gavrilovic] Well on the paper of it it would not appear to be compatible, but we have to flush it out in detail because we have—we're supposed to have two entities there—the Moslem Croat entity and the Bosnian Serbian entity. If they are treated in an equal way in the constitution, and this has to be flushed out, then this is a different matter. In fact a similar situation has been accepted almost two years ago by the Bosnian Serbs.

[Snow] Now what's your own view, is it, do you think, credible in the real world that Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Moslem parliamentarians will sit down in this planned, shared all-Bosnian parliament, together?

[Gavrilovic] It depends how much power this parliament has, I mean if you take it from Bosnian Serbian point of view at the moment, well they have no representation whatsoever. Bosnia has been an all-Moslem affair for the last three-and-a-half years, all the representatives have been Moslem from the Prime Minister to the President, the Foreign Minister and so on. If there is a rotational presidency as was the case in former Yugoslavia there is a possibility here of the Serbs getting their voice in as well. I'm certainly looking forward to a Serbian President also of this outfit, and see him being accepted by the other two sides.

Bildt Says Talks Will Focus Next on Cease-Fire

MS2709090395 London BBC Television Network in English 2130 GMT 26 Sep 95

[Interview with Carl Bildt, UN special envoy to former Yugoslavia, by presenter Peter Snow; Bildt in New York, Snow in London; from the "Newsnight" program—Live]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Snow] How close, Mr Bildt, are you now do you believe, to a final settlement?

[Bildt] Well I think we have quite some distance to go. We did some substantial work in Geneva on September 8, we've done some substantial additional work in New York today. But the more we do, I think, the more we become aware of the magnitude of the talks that is there ahead of us.

[Snow] Why have you not managed to get a cease-fire?

[Bildt] Well I think the focus of the efforts leading up to the meeting here today has been on the constitutional issues. I think the focus will now shift both to the cease-fire issues and to the economic issues, and we're going to work in parallel with those issues during the coming week. And I would very much hope that it would be possible to receive a cessation of hostilities within the—say the next ten days, because I think the conditions are right for it, and I think we've reached a stage in the peace process where it would be somewhat bizarre to have the parties continuing fighting in the way that they have been doing in the past few weeks.

[Snow] Right, lets look at the constitutional issues you've agreed upon. Now are you confident that the Bosnian Serbs will accept them, after all they are only represented at your talks, aren't they, by the Foreign Minister of former Yugoslavia—Serbia?

[Bildt] Yes I am. We've been having indirect contacts with them, and they were of course represented within the Serbian delegation here today. They have no difficulties, I would say with what has been agreed here today. Then of course there's a lot of things that have not yet been agreed that needs to be agreed in terms of say—responsibility for foreign trade, international economic relations, the monetary system, those sort of things, and that is going to be, to put it mildly, somewhat more difficult in the weeks ahead.

[Snow] Yes but do you really think it's credible, thinking of the Bosnian Serbs with their demands for their Republika Srpska. Do you really think it's credible after all this bloodshed, that they will be able to sit down in an all-Bosnian parliament shared between them and the Croats and Moslems?

[Bildt] Well they are going to have their own parliament—so will the federation have, and I would expect that most issues, the vast majority of the issues that we normally consider parliamentary business will be conducted by these two parliaments of the two entities, Republika Srpska and the Federation. They Bosnia-Herzegovina parliament is going to deal with the legislation that is necessary to fulfill the functions that are there for the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities. They are so far only foreign policy, but it needs to be more—foreign trade, international economic relations, monetary system, border control, customs, but it's only those issues that are going to be the subject for the decisionmaking of this parliament that we'll be discussing here today.

[Snow] So how independent, in a word, how independent is the Serb Republic really going to be?

[Bildt] Well it's going to be entirely independent in all of the questions that are going to be dealt with solely by the two entities, but is not going to be independent on the issues that are going to be dealt with by the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities, be that the Presidency, be that their own parliament. So far we've only managed to agree that foreign policy is going to be the responsibility of Bosnia-Herzegovina in contrast to the two entities. But there will be the need to add further issues to the list of the questions to be dealt with by the Presidency and by their own parliament.

[Snow] Right, now if you can yet through all the rest of it, if you can get through the agreement on division of territory, and so on and so forth, is it definitely the case that American troops will go in there and help to police the settlement?

[Bildt] Well you'll have to ask the American's about that, but President Clinton addressed that question when he spoke in the White House a couple of hours ago, and he said that the United States has been committed from the very start of this process to sending ground troops in order to help implement a peace settlement, that it is only after we have a settlement that they are ready to commit those ground troops.

SDA Official Comments on Geneva Talks

AU2409183695 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 21-28 Sep 95 pp 20-21

[Interview with Edhem Bicakcic, vice president of the Party of Democratic Action, by Hajdar Arifagic; place and date not given: "The Federation Will Conquer Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] it is believed that the Geneva talks are only one of a number of steps in the long peace process which is ahead of us. Although the results of the Geneva talks have not been verified, this party estimates it to be a big triumph of the Bosnia-Herzegovina diplomacy. Edhem Bicakcic, vice president of the SDA, explains why:

[Bicakcic] For the first time we have been given the right to 51 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Arifagic] The public interprets the results of the Geneva talks in various ways, but the basic question posed in the commentaries is when will there be peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Bicakcic] Most people I had contacts with see the Geneva messages as a relief and a way to peace, or a ray of hope that peace is possible. But peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina will really come true only when the balance of powers is established. Without it, there is no peace. That balance can be established with continued strikes by NATO forces, until Serb artillery and tanks are reduced to the number the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army possesses. Lifting of the embargo against the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will be a necessary measure. Until these two things are combined, it is not realistic to expect that Karadzic's Serbs will accept peace.

Therefore we still have to warn of danger, and tell the people to be cautious. Regardless of the fact that after Geneva peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina has a great chance, we have to continue strengthening our army in order to be prepared to guard the peace once it is reached.

[Arifagic] So, peace remains the main question in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Geneva principles significantly determine its destiny. What, in your opinion, is the most important message from those principles?

[Bicakcic] That is definitely the decision to maintain the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an internationally recognized, sovereign state. The fact that it consists of two constitutive entities does not have to be too important. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina consisted of three nations, it was a constitutive part of former Yugoslavia, but it was not a sovereign state. Recalling that, I also wish to point out that concerning the Serb entity it is now important that it remains firmly bound within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that in the Geneva paper there is nothing which would allow Serbs a possibility to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Arifagic] But, according to the "celebrations" on the Serb side, they obviously do not think that way.

[Bicakcic] They have no reason for that, unless they celebrate Geneva like all their defeats, like the Battle of Kosovo. If that is how they celebrate it, then they really have reason for that.

[Arifagic] What is the role of the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in light of proposed principles, and what will be the attitude of the SDA?

[Bicakcic] The parliament will verify that document, and, on the basis of 12 elements for the peace plan proposed by the president of presidency, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, consider the platform for future negotiations. After it has listened to the report of the foreign minister, the parliament will define that document, leaving room for our delegation to bring the peace talks to an end.

[Arifagic] There is an impression that the biggest problem in the final definition of the destiny of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be the demarcation of territories. There is fear that the whole project might come into doubt once that issue is reached. What is your prognosis?

[Bicakcic] For the Contact Group plan, and the map of demarcations, it was told at the very beginning that minor corrections were possible. That is what we have to start from in determining territories on which those changes are necessary. For us it is important that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will leave not one step of the liberated territory. That territory can only be expanded in all directions. Practically that means that Gorazde remains on the Drina, and our diplomatic efforts will primarily be directed to Brcko, as our first priority, then Doboj, and then the expansion of the territories from Visegrad, Sanski Most, the Sarajevo surroundings.

[Arifagic] When you speak about Sarajevo, how big is the Sarajevo you have in mind, and what is it like?

[Bicakcic] Without including the whole of Sarajevo in the federation there are no conditions for the territorial demarcation. Sarajevo must be completely open, with a railway and roads leading both to the north and to the south, with Mt. Trebevic as a recognizable part of the city. I am not sure whether Jahorina will be a part of that Sarajevo. Which does not mean that we renounce Jahorina.

[Arifagic] The Geneva meeting represents a new affirmation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. How ready is the federation to finalize the peace process?

[Bicakcic] Once again it has been proven that the federation is a strategic interest of Bosniaks and Croats, and that they can get more when they act together. That means that in the coming period we have to do much more about the implementation of the federation in order to bring that process to an end. There are new winds from the Croatian side concerning that. It might happen that because of too many political events this fall that concept will not be given as much space as it deserves. I will personally do my best for the development of that model, because, as Geneva has shown, it leads to further consolidation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Arifagic] In your opinion, is there any danger of a disintegration of the federation, after the demarcation with the Serb entity?

[Bicakcic] I do not think that the Croats will go in the direction of the disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The federation has been proven to be possible. Psychological barriers have been overcome, there is no more robbery on the roads, there is a rather big freedom of movement of people and goods on the territory of the federation, apart from the western part of Mostar and in Stolac, of course. But I hope that the obstructions will be removed there as well.

[Arifagic] Can you explain the destiny of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Bicakcic] There is no Bosnia-Herzegovina without Serb people, and no realistic politician is fooled by the idea that a Bosnia-Herzegovina without Serbs would be possible. But the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina have to understand that Bosnia-Herzegovina is their state, that their state is not across the Drina River, but on this side of the Drina, and that the Drina will remain the border regardless of all the aspirations to erase it as such.

[Arifagic] In that context, what will happen to the amendment of the Serb Civic Council to the constitution of the federation, i.e. their request to make them a constituent people in the federation?

[Bicakcic] There is no chance of that amendment being adopted before a final peace solution is achieved in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Arifagic] Refugees are particularly interested in the continuation of the peace process, because in that way their own destiny is being solved as well. Do you have any message for them in that sense?

[Bicakcic] The federation has shown that it is possible to bring back trust among the people, and to create conditions for their return to their homes. Unfortunately it will be harder to reach that process on the occupied territories, but it will definitely happen.

Presidency Member Views U.S. Visit, Banja Luka

AU2709094095 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Sep 95 p 11

[Interview with Mirko Pejanovic, a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and chairman of the Serbian Civil Council, by Slobodan Pavlovic in Washington; date not given: "Washington's Battle for Banja Luka"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "It appears to us that it was a useful meeting, useful for both sides," White House Spokesman David Johnson said on Wednesday [20 September], after a 40-minute meeting between Clinton's national security adviser, Anthony Lake, and the four-member delegation of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This group, which arrived in Washington and which the official statement for the press says is made up of four members of the Presidency and "other respectable and influential Bosnians, loyal to the democratic and multinational government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina," consists of: Stjepan Kljuic (member of the Presidency and founder of the Republican Party), Ivo Komsic (member of the Presidency and chairman of the Croatian Peasant's Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina), Tatjana Ljuic-Mijatovic (member of the Presidency and representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the United Nations in Vienna), Mirko Pejanovic (member of the Presidency and chairman of the Serbian Civil Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina [SGV]), Jovan Divjak (former deputy chief of the General Staff of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and founder of the charity Education Builds Bosnia-Herzegovina), Zarko Bulic (SGV deputy chairman), Mico Rakic (SGV member) and Ivan Lovrenovic (member of the Croatian People's Council).

Promises Against "Partition"

The five-day Washington agenda was quite extensive, the highlights of which were the meetings at the White House and Capitol Hill, where their hosts were Anthony Lake, one of Clinton's closest aides, on 19 September, and Robert Dole, leader of the Republican majority in the Senate and probable Republican presidential candidate in the 1996 elections, on 20 September. Pejanovic talked with NASA BORBA about those meetings and everything else that brought them to Washington and preoccupied them during this visit.

[Pavlovic] The topic of the day is Banja Luka and Holbrooke's peace mission. At the moment, while you are in Washington, the situation is getting red-hot. How do you view that, what did you tell the Americans, and what did you hear from them, apart from what has been stated for the public?

[Pejanovic] We expect that the decision on calling off military operations will be observed, and that—particularly in view of what has happened in the last 10 days or so—the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina will realize what a tragic situation the Pale regime has put them in. In that regard, we have sent from here (on behalf of the SGV) an appeal to the Serb people in the Bosnian Krajina that, we hope, will reach the public through NASA BORBA. We are trying to resolve the major problem—how to separate the Serb people in Bosnia from the Pale regime, which has caused such misfortune and that has expelled 500,000 Serbs from Bosnia so far.

[Pavlovic] What do you expect from the Americans?

[Pejanovic] The most important thing is that Mr. Lake has given us assurances that the United States is resolved not to accept the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is how the U.S. peace initiative was interpreted in the public. Lake has discussed the plan with us in detail. Additionally, Peter Tarnoff and Charles Thomas of the State Department talked with us about their endeavor to preserve the multinational existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, about the necessity to be patient now regarding further negotiations, about how important it is to implement what has been agreed upon, and what is expected to be agreed upon. On one point we have agreed immediately and fully—that without the return of refugees there is no real settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Pavlovic] What will happen with western Bosnia and how will the situation develop regard Banja Luka?

[Pejanovic] The liberation actions undertaken by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina are in progress, and that is a new, very important moment in the current situation. However, there remains a major, insolvable problem: What is to be done with the people, now when the Pale regime is losing, and when its army is sustaining defeats?

[Pavlovic] How are those unfortunate people to be helped, and how great a danger is there that the collapse of Krajina will repeat itself in western Bosnia?

[Pejanovic] We think it is possible to prevent it in two ways. One is to call off further military operations, and the second is to instill trust among the local populace and authorities by all means available, in order to make talks with the representatives of the legal authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina possible. That means that those local bodies of authority should turn to themselves, show peace and mutual trust toward their neighbors, and show a readiness to establish social relations, independent of legal relations. That is what we have demanded in our appeal. The problem is how to overcome that psychological barrier, to make the people feel like citizens of that town, region, and state.... For that, of course, it is necessary to have guarantees from the international community, in the form of observers, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] forces, that will protect and separate civilians from military activities, and, in such a way, prevent an exodus. We have proposed this here in Washington.

Preventing Serb Exodus

[Pavlovic] How realistic and feasible is that given the current situation, after almost three and a half years of war?

[Pejanovic] To a certain degree, it is realistic.... There are some possibilities there. In my opinion, the major problem now is to overcome the psychological barriers that came about because of distrust, hate, and the sowing of that hate.

[Pavlovic] Are there any indications that support your optimism about this appeal?

[Pejanovic] Yes, there are. The international community will have to measure the diplomatic balance in Bosnia, the balance that would mean the signatures and cooperativeness on the part of those who have led those people in crime. If not their personal signatures, a signature will be certainly obtained through Milosevic. Right now, for us in the SGV, any help we get is significant. In April, Milosevic avoided receiving our delegation in Belgrade, but now it would be very important to establish contact through him, because the Pale gang has lost its legitimacy among the people. Now the only thing they can do is threaten the people: "Run, or else the ustashas will slaughter you!" And for that reason, some new modes of the legitimacy of life and representation in the state must be found.

[Pavlovic] Do you think you can be that link with the Serb people in Bosnia?

[Pejanovic] We are that link. First, psychologically, because we live in cities together with the Croats and Bosniaks, we take part in the authorities, at least to a degree, and we have our own influence. We have legitimized ourselves in the eyes of the international community, which has made it possible for us, even now, from Washington, to send a message to Butrus Butrus-Ghali and Generals Janvier and Smith, in which we ask for their help in protecting the citizens of Banja Luka and other cities from military activities and preventing a new exodus of the Serb people. We have also let them know that our desire is that the Serb people remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because there can be no stable future for Bosnia-Herzegovina or peace in the region without the Serb people. We have repeated this here as well, to the Americans, in all the talks we have held. In the talks with Lake, we were asked a concrete question: How is the situation in Bosnian Krajina to be resolved? Our answer was: Call off the military action in order to prevent the fall of Banja Luka. Because, if Banja Luka falls, nobody knows what will follow. Perhaps after that, there will no longer be a peace process at all. On the other hand, we are concerned about the information from our sources that such an end may nevertheless be expected, that such a decision has already been approved by Belgrade!?

[Pavlovic] Would it be a surprise for you? Just remember Tudjman's napkin map in London and everything else that happened thereafter—Krajina and such things.

[Pejanovic] We are told that such a scenario has already been passed in Belgrade.... It is one of the major problems what will happen there....

[Pavlovic] We hear from U.S. sources that here, in Washington, you have discussed your possible involvement in further peace negotiations on Bosnia?

[Pejanovic] Yes, we have, but that is nothing new. We have been demanding that all the time, and we have only renewed our demand at the meeting with Lake and other U.S. Administration officials. For the time being, however, our demand, that a representative of the SGV takes part in the Serb delegation in the negotiations under Holbrooke's arbitration, will not be fulfilled.

The essence of our demand is clear to them, but.... It is clear that the SGV, by its existence, neutralizes the existence of the Pale regime as the exclusive representative of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course, it is clear to everybody how significant that is....

Serbs "Still Very Strong"

In the nine-member delegation of the Serb and Croat Bosnians that is visiting Washington, retired Gen. Jovan Divjak is the greatest authority on the current military operations in western Bosnia-Herzegovina and the possibility of the fall of Banja Luka.

"I think that one should not expect a pullout from Banja Luka's defense positions or the situation we had in Knin and Krajina in general," Divjak says, pointing out that the military forces of the Pale regime are still very strong in equipment and arms. "It is enough to know that they have over 400 tanks, and we have only 70. The offensive has subsided, and now political pressure is being applied to them. They have fortified their defense line, which is now being reinforced by heavy weapons withdrawn from around Sarajevo," Divjak says.

Ejup Ganic To Resume Political Duties on 27 Sep

LD2609204095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dr. Ejup Ganic, after a lengthy absence owing to injuries suffered in a car crash, has returned to Bosnia. Starting tomorrow, Ganic takes over his post in the republic's presidency and in the presidency of the federation. The Bosnia-Herzegovina TV cameras recorded his arrival in Fojnica, and our reporter took the opportunity to have a conversation with him which we are broadcasting in full. For our part we also sincerely welcome Dr Ganic back.

[Unidentified correspondent] Sometime before 1500 [1400 GMT] a UN helicopter carrying Dr. Ejup Ganic, a member of the presidency and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, landed at the Fojnica helidrome, where he was given an exceptionally warm welcome.

The first to welcome him back and wish him a speedy recovery was Bakir Alispahic, the interior minister, and after this his hosts and representatives of the central Bosnian canton did the same. After this, numerous Fojnica citizens greeted him and he arrived on foot at the republic's center for medical rehabilitation, where he is to spend the coming period recuperating, and at the same time he will be playing an active part in the political life of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In his office we asked him to talk to us specially for Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio-TV:

[Begin recording] [unidentified correspondent] Mr. Ganic, this is your return. We wish you a happy return and a rapid recovery and I would ask you: You are returning to your political activities. What are your priorities? We have been waiting for you for a long time, but you have been away?

[Ganic] Above all, in the presidency we have important decisions to take. These relate to the future of our state, the consolidation of our state and here I will try to [words indistinct]. I am now working and making my contribution.

However, one of the [word indistinct] tasks is the development of the federation. [words indistinct] in an organized, honest [word indistinct] and we must not allow any negative aspects. We must move forward. We must develop the state from within. So these tasks of the federation are very important. I previously worked on this. We must speed up our work on all problems.

As regards the global strategy of the protection of our state and the negotiations—in this area, too, I shall try to make my contribution, as I have done hitherto.

Naturally, there are many other matters which we must resolve as we go along. However, I stress that the strengthening of the federation and the development of the federation [word indistinct] task. We must move more rapidly here. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Mladic Says Aggression Against Serbs Continues

LD2609165095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1632 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Sept 26 (TANJUG)—The chief of staff of the Bosnian Serb Army General Ratko Mladic said at a press conference Tuesday in Banja Luka that calm prevailed at all frontlines in Bosnian Serb Republic except in its western part.

The aggression of Croatian and Muslim forces on Serbs in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina continues, Mladic said, expressing conviction that the NATO attacks and the Croatian-Muslim offensive on the Bosnian Serb state had been prepared for a long time with the aim of changing the balance of power to the detriment of Bosnian Serbs.

They have chosen the military option as they had failed in their diplomatic moves, but they probably did not really wish such moves to succeed, Mladic said.

Mladic also disclosed that 152 civilians had been killed and 273 injured in the 3,200 sorties of NATO aircraft, which dropped 10,000 tons of bombs.

Mladic described as unreasonable the Muslim demands for the demilitarization of Banja Luka and their threats of fresh offensives, explaining that Bosnian Serb Army was fighting to defend the homes of the Serb people and that it relied on its own potentials and on the strength of the people.

Every war eventually ends in peace, and it is logical that this war will also end, as its continuation can only bring about more trouble, Mladic said.

Bosnian Serbs have for a long time been proposing a cessation of hostilities as a step towards peace throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and providing opportunities to all sides to resolve all issues in another manner, but unfortunately to no avail, Mladic said.

General Mladic recalled that over 50,000 troops pretending to be Bosnian Croat or Muslim forces were taking part in the aggression on the Bosnian Serb Republic.

About 5,000 civilians were killed in this aggression, and 125,000 people were expelled while the world community watched. Serbs used to comprise 90 percent of the population of Grahovo, Glamoc and Drvar municipalities, he recalled.

The international comunity had given guarantees for the safety of the Serb people in their own state in Bosnia, but has not fulfilled its promise. This resulted in ethnic cleansing of unprecedented scale in this century, Mladic concluded.

Mladic Gives Assurances on Defense of Banja Luka

AU2709084795 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Sep 95

[Interview with Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic by Milka Tosic in Banja Luka on 26 September—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Tosic] After the press conference in Banja Luka, we asked Lieutenant General Mladic, commander of the General Staff of the Army of the Serb Republic, to comment for Serb Radio on the situation on the front in the western part of the Serb Republic, from Knezevo to Novi Grad [Bosanski Novi].

[Mladic] I would like to [passage indistinct] all the people of Krajina [passage indistinct], but the forces are not as strong as the propaganda [passage indistinct], but I trust our people and our army, and we will defend our areas. We have to fight.

[Tosic] We received the information today that the 2d Krajina Corps has been consolidated.

[Mladic] Everything will be consolidated, do not worry. The more they attack us, the more [word indistinct] and stronger we are.

[Tosic] What would be your message to the people in this area, considering the fact that the frontline is approaching the area?

[Mladic] There is no room for fear since, in some of the towns, the frontline cuts through houses, and yet the people have been fighting bravely and with great determination for four years now. Banja Luka should not worry, and neither should the Serb Republic, since we will, as we have done so far in various trials, come out as winners, and we will defend our people as well as protect our territory.

[Tosic] Thank you very much.

UN Concerned About Plan To Relocate Refugees

AU2609122095 Paris AFP in English 0134 GMT 26 Sep 95

[By Francoise Michel]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Sept 26 (AFP)—A joint Croatian-Bosnian plan to send tens of thousands of Bosnian refugees in Croatia back to occupy land recently conquered from the Bosnian Serbs has upset humanitarian agencies.

Some 100,000 people are affected, half the refugees in Croatia, from a score of towns in Bosnia-Hercegovina, including Bihac, Jajce, Travnik, Donji Vakuf, Maglaj and Grahovo.

Most of the towns were captured from the Bosnian Serbs earlier this month in a joint offensive by Croatian and Bosnian government troops that sent thousands of their Serb occupants fleeing.

The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva said Monday that some were still very close to the front lines and many were believed to be heavily mined.

Western officials said the aim was clearly to fill the reconquered territories with their former Moslem and Croat inhabitants who had fled the Serb advance up to three years ago, ahead of international talks on drawing the boundaries between the communities.

Bosnia is to be effectively divided between a "Serb Republic" and a joint Croat-Moslem federation while remaining officially a single state, under an agreement recently sealed in Geneva.

"They are killing two birds with one stone: getting rid of the refugees and strengthening the newly-conquered areas," a humanitarian expert commented.

But aid agencies expressed immediate concern at Monday's announcement by Zagreb of the mass repatriations of up to half the some 200,000 refugees in Croatia.

They said it was premature, since no peace settlement had been reached and the fighting in Bosnia was not over, and called for the decision to be reversed.

"The time has not yet come for reasons of safety and security," said UNHCR representative Alemka Lisinski here.

United Nations spokesman Christopher Gunness said UN officials were "extremely concerned at the prospect of a mass repatriation of refugees given the unstable situation in Bosnia."

"It would not be an appropriate action at this time. The UN believes that repatriation of refugees should take place in the context of an overall peace settlement," he added.

Two weeks ago Croatia began sending back more than 2,000 refugees who had just been expelled from Banja Luka by the occupying Serbs in retaliation for the capture by Zagreb's forces of the rebel Croatian Serb-held enclave of Krajina.

The Moslems were dispatched to Bihac and the Croats to Glamoc, a town which had been cleared of its Serb majority population after Croatian forces captured it in July.

The UNHCR said refugees questioned by its staff said they were being resettled against their will in places which were not their home. Some said they had relatives in camps in Croatia and a few had valid entry papers for third countries.

"These population transfers are totally reprehensible. These people are in a state of shock, not knowing what is happening to them," said a humanitarian organisation official.

"They are being used politically to mark out territory."

UN High Commissioner Sadako Ogata said in Geneva, "I am extremely concerned by this announcement, which could mean the forced return of tens of thousands of people to an area that is not prepared to receive them."

The UNHCR said Zagreb would also be in violation of the 1951 Geneva convention on the status of refugees, which Croatia had signed.

Bugojno Croats Say Authorities Obstructing Return

AU2609205895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the liberation of Donji Vakuf, the greatest number of Bosniak refugees accommodated in Croatian houses and apartments are returning to their villages. The majority of them are sending messages to the owners of the houses and apartments—Bugojno Croats—wanting them to return their house keys. This is commendable and has elicited great pleasure and awakened the hopes of our refugees regarding the normalization of relations and the possibility of coexistence. The hope, however, lasts only until the return to Bugojno, reads the statement of the Bugojno Municipal Council based in Livno. B-H PRESS reports the statement:

The official Bugojno authorities are not allowing Bugojno Croats to return to their homes and are moving new refugees from eastern Bosnia into their houses and apartments, say the Bugojno refugees of Croatian nationality. This is contrary to all Federation documents. If the Bosniaks are truly our allies and after the Washington Agreement and particularly after the Split Declaration they are, then everything must be done to implement these documents in practice. The first prerequisite for this is the return of refugees to their homes. Bugojno is one of the few municipalities in the Federation in which more than a year later, an interim municipal council, pursuant to the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has still not been set up, reads the statement of the Bugojno Municipal Council based in Livno.

HVO Reportedly Hindering Return of Refugees

AU2609184595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Sep 95

[Report by Nada al-Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] Why has the Republic of Croatia, without consulting and agreeing with the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, unilaterally decided to revoke hospitality for refugees and expelled persons from the Federation and the newly liberated areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina? I tried to find an answer in the Croatian Government Office for Refugees and Expelled Persons, where I asked for a statement by the office head, Dr. Adalbert Rebic. However, the short answer was: There will be no statements today, they cannot be made, and everything will be disclosed at a press conference next week.

Why not until next week? Panic has already spread among the people whose refugee status has been revoked. They have been crossed out on refugee lists in refugee camps. What if their food rations are also cut? Returning to Bosnia needs to be prepared because some places, although free, have been razed to the ground and there are no living conditions. I shall give only one example although there are many: Bosanska Krupa, for example, is as damaged as Vukovar or eastern Mostar. This was stated by B-H Refugee Minister Muharem Cero after visiting the town. However, there are also problems with the Bosniaks' return to newly liberated Bosnia-Herzegovina towns. People are being turned back, their return is being prevented.

Yesterday and today, the B-H Embassy's refugee department in Zagreb has been swamped by telephone calls from Bosniaks who stated their full names and said that they had been turned back when attempting to return to Jajce, for example. They are being turned back by the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] with the explanation that Jajce is a war zone. According to the same sources, representatives of the town's civilian authorities, who had been refugees, have also been turned back. Or a third example: A group of Bosniak refugees from Jajce who had been in Zenica also attempted to return to their homes, but they were all turned back. This is what these people claim in their telephone calls to the B-H Embassy in Zagreb.

It is curious that in the Croatian Office for Refugees and Expelled Persons they have nothing to say, or rather do not wish to say anything, about all this. They should have something to say, because the repatriation decision never mentions Mostar or Zepce. Why are people being turned back when they attempt to return to Jajce?

Official Calls For Federation Authority in Jajce

AU2609162595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Croatian Defense Council [HVO], and Croatian Army combat activities have led to the complete liberation of the Jajce Municipality; over 17,000 Bosniaks and 15,000 Croats lived in the area before the aggression. This is stated in a letter send by Jajce Municipal Chairman Enver Sabic to Kresimir Zubak, president of Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

Prompted by the fact that the HVO and the Croatian Army currently control the greatest part of the Jajce Municipality, I call on you, Mr. President, Chairman Sabic writes, to implement the process of establishing the Federation, which both the Bosniak and Croatian sides are striving for, in Jajce. It is your and our obligation to establish a single authority organized according to the Federation Constitution. The realization of the [words indistinct] is the fact that the Croats and Bosniaks did not engage in any mutual conflict during the aggression on Jajce. The municipality and the town have enough housing to allow for the return of the expelled citizens. This May, an interim municipal government was set up in accordance with the Federation Constitution and with the full agreement of the Bosniaks and Croats, reads the letter send by Jajce Municipal Chairman Enver Sabic to Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak.

Sarajevo Mayor Makes Appeal to Serbs in Suburbs

AU2609203795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tarik Kupusovic and Ante Zelic, chairman and deputy chairman of the Sarajevo Municipal Assembly, have addressed the citizens of Grbavica, Hadzici, Trnovo, Vogosca, Ilidza, Ilijas, Pale, and other parts of the city temporarily controlled by the aggressor.

Sarajevo is slowly approaching a period that will be characterized by intense renovation and reconstruction, a period of foreign capital investment, and finally, the comprehensive revival of an integral Sarajevo. In this process, all Sarajevo citizens will be given the chance for a fresh beginning and a better life in their city, states the appeal.

It is time for you to prepare for the process of reintegration into an integral and joint Sarajevo, and to reject those who are trying, with arms and force, to impose on you the Greater Serbian idea of all Serbs in one state and only Serbs in this state. This idea has only brought suffering, pain, and tears. We want to abolish artificial borders and enjoy a free and open city. Sarajevans do not want honorable Sarajevo Serbs, who are living under Karadzic's and Mladic's control, to meet the fate of their countrymen from the Croatian and Bosnian Krajinas. We are certain that you are mature enough to see what sort of a future awaits you if you forget that you are a Sarajevo citizen. What your leaders, who have been indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal, are offering you will bring the continuation of suffering and a completely uncertain future.

Sarajevo citizens, yesterday's neighbors are ready to give you a chance, while the legitimate city authorities will secure for you equal positions, so that you can start a new, happier, and economically more secure joint existence in the integral city. This is stated in the appeal addressed to the citizens of Grbavica, Hadzici, Trnovo, Vogosca, Ilidza, Ilijas, Pale, and other parts of the city under the aggressor's temporary control, by the Sarajevo city authorities.

President Izetbegovic Welcomes Released POW's

AU2609153095 Paris AFP in English
1439 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Sept 26 (AFP)—Bosnian warring factions exchanged 34 prisoners of war Tuesday [26 September] on the neutral ground of the UN-controlled Sarajevo airport.

The Bosnian Government side released 17 Bosnian Serb soldiers from prisons in Sarajevo and Tarcin, while the Bosnian Serb side released 17 Bosnian soldiers who had been held in the eastern city of Foca.

Twelve of the government soldiers had been captured on the Treskavica mountain, south of Sarajevo, in July, according to Amor Masovic, the head of the Bosnian exchange commission.

After the prisoner exchange at midday, the released Bosnian soldiers were transported to the Bosnian presidency building where they were welcomed by President Alija Izetbegovic.

They were then driven to an army barracks in downtown Sarajevo where they were greeted by relatives who had been waiting all morning.

"I am waiting for my husband who was captured in Treskavica on July 2. I haven't seen him in four months, and our baby daughter is now six months old," said 30-year-old Ahir Hadzimuratovic.

The Bosnian prisoners in Foca were forced to work in a mine in nearby Miljevina, Masovic and relatives said.

"I haven't had any contact with my husband, not even through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who were not allowed to visit them in prison," Hadzimuratovic said.

About half thow waiting outside the barracks were disappointed.

"My brother, who was also captured on July 2, is not among the exchanged today, but I came to see his comrades and ask whether he is alive or not. The Bosnian Serb television said he was dead but I want to hear from his colleagues about his fate," said Hikmeta Ibrahimag, 48, wiping tears from her face.

The Bosnian Government side expects another 11 soldiers to be released soon, Masovic said.

Tudjman Denies Aspirations for Greater Croatia

LD2609161195 Paris TF-1 Television Network in French 1900 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatia's President Franjo Tudjman was received at the Elysee Palace by Jacques Chirac. He also had talks with Defense Minister Charles Millon.

This gives us the opportunity to talk about eastern Slavonia, which is currently held by the Serbs. Loick Berrou and Philippe Leroux followed him all day:

[Berrou] The conquering hero arrived at Orly airport this morning. Franjo Tudjman, who, for four years now, has been the president of a country amputated of one third of its territory, was able to celebrate with his soldiers in August this year the blitz reconquest of the Krajinas. This month, the Croatian Army built on its successes by crossing into Bosnian territory where it played a large part in the retreat of the Serb forces, so much so that the specter of a greater Croatia resurfaced:

[Begin Tudjman recording, in Croatian with superimposed French translation] No, this is sheer speculation. A greater Croatia is out of the question. It is true that 70 percent of the territories recently liberated in Bosnia were liberated by Croatian forces. The Bosnian Serbs now only occupy half the territory. This is our contribution to the peace plan that makes provision for 51 percent of the territory for the Croatian-Bosnian Federation, and 49 percent for the Serbs. [end recording]

[Berrou] Franjo Tudjman's priority, as he told Jacques Chirac, is Vukovar as well as eastern Slavonia, which he intends to recapture from the Serbs whether they like it or not. But the highly chaotic alliance with the Bosnian Muslims is also a major problem:

[Begin Tudjman recording] You know, it is rather the same problem as you have had in Algeria. Cohabitation between Muslims and Christians is always a bit difficult. It is our duty to integrate the Bosnian Muslims into European civilization, in order to prevent fundamentalist tendencies from developing there. [end recording]

[Berrou] Tonight, the Croatian president will enjoy the luxury of attending the signature of a highway building contract. In Croatia, the postwar period seems to have begun already.

Tudjman: Zagreb, Paris Agree End of War in Sight

LD2509234095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have received another report from Paris. One of the questions at [Tudjman's] press conference attracted the attention of all reporters: whether peace was close? This is what President of the Republic of Croatia Franjo Tudjman replied to this question and what he said about the purpose of his visit to France.

[Begin Tudjman recording] We could and we had to agree that we were nearing the end of the war crisis and that peace was within reach. The main international factors will still need brave wisdom as well as a determination to impose peace on those who would like to carry on waging war. When I say impose, I do not refer to war, as I believe that the international community has a powerful device, sanctions. Likewise, instead of the inefficient and ineffective peace force in the form of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] an effective NATO force should be sent there, or such international forces which would know what they want and what their purpose is.

As for your second question, about the purpose of my visiting President Chirac, I can tell you that we wanted, through this visit, to truly consolidate our comprehensive cooperation with France, thereby making it clear in this way, too, that Croatia is not unilaterally linked to any country in Europe, including Germany since you have mentioned it. It rather wants relations with the EU as a whole and with France in particular because since World War I, let us mention the Versailles Treaty, throughout all this time, and today, too, it plays a very important role in dealing with all European matters. Croatia really wants, we are glad to hear the same reply from the French side—comprehensive relations in every sphere of political, economic, cultural, scientific and sports life—in the interest of securing peace in the area of Yugoslavia, in the interest of developing not just bilateral relations but peace in entire Europe. [end recording]

Granic Seeks 'Quick' Solution on Territory Issues

LD2609085195 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade still refuses to accept an agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Srem as part of a comprehensive peace package, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic said last night after a meeting between the U.S. secretary of state and the foreign ministers of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Croatia told the meeting that Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Srem is a key issue and the American side gave us its full backing, Granic said. According to him, there have been some indications that the Serbs are prepared for certain compromise solutions; the Croatian Serbs from the area are more realistic and Milosevic is more flexible.

However, Croatia will not be satisfied with step-by-step solutions because it wants a quick, permanent solution enabling it to reintegrate the Croatian area, Granic said.

Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic said that he is not sure if the Bosnian delegation will attend a meeting of the foreign ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the Contact Group in New York today.

Serbia is demanding fresh concessions; we are not prepared to grant them and that is why there is a doubt whether the meeting will be held or not, Sacirbegovic said in New York last night.

Granic Comments on New York Achievements

LD2709000995 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2224 GMT 26 Sep 95

[Telephone interview with Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, in New York by Dubravko Merlic in Zagreb—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Merlic] Next this evening we have Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the government of the Republic of Croatia. Good evening, Mr Granic.

We have just shown our viewers clips and the statement of Richard Holbrooke on what was achieved in New York. Firstly, what is your assessment of what was achieved, of the document in which everyone is emphasizing the word "principles."

[Granic] These are indeed only principles. On the basis of these principles the future constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be founded. Today a step forward was achieved on the election of the presidency, government, parliament, and constitutional court, and on elections. However, this is still far from a final solution, but it is certainly a step forward. What remains to be completed, discussions still to be completed, cover the cease-fire, the maps, and of course the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina still has to be drawn up.

[Merlic] How strong was the desire of the Americans and the representatives of the Sarajevo government that Bosnia should remain undivided, and how strong was the desire of the Serbs to get the greatest possible degree of autonomy, independence of the so-called Serb Republic?

[Granic] These matters are well known and there is nothing new here. This is certainly a compromise but what was important for us was that with this solution it may be possible to find solutions for the protection of the interests of the Croatian people, naturally within the Federation and through the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that we can be satisfied with these solutions. The meeting was attended by Mr. Pogarcic in the capacity of deputy foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation.

[Merlic] Can you tell us in greater detail, if possible, why there were so many problems regarding the parliament and the presidency? How has it been resolved in practical terms in these principles?

[Granic] What was solved is that representation will be on the basis of a two-to-one ratio in favor of the Federation. This is what is important for us: that the Croats are treated as a constituent nation. On the other hand, the Bosniaks insisted that elections should be held as soon as possible and that this suprastructure should not be set up through representation, but that this should rather be done through elections [sentence as heard]. Elections should be held as soon as the OSCE mission establishes that all conditions have been met. Such a proposal was accepted in the end.

[Merlic] What is of greatest interest for Croatia is the issue of the currently occupied Croatian areas, eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem. There is only one sentence, but I think it is important. It says that in every future peace package the issue of occupied areas of Croatia will be of greatest importance. What does it mean?

[Granic] That is the key sentence. Numerous talks were conducted. Both bilateral and multilateral. I would primarily single out the talks with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. He confirmed the strategic partnership between the United States and the Republic of Croatia and also confirmed that the problem of peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem will be part of the entire package. This sentence reflects that position.

Not only this meeting, but also other meetings dealt with the problem of solving the issue of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem. There were many other important bilateral meetings in the presence of U.S. negotiators, with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, two meetings with Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic, and a number of meetings with U.S. negotiators, with Mr. Holbrooke in particular.

My opinion is that we can be pleased with the meeting today, and that we can feel a certain progress, i.e. that chances for a peaceful settlement exist—for the reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem within the framework of the entire peace process.

[Merlic] Did Croatia, by placing its signature on the document, tie its own hands with regard to being possibly prevented from solving the problem of occupied areas by military means. Were any deadlines mentioned?

[Granic] There was no mention of any deadlines. We are yet to start negotiations on a cease-fire. This document has been accepted, but we are yet to talk about a cease-fire.

[Merlic] Will Croatia accept—at the possible request from the international community, and in accordance with this global solution—that the problem of occupied areas of Croatia be resolved in the period of two to three years?

[Granic] Croatia will not accept any postponement of the solution. The solution has to be within the overall package; that means—if it comes to a peace conference, the problem of the reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, western Srem and mutual recognition by all the states must be resolved.

[Merlic] Mr. Granic, thank you very much.

[Granic] You are welcome.

General Tolj Warns of Another 'Storm' Operation

LD2609190195 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Chetnik terrorists based in occupied areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina—completely unprovoked—opened fire with Luna and Orkan rocket systems on the wider area of Kutina, Pozega, Ivanic Grad, Novska, Jasenovac, Zupanja, Nova Gradiska, and Kosutarica, wounding eight citizens. A five-year old girl and a 15-year-old boy are in a critical condition. Material damage is huge, says a communique released by the Political Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia adding:

The fact that exclusively civilian targets in urban areas came under attack clearly reveals Karadzic's terrorist intention to cause as many casualties as possible, wishing in that bestial way to boost morale of his disbanded hordes that are withdrawing in panic deeper into the occupied area.

It is beyond any doubt that the decision to use the rocket systems was adopted by the very top circles of Karadzic's political and military leadership, which is in line with a recent statement made by Radovan Karadzic, that he will use retaliatory weapons against the Republic of Croatia. This shows more than clearly the obvious hypocrisy of Serb politicians who have been trying to persuade the world diplomacy in Belgrade and in New York today that they urge a peaceful solution of the Bosnian crisis.

Today's terrorist act shows that the Serbs have not learned their lessons well from Bljesak [Flash], Ljeto 95' [Summer 95'], Oluja [Storm], and Maestral [Adriatic wind] and are continuing with provocations and trying to use terrorist methods to threaten Croatia's state territory, the lives of Croatian citizens, and inflict material damage in order to rebuild the self-confidence of the Greater Serbian policy that has suffered its definitive defeat.

Should they continue committing such crimes, the Serb losers must know that a Storm-like response will follow if an order to that effect is given to the Croatian Army, says the communique signed by Major General Ivan Tolj.

Developments in Refugee Repatriation Viewed

Bosnia Asks For Delay

AU2609122395 Paris AFP in English 1044 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Sept 26 (AFP)—Bosnia is hoping that Croatia's plan to repatriate some of the 200,000 Bosnian refugees here can be delayed until the area is safer, a Bosnian embassy spokesman said here Tuesday.

Zagreb had announced Monday that it would be sending back Bosnians from areas that used to be front-line towns but were now safer, as well as from areas that had been Serb-controlled but were retaken in offensives this month.

"There is an agreement in principle between Zagreb and Sarajevo (to send back the refugees) but we hope that this can be delayed until the situation in Bosnia stabilizes," said embassy spokesman Zejna Nametak.

Up to 100,000 of the Bosnian Croat and Moslem refugees in Croatia could be affected by the decision.

Humanitarian organizations objected to the decision, and called for the repatriation to be put off until the war ended because of the threat of further fighting. Croatian and UN authorities were to meet early Tuesday to discuss the issue.

UN: Zagreb Considering Delay

AU2609155695 Paris AFP in English 1502 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, Sept 26 (AFP)—The United Nations said Tuesday [26 September] nearly

300,000 people had been displaced in former Yugoslavia since July, and reiterated its call for Croatia to delay repatriation of tens of thousands of longer-term refugees from the Bosnian conflict.

"The United Nations remains seriously concerned about the decision of the Croatian government," UN spokesman Christopher Gunness told journalists, referring to Zagreb's announcement it would send an estimated 100,000 Moslem and Croat refugees back to Bosnia with "immediate effect."

Gunness said the United Nations had only been informed of the move at the last minute. The UN spokesman earlier said it was not the right moment to send the displaced persons, who either fled or were expelled from parts of north Bosnia amid the recent fighting in the region.

"It would not be an appropriate action at this time," Gunness said Monday. "The UN believes that repatriation of refugees should take place in the context of an overall peace settlement," he added. [passage omitted]

A meeting between UN and Croatian officials on the repatriation issue Tuesday was "inconclusive," but Zagreb was considering the request to delay sending back the refugees, Mans Nyberg, a spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, told AFP. [passage omitted]

UN Fails To Persuade Zagreb

*AU2609175295 Paris AFP in English
1713 GMT 26 Sep 95*

[Report by Francoise Michel]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, Sept 26 (AFP)—UN aid workers failed Tuesday [26 September] to persuade Croatia to drop plans to send tens of thousands of Bosnian refugees back to Bosnia, sources at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said in Zagreb.

The UNHCR told the Croatians it was "deeply worried" by Zagreb's decision to withdraw refugeee status from about 100,000 Bosnian Croats and Moslems and repatriate them.

"The meeting was not conclusive," said a spokesman for the UNHCR. "The Croats told us they were studying our request." There was no comment from the Croatian Office for Refugees.

Humanitarian bodies have criticized the repatriation plans as premature but hold out little hope that the Croatians will change their mind and postpone them. They say the plans should be seen as part of a strategy of a rapid repopulation of Bosnian territory in advance of negotiations between the Croat-Moslem Federation and the Bosnian Serbs and inside the federation itself. [passage omitted]

Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic recently expressed surprise at news that only Croats would be allowed back into the central Bosnian town of Jajce, recently recaptured from the Serbs by Bosnian Croat forces. Before the war it was inhabited by both Croats and Serbs. [passage omitted]

Issue of Confiscation of Serb Property in Croatia

*95BA0357A Zagreb ARKZIN in Serbo-Croatian
1 Sep 95 p 9*

[Article by Tatjana Tagirov: "In Spite of the Constitution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *If Croatia adopts the decree on the state's confiscation of Serbian property that has been announced by Krpina, and was boldly politically justified by the president a few days ago, it will trample its own Constitution—by taking citizenship away from tens of thousands of its own citizens, carrying out a confiscation of their property (acquired over the course of centuries), and definitively ranking itself among the countries that do not respect the institution of private property!*

During and after the Croatian military operation "Storm," Croatia was left, according to most sources, by as many as 200,000 people, but according to official Croatian sources, about 120,000 Serbs. At the same time, thousands of Croats from Vojvodina (especially Srijem) and Bosnia-Herzegovina left their own homes (likewise occupied for centuries), and arrived in Croatia, met with promises by the Croatian authorities that they would help them to start a new life. For days now, however, the drama of "Babo's" [Abdic's] refugees in Vrginmost has been going on; they are refusing—in spite of guarantees of safety and the promised amnesty by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government—to return to Velika Kladusa, and they either want to stay in Croatia or (mostly) leave for third countries.

Who Should Live (Here)?

While the Serbs, according to the Croatian authorities' current stories, left voluntarily while taking along their movable property (so we suppose that disproves the accusations of looting made against Croatia in recent days?), and declined the invitation to remain as loyal citizens of Croatia (the president said "So long to them!" in the middle of his trip on a modified "blue train"), the Croats from Banja Luka and Vojvodina are welcome, but for the refugees from Velika Kladusa, "it is out of the question for them to stay in Croatia." Or, as Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Bosiljko Misetic vividly explained it using (only?) them as an example, "Croatia primarily does not want to have people who belong to another nationality living in it."

Even if people can be moved around and forced to leave behind everything that they had lived with until then, however, the fact remains that their property has been left "there somewhere" at the starting point of their exile; and all the constitutions—thus, both the Croatian, Serbian (Yugoslav), and Bosnia-Herzegovina ones—say that private property is inviolable.

Under the assumption of the establishment of more or less normal life in the areas whose authorities are sending their own citizens somewhere that they allegedly belong by the logic of blood and origin, the various written statements by which the displaced Croats (with the exception of those who exchanged their homes and property in time with members of another nationality from Croatia), expelled from their homes, left their property "voluntarily" to some alleged states and their "authorities" should be proven pointless, completely without any legal validity. Those who exchanged houses in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Vojvodina for houses in Croatia or vice versa in time thus turned out to be lucky, even if we know how many problems the newly arrived Croats from those areas had in the legal arrangement of their property relations.

Things are somewhat more complicated with the property of the Serbs who left the Krajina. Here, an attempt is being made—at least that is how it seems—to legalize something that is nevertheless in violation of the law in Serbia and in the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled by the Bosnian Serbs.

Confiscation

Probably assuming that most of the refugee Serbian population will never return, the authorities have already made an effort to announce a scenario of filling the emptied areas. The president, in his speech in Karlovac, thus stated that thousands of Croatian displaced persons should be housed in the Krajina "houses and farms that are left, because they are on Croatian land, the property of the Croatian people and the Croatian state." On the same day, 26 August, a statement by Drage Krpina, president of the Committee for Peaceful Reintegration, appeared in the daily newspapers: "that a decree regulating the transfer of the property of the refugee Serbs to the state ownership of the Republic of Croatia will be in Assembly proceedings soon."

The intentions are consequently obvious, especially if one adds to that the questions by "reporter/soldiers" at news conferences about whether there will be a deadline for the departed Serbs to return to their (or is it?) homeland.

Let us analyze the legal framework for this story, however. Article 14 of Chapter 3 of the Croatian Constitution says:

"Citizens of the Republic of Croatia have all rights and freedoms, regardless of their race, skin color, sex, language, religion, political or other belief, national or social origin, property, birth, education, social position, or other characteristics.

"Everyone is equal before the law."

Article 48 of the Constitution is clear: "Property rights are guaranteed."

There is one possibility of a restriction, however, prescribed by Article 50 of the Constitution:

"It is possible to restrict or confiscate property by law in the interest of the Republic of Croatia, with compensation for its market value.

"In exceptional cases, the right of entrepreneurship and owners' rights can be restricted by law in order to protect the interests and security of the Republic, nature, the environment, and people's health."

Admittedly, the interests of the Republic are always hard to define, and literally depend on the arbitrariness of the ruling regime. Even the most rigid interpreters of the letter of the legal and constitutional provisions will admit, however, that one could hardly call the confiscation of the property of thousands of people whom, nota bene, the state even protects through special regulations on the position of national minorities, an "interest." The possible logic of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," on the grounds that that is also happening to Croats, for example, in Banja Luka would mean equating the Croatian authorities with the violence of the military junta in Karadzic's world.

By the way, it is worth keeping in mind that some of the former inhabitants of the Krajina also have relatives in the "rest" of Croatia, and so the announced decree, in practice, would take away from them property to which they have a right, either directly through ownership, or through inheritance—while no one is even mentioning the prescribed market value! The collection of possible war damages, on the other hand, implies a state of war (which was never proclaimed in Croatia), and a state as the one responsible, not citizens who are innocent victims or war, or possibly guilty just because they voted for warlords.

In other words, that would be a confiscation of the Serbian property in the Krajina, and consequently, the use of an institution that the Croatian Constitution does not recognize!

Naturally, the catch-22 appears here in the form of the citizenship certificate. Anyone who does not have that magic piece of paper cannot do anything—sell his property, travel, or come back if he has left....

Citizenship

The Croatian Constitution's Article 9, paragraph 2, says: "A citizen of the Republic of Croatia cannot be expelled, nor can his citizenship be revoked; also, he cannot be extradited to another country."

If we agree with the position of the Croatian authorities that the Krajina Serbs were not expelled, but rather left voluntarily (so these authorities do not have any stain on their conscience), then the Constitution prohibits revoking their citizenship. The argument "Yes, but they do not have a citizenship certificate" does not sound too convincing here. True, but if we know that a "citizenship certificate" is just a piece of paper, the state's confirmation that someone is a citizen (and thus only has a "declarative" nature, i.e., a confirming one, and not a "constituent" nature, i.e., establishing a certain status), then for those who lived on Croatian soil for centuries, and who (like all of us) previously had SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] citizenship, and after the 1975 SFRY Constitution citizenship in the Republic of Croatia as well, the following should be kept in mind: The Law on Croatian Citizenship, in the transitional and final provisions, in Article 30, says: "A person is considered to be a Croatian citizen if he acquired that status in accordance with the regulations valid until the date that this law goes into effect," and the explanation that follows says that there is no change in the "citizenship status of persons who acquired citizenship or had it in accordance with the regulations in effect before 8 October 1991," and that their "citizenship can cease only in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Croatian Citizenship." In this regard the law provided for the following means of termination: rejection, renunciation (for persons who have dual citizenship, and renounce one of them), and in accordance with international treaties. Naturally, for rejection, the will of the citizen and his own request are essential, not the will of the state.

A Final Solution—For Whom?

The Croatian state, therefore, if it does adopt the decree announced by Krpina—and a few days ago the president was giving a bold political justification for it—will trample its own Constitution by taking citizenship away from tens of thousands of its own citizens, confiscating their property (acquired over the course of centuries), and definitively ranking itself among the countries that do not respect the institution of private property! That will be the last step in the already controversial attempts to restrict property—many citizens have already been prevented by the citizenship certificate game from making use of their own property, or even inheriting property.

For those who are consoling themselves and their own deadened conscience these days with the sentence "The Serbs left on their own, by their own decision, in any case," not to mention the warnings about "the deadline for returning," the observation that they are not reading their own constitution, the super-law that is binding upon everyone and every individual, follows once again. Specifically, Article 32, paragraph 2 of that document says, "Every citizen of the Republic of Croatia has a right to leave the state's territory at any time and to settle abroad permanently or temporarily, and return to his homeland at any time."

That is, naturally, unless we intend to take away their homeland (read: citizenship) through a "final solution" because "Croatia primarily does not want people who belong to another nationality to live in it."

In spite of all the good intentions and well-intentioned statements, contrary to both the Constitution and international law, whether we like it or not, this smells like genocide.

But (nota bene)—who will belong to the other nationality tomorrow?

Expert on Electoral System Views New Law

AU2609172695 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 18 Sep 95 p 5

[Interview with Prof. Dr. Smiljko Sokol by Mladenka Saric; place and date not given: "What Kind of Party Is Afraid of 5 Percent?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prof. Dr. Smiljko Sokol, professor of constitutional law at Zagreb Law Faculty, is an expert and author on changes in the electoral system soon to be adopted in parliament. The next parliamentary elections will have substantially changed rules of play, which were seen as controversial from the time that they were announced. Generally speaking, the only fact that has not been changed is that the electoral system is mixed. We spoke to Prof. Dr. Sokol about new prohibitive rates, the new ratio of the proportionately elected part of the parliament and the part elected by majority, about the representatives elected by the diaspora, and about other election innovations.

[Saric] What do you think of the assessments that electoral changes represent a backward step in the democratization of the country?

[Sokol] When it is a question of the amendments to the Croatian Parliament Representatives Election Law, the modifications are in line with the democratization of the political system, and some of them are even in line with the demands of expert and political, particularly oppositional public. The very oppositional parties in spring 1992, at the time of the adoption of the Croatian Parliament Representatives Election Law, suggested changing to a purely proportional system, or that at least the major part within a mixed electoral system be proportional. On these lines is also the suggestion that more than three-fourths of representatives in the Chamber of Representatives—out of the 120 that are elected on the basis of equal and general voting rights of Croatian citizens—be elected by the proportional electoral system through the state lists. We are talking about 92 representatives. If the suggestion is accepted, in the future four-fifths of the representatives in both chambers of the parliament will be elected in the proportional way. Along the same lines is also the acceptance of the oppositional demand that the opposition has its representatives in electoral commissions and counting boards, too.

Prohibitive Clause

[Saric] In what sense is that a step toward democratization when there are those who say that the majority way, when it is known how many votes each individual candidate wins, is the only honest way?

[Sokol] A predominantly proportional approach is more suitable for a multiparty system. Only in that way can one achieve more or less proportional representation of parties in relation to the number of votes won. The proportional system is the most rightful, but it stimulates the crumbled state of the party system, stimulates divisions among parties and viability of small parties. In almost all the countries in which a purely proportional system has been applied, or where the proportional system predominates in relation to the majority system, that is corrected by the institution of the prohibitive clause, that is, by the ruling of the minimal percentage that a party or a coalition must win in order to enter parliament. The rates vary from a minimum of 2 percent to a maximum of 10 percent.

[Saric] How high is this 5-percent prohibitive clause to the parties that one can assume will enter the electoral competition?

[Sokol] The 5-percent clause predominates in contemporary electoral systems of the developed, but also of the new democracies in eastern and central Europe. For instance, Germany has this rate, and—apart from Hungary, which has a 4-percent rate—all the new democracies that now have a purely proportional or mixed electoral system: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia... If we take a look at that from the perspective of the Croatian multiparty system at this moment, this prohibitive clause may seem too high to some people. But it is considered that a party that is not capable of winning the confidence of 5 percent of the electorate is not strong enough to affirm itself in future as a prospective party in a particular political system.

Reasons Against Forming a Coalition

[Saric] Are the restrictive clauses for the party coalitions too high—8 percent for a union of two, and 11 percent for a union of three or more parties? Some opinion surveys show that it is difficult to imagine any coalition winning 11 percent of votes.

[Sokol] I do not think those clauses are too high. Certainly, to a degree, they discourage coalitions among parties. In developed democracies, as a rule, there are no coalitions in the proportional system, because it is very hard to convey the relations between the parties on the list. It makes a difference at what place on the list a candidate of some party stands because they enter parliament in the order on the list. For example, the list that wins 20 percent of votes gets five or six seats. The seats would be given to the candidates from the top of the list. All others would fail. Strong parties would have to make concessions to their weak coalition allies. With the proportional system it is hard to shape coalition lists.

The second reason not to form a coalition is that each party that estimates it can win 5 percent of votes, knows its position. It can only lose if it enters a coalition. Therefore, those relatively high figures in the clauses are not so important, because the parties, that are so weak that they cannot win even 5 percent would not be able to cross that threshold in a coalition, either.

In the world today, precisely because of the superior structure and strength of the parliament in relation to the executive authority, one applies a series of criteria in an effort to ensure that the smallest parties do not enter parliament, that is, to unite on the left, on the right, or in the center, thus forming strong parties. That is the positive effect of those prohibitive clauses. The Czech Republic has exactly the same system—5, 8, and 11 percent.

There Will Not Be a Low Turnout

[Saric] It is known that in many developed democracies a high percentage of the electorate fails to vote. What response can be expected from the Croatian electorate in the next elections?

[Sokol] Turnout can vary a great deal. In the United States it can be even less than 50 percent. In Switzerland, it has been less than 70 percent in some referendums. In Croatia the turnout will not be nearly so low. I think that at least 70 percent of the registered voters will go to the polls, which is a large percentage. However, the nature of parliamentarianism neglects how many voters voted. In the West it is never calculated to get a political evaluation of the results. The elections are equally legitimate whether 90 percent or 30 percent of voters went to the polls. It is ridiculous to say that someone has not been elected democratically, because one won 30 or 40 percent of the votes of the total electorate body. The U.S. President was elected with less than 40 percent of the votes of the total electoral body. But nobody mentions that.

[Saric] What does your assumption of a large electoral response tell us about the atmosphere in Croatia? Does that mean that the electorate is not yet fed up with the elections or the people feel a need to influence events?

[Sokol] Both. After Operations Flash and Storm, the Croatian flag in Knin and recent Croatian victories in Bosnia-Herzegovina, along with the relatively good economic and social state of Croatian society, there is a high degree of self-consciousness and satisfaction among the majority of Croatian people. In my judgment, that will also affect going to the polls and deciding on the elections. The second reason, of course, is that in the majority of the new democracies the response is greater also because of the feeling that one can influence the shaping of the state authority. In the old democracies, the elections are a normal routine, the majority of the electorate thinks that the elections will not significantly change the situation in a country and that it is all the same which of the two or three parties wins.

Stories About One-Party System—Mystification

[Saric] What will happen with the small and regional parties, apart from the IDS [Istrian Democratic Congress], after the elections?

[Sokol] The regional parties will have some electoral success only if they can be affirmed in an area that has to cover at least one electoral unit. A mixed electoral system is suitable for the regional parties on the whole. As much as there were demands from the expert and oppositional public for a wider or complete introduction of the proportional system, so too was there equal strength of opinion for keeping the election of an individual candidate in one segment. Thus every Croatian voter has his own representative.

[Saric] How do you comment on the objections that the changes have been made to measure for the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], and that a one-party system is being introduced?

[Sokol] These objections are groundless. The broadening of the proportional system is in the interest of all parties, particularly the medium-sized ones. The only political objection could be the one opposed to the increase in the restrictive clause. However, what kind of a political party wants to parry with the HDZ, and yet is opposed to the 5-percent clause? If that party does not believe that it can win 5 percent, then how can it aspire to win a majority alone or in a union with another party? If it is afraid of the 5-percent clause, that is a sign that it does not believe it will succeed in the elections.

The stories about one-party systems are a pure political mystification. Well, it is not a one-party system when one party has the majority. That would mean that the majority of the old democracies have had a one-party system for a long time. The Conservatives in Great Britain have had a firm majority, far more firm than HDZ, ever since 1979. In Spain, the Socialists have been in power since 1981. In Sweden, the Social Democrats had a firm majority from the mid-twenties to the end of the sixties... Technically, it is all the same whether some party has a majority of only one representative, or a majority of 70 percent of the total number or representatives. That is the same quality. The only change in quality would occur if the HDZ were to win a two-thirds majority of representatives, which is needed to change the Constitution.

Elections Have Nothing To Do With Census

[Saric] How probable is that?

[Sokol] There is a possibility. I am convinced that there is almost a 50-percent chance. I estimate that the HDZ will win a firm majority of seats. At least 70 to 72 seats out of 127, and it is quite possible for the HDZ to win a two-thirds majority. But it would not be a one-party system at all. A strong opposition in the parliament is not expressed in figures, but by the people who use arguments to cleverly oppose the stands of the party in power. It is all the same whether there are five or 25 of them, because they cannot overthrow the government or adopt a law that is not supported by the majority.

[Saric] Since the demographic structure has been changed by the departure of the Serbs from the liber-

ned areas, to what extent are the elections valid without a census? How many voters are there in Croatia?

[Sokol] As many people as have been listed on the electoral registers, just so many have the right to vote. It is a completely different matter how many of the registered voters go to the polls. Legally, the census and the elections have nothing to do with each other. One can make political observations, but the elections have nothing to do with the census. I would like to stress the constitutional provisions regarding the elections, for which the writs are issued before the expiry of the mandate. Article 77 says that the Chamber of Representatives and the Chamber of Counties can be dismissed if the majority of all the representatives so decides. Afterward, the President of the Republic must issue writs for elections, and this has nothing to do with the census, or any other political or legal fact. The next constitutional provision says that the elections should take place at the latest 60 days from the day of the expiry of the mandate, or dismissal of the parliamentary chambers.

[Box, p 5]

Four Parties in Parliament—Reality

[Saric] How many parties do you expect in the next parliamentary session?

[Sokol] The smallest number of parties one can expect is three, the biggest six. There are HDZ, HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party], HSS [Croatian Peasants Party], HSP [Croatian Party of Rights], IDS [Istrian Democratic Congress], and possibly, SDP [Social Democratic Party].

[Saric] What is, in your opinion, more realistic: that the three strongest parties enter Parliament, or that six parties take positions?

[Sokol] I think it is most realistic to expect four parties. However, the mood of the electorate can change during the election campaign, and particularly immediately before the elections. Usually, experience shows that a long period of advertising is not suitable for the majority of the parties. It is suitable for the rich parties, which have a greater influence upon public opinion. The world experience says that election advertising is most efficient in the last eight to 10 days. Everything that lasts for a longer period of time, costs a lot, is tiring, is repetitive...

[Box, p 5]

Why Three Seats for Serbs

[Saric] The Serb national minority is being offered three seats in the Parliament. Why exactly three?

[Sokol] Since some of the provisions of the Constitutional Law on National Minorities, as well as their representation in the Parliament, are being suspended until the census, it has been suggested that Serb minority have three representatives. They will be elected from a special list, over the whole territory of Croatia. The candidates can be nominated by any party or independent group of voters. I personally supported the idea that only one representative of the Serb minority be elected, as is the case with other minorities. But there is some logic in their having three seats, because whatever the number of the Serbs, it is surely far greater than the other national minorities.

[Box, p 5]

Special List for Emigrants

[Saric] The most controversial regulation is the one about the 12 representatives elected by the diaspora. Is it justifiable that people who do not live in Croatia should influence the political circumstances and the life in it?

[Sokol] Croatians abroad, that is, those who have their residence outside the territory of the Republic of Croatia also voted in the first elections for the Chamber of Representatives. That is a constitutional obligation. The Constitution says that the right to vote is general and equal and that all citizens of the Republic of Croatia have this right. According to Article 45, the state is obliged to make provisions for all the citizens who have residence out of Croatia to participate in the elections. In the 1992 elections the voters who live outside Croatia voted for the state lists. Now, we are adopting the only solution that is in total accord with the provisions of the constitution and provides equal voting rights to all Croatian citizens. According to the Law on the Electoral Register, there is a special register for the diaspora, kept in Zagreb. There are already approximately 420,000 voters, far more than 10 percent of the total number of voters, which, according to the electoral register amounts to around 3.8 million. According to that principle, we have chosen a solution in which they elect 12 representatives on the basis of a special list.

[Saric] How will this special list be drawn up? Who will present it?

[Sokol] It will be drawn up like all other state lists, only there will be 12 candidates.

[Saric] So, each party can make a special list for the voters with residence out of the country?

[Sokol] That's right. And all Croatian citizens can be on it, in the country itself and from all over the world. It is not a condition that the candidates can be only those Croatian citizens who have residence outside Croatia. The candidates, too, who have residence outside Croatia can be on put on the state lists.

[Saric] Are there similar examples in the world?

[Sokol] All countries with a large number of emigrants give participatory rights to their citizens at least in parliamentary elections and for the president of the state, if elections are direct (Italy, Spain, Greece...). I am afraid that it is hard to find a better technique for satisfying equal right to vote in a mixed system. Besides, it has to be clear that it also extends to Croatian citizens who live in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Problems Facing Croatia After 'Operation Storm'

95BA0364A Zagreb ARKZIN in Serbo-Croatian
1 Sep 95 pp 2-3

[Article by Vanja Novak: "Franjo, When Will Prosperity Be Coming?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following Operation "Storm," only Franjo Tudjman and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] now stand between God and the Croats; the next election will unambiguously confirm that metaphysical assertion. There is also something good about that, and that is, there will be a period of catharsis. The government will have an occasion to prove what and how much it is capable of, without the alibi of the war it has had up to now. From the prepolitical period, to be sure, in the worst possible and most avoidable way, by force of necessity, almost involuntarily, and as a side effect of all these events of the storm, we are entering the political era (because the political parties have not managed to impose political struggle, obsessed as they are with proving their Croatism and orthodoxy). The war will no longer be a justification, and eastern Slavonia and Baranja are not and will not be an excuse for real mistakes (above all, economic). Zarko Puhovski's assertion that "this debate will be the content of the next election, the one that comes four years after this one," is depressing, but completely true. We will have to hold out for those four years. The last four years we have just been getting by; the next four will be something similar, and only then perhaps will better times come.

As one Jew said: "We waited to get our state for 2,000 years, but why did it have to happen to me...?"

Deja Vu

Having been Croats above all Croats or only Croats, the Croats are now able to become the citizens, and only then can they become workers, peasants, the bourgeoisie, the middle class, each with his own interests, desires, and abilities, each with his own pocketbook, with his own tax burden around his neck, and his own army in his budget. And then also everyone with his own political party. So, there are chances for normal life, but they are so far away.... The next four years will be four more years of triumphalism, parades, old soldiers' stories, commemoration, the personality cult, all of it *deja vu*.

We have clearly entered the election campaign—the HDZ must capitalize on this triumph—the politicians have already begun to swich to the party that is winning, and they are promising travel passes and a pension hike! Months of media brainwashing will follow, the opposition will be silenced in every way. There is a possibility that at the last moment Franjo will snatch another victory by establishing the border on the Danube through diplomacy. The artificially maintained Croatian economy will hold on some more, and then, when Tudjman and the HDZ consolidate their power for another four years, the economic restructuring will begin—until then, those segments of the economy that have any importance will be firmly in the hands of members of the HDZ! The kuna will be devalued, and the inflation that allows economic development will be recognized. That future development is what allows the United States to hold Tudjman in its hand—without their aid, political, economic, and also military, the promised prosperity will not be quickly achieved!

New Realities

All of a sudden everyone has begun to enjoy the fact that Croatia is a "respectable military power" and even the "new Balkan policeman"—something that gave people shivers when the policeman was supposedly Serbia. Ten thousand square kilometers have been cleansed of Serbian population (one gets the impression that Belgrade, Knin, and Pale—each with its own calculation—are nevertheless responsible for this to a decisive degree), and no voice has been heard against that "new reality." Ethnic cleansing and self-cleansing have been accepted with relief by everyone.

The most frequent comment these days has been "well, they left voluntarily...." (even the president said this in his speeches on the Freedom Train!), and this common public reaction perhaps represents the deepest submersion into hypocrisy which the intellectual and political public here has experienced in recent history.

The difference, mentioned so often, between aggressor and victory did exist (especially in the case of the Bosnian Muslims). But the difference between the two policies cannot be found in their substantial elements. There are shades of difference. What is most important—the ethnic cleansing, the "humane resettlements," the division of Bosnia, the voice of weapons (which in Croatia was not received enthusiastically right up until the moment when there were real opportunities for a Croatian military success), those essential and portable elements of Croatian and Serbian policy, are identical.

Tudjman and the Seven Dwarfs

The opposition, of course, demonstrated that it has no essential alternative to Tudjman's design of the state and society—no intelligent man has doubted it for a moment—and it has shown that it does not have a single person capable of imposing his own discourse, his own conception of "political reality," his own hierarchy of values, one which would not take Croatian political space as a given, but would shape it. People like Horvat and Paraga have shown themselves to be unable to organize firm and clearly defined parties, and the image they present seems ridiculous to the public....

Tudjman is surrounded by seven or eight dwarfs, dilettantes, and exhibitionists, but even that is good. That is, if the slogan "Even after Tito—Tito" proves to be true and with something to spare, then it will no longer be possible for the slogan "Even after Tudjman—Tudjman" to be true. Either Tudjman will rule forever, or after his term we will get a president whom, we hope, no one will know what to call, and it will be true good fortune if we are no longer governed by giants of current events, politics, and history.

The thought that we could get a copy of him is a good reason to think about looking for another homeland, but that is the darkest version of the future.

Nevertheless, it is a fact that a state is not made up only of borders, territory, and the army. There are also people, lives, the economy, culture. In Croatia, there are also 200,000 displaced persons, now returnees who have to be returned, cared for, placed in jobs, provided housing, social welfare, and health care, loans, and communications. There are also 200,000 unemployed who need to be provided jobs. And then 200,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina who will still be waiting for a resolution of their difficulties. And at least the same number of those who are living at the minimum level of subsistence. A million unsolved problems. The HDZ's campaign message, we recall, went like this: From triumph to prosperity. Allow us now to express doubt about the ability of the incumbent party to fulfill that promise. An effective solution would require mobilizing the entire creative strength of the nation, and even then it would be tough. But the HDZ has always been narrow and exclusive as a party. Whoever is not with us is not even a Croat, and therefore is not suitable even to take part in privatization, nor to buy an apartment, to obtain a concession for radio and TV frequencies...

The most recent assault on the few remaining independent media (even GLOBUS) shows that, in spite of the military triumph, they are not thinking about loosening the screws for which the war might have served as a convincing excuse to some extent. There are no longer occupied areas (except in the east), there is no longer a serious military threat, but instead of liberalization, they are going to complete the creation of a one-party state in a truly rigid form.

However that may be, the suspension of democracy was obviously not a temporary state resulting from the war, but a lasting ideological and mental obsession of the incumbent administration. Is there any need for proof that this can only be harmful, harmful generally, and harmful to a great extent?

The Wisdom of the Alpine Croats

Do they feel insecure? Are they afraid of social unrest? Or perhaps they believe that they are strong, masters in their own house, and that the West will be passive?

In the interview which Milan Kucan gave to Adam Michnik, the Slovenian president was fascinating in his display of reason, steadiness, and caution. Kucan the realist said: "We Slovenes are carried away with the thought that Europe can hardly wait to receive us, because we are orderly, intelligent, and we are on the sunny side of the Alps, and that is a mistake. We have to approach things soberly."

Slovenia is 20 years ahead of Croatia in its civilization, its politics, and its economy (economic growth is 10 percent, while the Croatian economy has a drop in production), but that does not hinder Kucan from being cautious. This is the only way of managing to get anything done. Our president and the brain trust around him are convinced of their Europeanism, of their economic and military power, and their good reputation in the world. Maja Freundlich writes that Tudjman is the only great politician of this era and one of the most important in this century, although we are at the very bottom except that our borders have been worked out to some extent. Tudjman is continually placing himself in the political coordinates of a space inhabited by relatively insignificant and anonymous countries which are enemies (Britain, France, Russia...) and by Croatia with its friends "from great America to China with its big population." This narcissism, joined with autism and some kind of prophetic idea in the background, cannot produce anything valuable.

The Flowers of Croatism

The question of all questions also remains open: Bosnia. The time seems to have come for division, not because the nationalities of Bosnia have now realized this, but because Clinton needs a quick fix in the election campaign. Belgrade and Zagreb immediately agreed, they are waiting for answers from Sarajevo and Pale. Karadzic will perhaps consent, but what will Alija say? Does he have a choice? If he consents to the 51/49 split, he must take into account that those 51 percent will be divided with the Croats, and he will get, then, about 30 percent of the territory. How will he explain the loss of the Muslim Drina Valley to the Bosnian Muslims? How will he keep his identity in a community with the far more numerous Croats, who are superior in every respect? All those questions are open. At the same time, it is hard to believe in the "sincere" alliance of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Tudjman is acting like Churchill: Croatia has no friends, Croatia has only interests. It is obvious that the HV [Croatian Army] and HVO [Croatian Defense Council] have been using the Split Agreement only to consolidate Croatian borders (while Glamoc, Grahovo, and perhaps Drvar, which have no great importance to the Bosnian Muslims, have fallen, Donji Vakuf, which is important, is being strongly defended, and the HVO is not taking any very serious part there).

And Izetbegovic is probably thinking that Bosnia has no friends, only interests. But while Croatia is spreading, Bosnia is stagnating.

On top of all that, the answer to two important questions is completely unclear: First, if Tudjman is an advocate of an ethnically pure state in Croatia, why is he advocating multiculturalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

And second, is it possible that he has given up on his 30-year-old idea that multinational communities are untenable? That is, this is the quintessence of Tudjman's philosophy of history, and the basic idea of his most important book, *Velike ideje i mali narodi* (*Big Ideas and Small Peoples*). Whereas earlier he was a Marxist, and he believed that the course of history was a process of emancipation of the exploited classes, in the nationalistic phase he has only substituted participants. History will continue its march, and it has a logical meaning which is discernible: It represents the emancipation of the small peoples, and their formation into nation-states. At the end of the Marxist vision, there is the El Dorado of communism. At the end of Tudjman's national philosophy, there is the El Dorado of the nation-state.

NNNI [expansion unknown]

If, in the end, Croatia does enter into some close community with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Muslims will experience several parallel processes:

—A play on the idea that the Muslims are the "flower of the Croatian people," which ultimately means that a good Muslim is not a Muslim, but a Croat (and, if possible, Catholic!!).

—The development and spread of forms of nationalism, chauvinism, and racism toward the Muslims; they are of a different faith, dirty, sloppy, their food stinks, they are loud, they listen to "Turkish" music, and so on—all the way to a kind of apartheid creation of reservations and ghettos.

—This kind of pressure will merely develop and strengthen the ethnic self-consciousness of the Muslims, and in five to 10 to 15 years we will have a new war for Muslim national emancipation (in short, the Israel-Palestine situation!).

Both of these issues are cause for concern.

The question of the Bosnian Muslims cannot be resolved that way—insistence on that kind of division can bring benefit only to Clinton and his administration, but in the future it contains only the germ of future conflicts between Croats and Bosnian Muslims for living space and for economic or cultural hegemony.

The question of whether it is possible to renew an integral Bosnia, and whether this means a potential new war for 10 or 15 years, is still more difficult.

Enough blood has been shed in Bosnia so that this is both possible, but also impossible, in equal measure!

It is early, then, to celebrate; we should not be surprised by anything.

Expectation of Economic Boom in Krajina Viewed

95BA0355B Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene
6 Sep 95 p 13

[Article by Alfonz Soljan: "The Former 'Krajina' Is Croatia's El Dorado"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 6 Sep—Maribor's Marles intends to open its own shop soon in the vicinity of Split. It will thus begin prefabricated construction in Croatia. Marles will thereby join those who have realized in time the great possibilities for work, especially on reconstruction of the liberated areas.

Financial experts, bankers, and businessmen are openly acknowledging that the former "krajinas" will soon become Croatia's El Dorado. Economic development will certainly make work possible for many, and most of all for the 100,000 Croatian refugees who will return home in the coming months, in most cases to destroyed houses. There will be plenty of work for builders, and construction material will probably be very highly valued. At one time there were about 50 major enterprises in the liberated territory. Many of them have been destroyed or looted. A few of them, however, have been left well-preserved, and they have already started production. The Drnis vineyard is thus working on a large scale, because there is a great deal of wine in its cellars, and there is also considerable demand for it. The famous Gavrilovic meat plant in Petrinja may also soon start up its drying ovens again. There is plenty of raw material. More than 30,000 cows, 140,000 sheep, 4,000 horses, and 40,000 pigs are wandering around the fields and woods of the formerly occupied territory.

Better times are thus in sight for the economy there as a result of the liberation. The basis of development policy will be transportation links, the revival of tourism, the development of industry and agriculture, and the increasingly lower risk. That is why some people are predicting that next year the domestic social product may increased by another 10 billion kunas, or 3 billion German marks [DM]. They also expect higher prices for stocks and greater interest on the part of foreign capital, especially for investments in tourist enterprises. The more attentive readers of exchange rates, however, did not miss the slow rise in the value of the mark in comparison with the kuna. Rumors have therefore already spread about a possible devaluation and renewed inflation. Those who formulate government economic policy say that there is no reason for such a fear. In any case, we will have to wait a while longer to see whether those predictions come true. We must not forget that Operation Storm liberated primarily underdeveloped Croatian areas. A great deal of money will be needed to revive them. In the last five years of the Serbian occupation, war was the only economy there. According to the information that our liberators found, in the middle of last year there were somewhat more than 20,000 people employed and about 27,000 unemployed. Those who were carrying weapons were not even counted.

Kwasniewski, Pawlak Registered To Run for President

LD2609171695 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1641 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw, 26 Sep—The State Electoral Commission [PKW] today registered Aleksander Kwasniewski and Waldemar Pawlak as candidates for the post of president. Lech Walesa, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, and Kazimierz Piotrowicz were registered earlier.

Today the PKW received motions for the registration of Jan Olszewski, Jacek Kuron, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, and Leszek Moczulski. The commission is examining these motions.

Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz told journalists that she received the support of 200,000 people. [passage omitted]

Jacek Kuron collected 121,000 signatures. [passage omitted] Leszek Moczulski, Confederation for an Independent Poland leader, collected 120,000 signatures, and Jan Olszewski 115,000.

Under the electoral timetable, the deadline for the submission of motions for registration is 28 September.

Financing of Election Campaign

WS2709083495 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski: "Financing of the Election Campaign; Boxing with Money Bags"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Campaign staffs are already collecting money for the campaigns of their candidates. Those candidates who are in top positions in the preelection opinion polls stand the best chance of getting money from businessmen and companies. Some businessmen will sponsor more than one candidate, just in case. Even though the staffs will have to account for financing the campaigns before the State Electoral Commission, we will never know the names of the main sponsors.*

Not all candidates can count on donations from businessmen. Trying to decide to whom to give financial backing, sponsors rely first of all on their assessment of the candidates' chances of success. Those who, in line with the results of opinion polls, seem to stand the biggest chance of winning the elections, will receive donations from businessmen more frequently than those whose rating is lower. The group of the lucky candidates currently includes Aleksander Kwasniewski, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, and Lech Walesa.

One of the main reasons the campaign staffs are impatiently waiting for the results of more and more polls is that they want to see whether they will receive large amounts of money for the campaign. Money is needed so that the candidate will not be in a worse situation than his rivals.

It is very likely that the fact that Jacek Kuron's campaign lost momentum after the bicycle accident and a stay in the hospital had a considerable impact on the finances of his campaign staff. [passage omitted]

Zielinski: 300 Million Zlotys So Far

Money for the election campaign of Tadeusz Zielinski, if he manages to register as a candidate, may cause yet another dispute between him and the Union of Labor [UP], the party that supports him. The previous dispute was about whether Tadeusz Zielinski should resign from the office of the civil rights spokesman; Zielinski announced that he would not resign, whereas UP Chairman Ryszard Bugaj encouraged him to vacate the post. UP officially declared that it would earmark 550 million old zlotys for the election campaign of its candidate. This sum is far too small. This means that Bugaj's party will not be able to finance the entire campaign of the candidate.

"UP will not give even one zloty more," says Jerzy Rogala-Lewicki of the party's campaign staff. "We are hoping that the moment the professor is officially registered as a candidate, people who are now only watching the campaign from afar will start donating money," he says.

He had a phone call from a Krakow entrepreneur. "If you catch up with this train and get on it (that is, register your candidate—K. Gr.), I will be able to help you get a first-class ticket," he said.

Even though Zielinski's campaign staff seems to be having trouble raising funds, it is planning to focus on a television campaign, which is the most expensive. "It is indeed the most expensive; however, it is also the most efficient, which means that it is the cheapest," says a member of the staff. So far, Zielinski's campaign has cost approximately 300 million [old] zlotys. "In this campaign, there are at least three moneybags we have to box with," Rogala-Lewicki says. However, he refuses to say whose campaign staffs he calls "moneybags."

Walesa: A Good Response

"Preliminary talks are very promising, so I believe the response will be good," says Boguslaw Kowalski, spokesman of Lech Walesa's campaign staff. "We are holding separate talks with those whose financial capabilities are bigger," he says. Fund-raising "bricks" will be printed and then sold. The campaign staff's banking account has been open for a few days. Kowalski claims that there have been no payments yet but stresses that there is a response. It is quite possible that serious companies will provide financing for the campaign. He will not reveal any specific details because the talks are binding on both sides. He believes that first payments to the account will be made this week.

Lech Walesa has recently been meeting with business circles quite frequently. Last week, when he was visiting Silesia, he had dinner with them. On 27 September he will meet with the Corporation of Polish Managers, and on the following day with the Business Center Club. He is also planning to hold a meeting with the National Chamber of Commerce soon.

Gronkiewicz-Waltz: Temporarily Maintained by Parties

The campaign staff of Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz is currently counting signatures supporting the candidate. Several people are counting, while others are holding discussions. There is activity in all rooms.

"We are hoping that the sale of the 'bricks' will provide funds for the campaign," says staff member Robert Kuraszkiewicz. The bricks are being published in a newspaper edited by the staff. Some graphic elements of the bricks resemble the new zlotys. "Businessmen come to us and make declarations, and this is why we are optimistic about the future," he says. We are trying to seize service offers, which are the cheapest. Right now the bank president is being maintained by the parties that support her.

"We are living on what people are giving us, which is concrete material support rather than financial backing," says Piotr Wojcicki, former Sejm deputy of the Movement for the Republic and now an inspector in the National Bank of Poland. He has taken unpaid leave from his work to be able to engage in the campaign of his superior.

Kwasniewski: We Will Pay Later

"Aleksander Kwasniewski does not have much money at the moment," says Edward Kuczera, the purse bearer in Kwasniewski's campaign staff. "The purse contains donations from the candidate's closest entourage. We arrive at agreements with companies for current services, and we will pay when we collect the money. On this principle, for example, we have rented the bus [on which Kwasniewski travels around the country and meets with voters]. When our candidate is officially registered, we will be able to accept payments supporting his campaign fund; there have been quite a lot of such declarations," he admits. "We will be able to collect money among people. We are going to print 'bricks.'" "I will not conceal the fact that we are counting on wide support; we are also hoping that the number of people who will want to support our candidate will be very large. At meetings, people make declarations that they would like to support the campaign financially. I make a mental note of those declarations. By all means I must avert a situation in which the scope of tasks would exceed the actual capabilities," he says. He supposes that the campaign will cost more than 20 billion [old] zlotys.

Kaczynski: An Ascetic Campaign

"The Center Accord [PC] is collecting money for Lech Kaczynski's election campaign," says Przemyslaw Gosiewski, who coordinates the work of the campaign staff. In individual voivodships, PC supporters are giving donations that, for the time being, are covering the cost of printing leaflets and small posters, as well travel made by the candidate. Soon they are going to print "bricks." Gosiewski claims that things will probably stay this way: The staff will have little money at its disposal, as a result of which it is planning an ascetic campaign.

Pawlak: The PSL Will Provide Funds

One of the richest parties in Poland is the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. The election campaigns it has waged so far have been expensive. One can suppose that the same will happen this time. "Among us, support will be provided by the party," we were told by the director of the PSL club.

Olszewski: Spiritually Rich

Jan Olszewski's campaign depends for the time being on donations from people. "Our staff mirrors exactly the situation in Poland: It is spiritually rich but materially poor," says staff member Zbigniew Wojciechowski. He assesses that they have very little money for the needs of the campaign. "Our electorate consists of ordinary, poor people. We need approximately 10 billion [old] zlotys to conduct the campaign properly," he estimates. "Bricks" will be printed. There are 10-20 million zlotys in the bank account now.

New Nonresident Iranian Ambassador Appointed

*LD2709114795 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic
1013 GMT 27 Sep 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 27 Sep (KUNA)—The Kuwaiti ambassador to Russia, Fawzi al-Jasam, presented his credentials to Poland's deputy foreign minister as a nonresident ambassador to Poland. During the ceremony, the Kuwaiti ambassador and the Polish official praised bilateral ties.

Oleksy Leaves for Official Visit in Spain

*LD2709094795 Warsaw PAP in Polish
0921 GMT 27 Sep 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 27 Sep—Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy left for Spain this morning on a three-day official visit. The prime minister stressed before departure that this was the first visit at such a high level in quite some time.

Oleksy recalled that Spain was holding the EU chairmanship at present and announced that he would talk with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales and other Spanish politicians about inviting Poland to the December summit in Madrid, where Poland would want to be present.

The Polish prime minister's talks in Madrid will focus on European integration and also on Polish-Spanish bilateral cooperation, trade exchange, and cooperation between Poland and Spain on other markets, especially in the Mediterranean region.

Oleksy Interviewed on Army, Defense, NATO

*WS2609151695 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA
in Polish 25 Sep 95 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy by Antoni Witkowski and Jerzy Markowski; place and date not given: "Exclusively for POLSKA ZBROJNA; Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy on Defense"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [POLSKA ZBROJNA] We are primarily interested in defense issues. How do you, as head of government, assess the implementation of the Sejm resolution regarding Army and defense problems?

[Oleksy] I believe that the tenets of that resolution are of real relevance for the creation of Poland's new defense system. I agree that all of the activities in that direction should reflect our striving for integration with NATO; hence, the principle of civilian control over the Armed Forces is beyond any discussion. The government is trying to realize most of those tenets on a daily basis. However, some of them demand long-term activities coordinated by the entire state. In particular, this concerns the tenet that is very hard to implement—ensuring a systematic increase in the Defense Ministry budget, so that no later than the end of 1997 it reaches 3 percent of the GDP.

In my opinion, comprehensive resolution of the problem of financing the development of defense, primarily the Armed Forces, is indeed of the greatest importance. Given that work on drafting the budget for 1996 is still under way, we will be able to talk about the details of financing defense and the Army no sooner than its completion.

[POLSKA ZBROJNA] We think that, like our editorial office, the prime minister is flooded with protests against the revised draft resolution on pensions for servicemen. We know that you have responded to many people. Can we consider that issue closed?

[Oleksy] The resolution on pensions for career servicemen and their families was passed by the current Sejm in December 1993. It was supported by all of the parliamentary factions and circles. The resolution preserved a separate system of pensions for Army pensioners, which has been a norm in our state since the interwar period—namely, since 1923. The current resolution creates mechanisms facilitating the elimination of the so-called old pension wallets and the introduction of a thorough revaluation of allowances in proportion to pay increases among career servicemen. Therefore, the government does not see any reason that would justify the need to change the current system of military pensions and advocates the preservation of that system in the future.

[POLSKA ZBROJNA] There are opinions to the effect that the government pays too little attention to defense issues. Do you agree with them?

[Oleksy] The government treats defense issues as a priority task, and not only because Army problems are personally close to me. The point is that, even in peacetime, one must not forget about organizational activities in the event of a threat or, God forbid, a war. For this very reason, the Council of Ministers has set up the Committee for Defense Affairs, which coordinates the resolution of basic problems of the state's defense and security, including the process of upgrading our Army. However, these issues cannot be regarded in isolation from other problems that are in the government's range of vision, particularly the state's socioeconomic situation. At the same time, we should constantly be aware of the fact that, in light of the current system transformation, we need more than just political will; we need people's acceptance and money.

[POLSKA ZBROJNA] Do you think the principle of civilian control over the Army is fully observed in Poland?

[Oleksy] I mentioned this while answering your first question. However, I will repeat that, from the perspective of our admission to NATO, the very principle of civilian politicial control over the Army cannot be disputed. At the same time, this derives not only from our desire to integrate with the Western security system. Ensuring civilian control over the Army is also one of the most important elements of Poland's developing democracy and a condition for society's trust in the Army. However, this presumes unconditional subordination of the Polish Army Staff to the civilian defense minister. This kind of decision rests with the parliament though, to avoid ambiguities or gaps in this issue.

[POLSKA ZBROJNA] The security policy principles and the Polish Republic's defense strategy were approved in 1992. Times have changed. How do they look currently?

[Oleksy] We have subordinated the process of political-strategic planning directly to the targets of national security. Along with introducing changes to the system of the Armed Forces management and command, we have reorganized the Army, which, despite numerical reduction, ensured its preparation for multipurpose use in the event of a military threat. It is worth adding that, at the same time, Poland has fully met its commitments under the Central Europe Arms Reduction Treaty. Currently, the primary issue is that of upgrading the Armed Forces equipment. We have accepted the principle according to which the Polish Army's demand for new armaments and hardware will be met by domestic production within a period of 10 years or so.

In May 1995, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution facilitating the restructuring of debts incurred by companies and enterprises that manufacture products for the Armed Forces. By the end of October, the Defense Ministry is to submit, for the Council of Ministers' consideration, a concept for a new system of scientific research and development in the sphere of armaments and hardware. The so-called strategic governmental programs are a relevant element of the Armed Forces' upgrading. Within the framework of those programs, projects are realized that play a decisive role in national defense—for instance, the projects of developing a helicopter gunship and an antiaircraft system.

[POLSKA ZBROJNA] The issue of expenditures connected with our membership in NATO has recently become hot. Is our budget prepared for this kind of burden?

[Oleksy] The government I head is striving for full-fledged integration with the NATO defense system and is ready to undertake the accompanying commitments. I have always emphasized that, along with rights, NATO membership entails commitments. We will all have to share the burden of those commitments when Poland becomes a member state. Partnership for Peace is undoubtedly the first stage of the integration process. In the future, we are going to include all of our operational forces in NATO's military structures and fully participate in the integrated structure of the NATO command. In light of this goal, the government is striving for expansive cooperation of the Polish Armed Forces with NATO armies through bringing the system and procedure of command in line with NATO's system, reforming the communications system in accordance with NATO standards, and coordinating antiaircraft defense systems and personnel training according to NATO principles. After discussions within the government, I can only say that the amount of financing cooperation with NATO will depend on the nation's economic potential. Under the current circumstances, my government declares its desire to annually increase real defense expenditures, provided the GDP increase rates are ensured and the parliament supports the government's projects, such as reform of the social security system and the system of health protection. We cannot forget about the needs of other branches of the budget sector. Nevertheless, we would like to grant the Defense Ministry the right to use the entirety of its budget allocations for purchasing new armaments and hardware.

Government Backs 3% Increase in Defense Spending

LD2609203695 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 26 Sep 95

[Relayed via Warsaw TV Polonia Network; passages within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Council of Ministers has, at a closed part of its proceedings, expressed itself in favor of an increase of real expenditures on the Army in real terms, by 3 percent every year.

[Unidentified correspondent] Minister of Finance Grzegorz Kolodko said that ministers had worked out, as he put it, directional decisions with respect to defense.

[Kolodko] "Which will, at the expense of the taxpayer, from the state budget, and of course taking into account the competitiveness of other groups of needs, increase outlays on defense up until the year 2000, so that they increase by approximately 3 percent in real terms year after year."

[Correspondent] The minister of national defense did not wish to reveal what decisions had also been made.

[Defense Minister Zbigniew Okonski] "This was a secret meeting. I cannot, unfortunately, share this with those present here now."

[Correspondent] The discussion on defense had been planned for a long time because the government must soon present to the Sejm a report on the condition of the state's defense readiness. That is why Prime Minister Oleksy spoke with the general staff yesterday, also at a closed meeting.

[Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy] "The state of the Armed Forces is, as regards their spirit, battle ready, whereas, as regards their technical condition, it is very unsatisfactory from the point of view of the standards we are obliged to meet and that we will be obliged to meet on the road to NATO, and from the point of view of the defense effectiveness of the Army."

[Correspondent] It is not clear, however, when there will be a debate on defense in the Sejm.

Army, Defense Issues in Constitutional Draft

95EP0145C Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 21 Jun 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Jan Forowicz: "In Search of the Golden Mean"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Constitutional Committee has adopted proposals for maintaining the president's ascendancy over the armed forces in his capacity as their commander in chief. At the same time, it strengthened the standing of the civilian minister of national defense vis-a-vis the chief of the general staff of the Polish army.

Of the five drafts of the constitutional provisions governing the powers of the president with respect to the armed forces, the Constitutional Committee selected the draft proposed by Deputy Krystyna Lybacka. Discussion centered on the scope of the military powers of the head of state. But that is not all. With respect to the president's duties in the domain of national defense and national security, the members of the committee have yet to discuss the manner in which the head of state is to declare war or to impose a state of emergency. They will also resume discussion of national defense when defining the tasks of the government.

The constitutional article proposed by K. Lybacka bears the number 121 in the draft of the constitution. Following its above acceptance, it will now be recommended by Kwasniewski's committee to the National Assembly in the language drafted by that member of the Sejm National Defense Committee [Lybacka]. This is also important considering that Lybacka has been in close touch with the Presidium of the National Defense Committee when drafting her recommendations.

The Proposed Provisions

If the proposal is accepted by the Assembly, the following provisions will be incorporated in the future Constitution:

—The president is the commander in chief of the Polish armed forces.

—In peacetime the president exercises that command through the mediation of the minister of national defense.

—The president appoints and recalls the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army on the recommendation of the prime minister as presented by the minister of national defense. Deputy chiefs of the General Staff of the Polish Army, commanders of the armed services, and commanders of military districts are appointed and recalled by the president on the recommendation of the minister of national defense.

—In wartime the president appoints and recalls the Supreme Commander on the recommendation of the chairman of the Ministerial Council.

—Legally prescribed military ranks are conferred by the president on the recommendation of the minister of national defense.

Krystyna Lybacka's proposal also includes a cryptically couched sentence providing for the legal definition of the specific powers of the president ensuing from his position as the commander in chief of the armed forces in peacetime. It is intended to prompt consideration of the specific nature of such powers. But that is a task for legislators. The only conclusion that can be inferred at present is that, if the Constitution is adopted, any related implementing laws can only, in accordance with the principles of legal order, mirror accurately the letter of the supreme law of the land.

Another observation: The solutions proposed by Deputy K. Lybacka, especially as regards appointments to the highest military posts, are highly similar to or identical with the provisions of the currently binding Little Constitution. The only major change concerns the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army: Under the current provisional Little Constitution the president appoints and recalls him "in consultation with the minister of national defense."

The President as the Commander in Chief

In voting on the president's prerogatives the deputies and senators favored the "golden mean." They rejected extreme solutions. For example, they did not agree with Senator Alicja Grzeskowiak who supported a strong presidency (with the government "submitting reports to the president and the chamber of deputies"). A few more—but not many more—votes were gained by the proposal of Deputy Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz who wanted to deprive the presidency of its prerogatives ("The presidential system is in our conditions an improper solution: It debilitates the parliament and harms democracy").

Nor did anyone question the need to maintain the president's ascendancy over the army as a means of stability of the state. But full support for this idea was conditioned on the need to define it more precisely in practice. Krystyna Lybacka argued, "To clarify this issue and avoid misinterpretations that would be so costly to public tranquility, we have incorporated in the draft of the Constitution checks and balances between the president and the Ministerial Council as represented by the prime minister and the defense minister."

The provision for the president's ascendancy over the armed forces in peacetime "through the mediation" of the defense minister means that, among other things, the principal decisions on the status of the General Staff of the Polish Army within the ministry's organizational structure and on proposals by the General Staff that transcend military structures will be taken by the defense minister.

Rule by the Collective, Yes, but Not in the Army

The author of a competing draft of Article 121, Deputy Jerzy Ciemniewski, wanted the "mediator" of the president's ascendancy over the armed forces to be not the defense ministry but the Ministerial Council. If his proposal were accepted, it could cause much confusion in the future, according to K. Lybacka, for it would imply decisions taken by a collective body, such as a majority of the ministers, whereas in the military there is no room for that kind of decisions. In the military, orders are issued. Who would accept personal responsibility for an order issued by the Ministerial Council? On the other hand, decisions on national defense issues would have to be taken collectively by the Ministerial Council, but such situations are rare in the everyday operations of the defense ministry and the government. For this reason also, Prof. Ciemniewski's proposal was not considered relevant.

In a conversation with the POLSKA ZBROJNA reporter, Deputy Lybacka reflected that drafting a new law always involves the question of the extent of the goodwill of those implementing it. This may be exemplified by the constitutional provision governing the appointment of the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army. He is to be appointed by the president upon appropriate recommendation by the prime minister. But how will it look in practice? The prime minister will transmit such a recommendation upon being advised by the minister of national defense. If the participants in this process have different opinions about the suitability of a candidate, it may take weeks for them to reach a consensus.

But if we assume that goodwill reigns among the partners, then this provision is meaningless, said K. Lybacka. The text of the letter from the defense minister is then almost mechanically copied in the letter from the prime minister. The head of government [the prime minister] signs the letter and presents it to the president. Then the president can appoint the chief of General Staff very quickly. Can obstructions to this process be averted in advance? To eliminate threats to the procedure from some undefined but not excluded elements of political power plays, Deputy Lybacka wants the decision of the president to be countersigned by the prime minister.

The Discussion Will Be Continued

Some related topics will be further discussed at the next, July meeting of the Constitutional Committee. It may be that the Committee will accept the countersigning proposal. During its deliberations last week it was clearly emphasized that, after all, the list of presidential decisions requiring the prime minister's signature to be valid has not yet been closed.

What will happen next with Article 121? it may be that in the course of its further work the Constitutional Committee will subject it to some cosmetic changes. The discussion of the next part of the Constitution, concerning the government's role in translating defense policy into reality, has already begun. It could not be ended last Saturday owing to the lateness of the hour. The Committee's members intend to enumerate the tasks of the government in that field. It is not unlikely that, while defining more precisely the next article, they will revert to discussing Article 121. Deputy Lybacka may by now be certain that her proposal has a good chance of becoming a lasting part of the Constitution for many years.

European Security, NATO, Russia's Role Viewed

95EP0180A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
31 Jul-1 Aug 95

[Article in two installments by Przemyslaw Grudzinski and Henryk Szlajfer, professors at the G. C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany: "The New Europe and the Remnants of the Cold War"]

[31 Jul p 6]

[FBIS Translated Text]

NATO and the Concert of the Superpowers

The discussion of the role and the geopolitical scope of NATO is concerned only to a limited extent with the security of Central Europe. The principal topic of the dispute is the future of Europe since the ending of the Cold War division of the continent into zones of influence. During the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were the outside instruments used by the superpowers to control a Europe hobbled by the straitjacket of the Yalta decisions. The fact that Central

Europe was a puppet of the USSR is self-evident. But it is just as self-evident that West Europe pursued no foreign policy, and in particular no European policy, of its own. That was unpleasant, but inevitable. This was realized by Charles de Gaulle, as was evident in 1969 when, after a talk with President Richard Nixon, he confided in an adviser, "Were I the president of the United States, I would not be certain whether or not France has the right to object."

The spontaneous transformation of Central Europe and disintegration of the USSR in the years 1989-92 meant a radical limitation of the political and military domination of Central and East Europe by the USSR/Russia, as well as a marked reduction in the political and military presence of the United States in West Europe. Europe began to face a window of opportunity for gaining the status of an "actor" that would operate on a global scale by redefining its relations with Russia and the United States. It is in this context, too, that the discussion of NATO's future should be considered.

Direction of Evolution

The direction of NATO's evolution is not yet a foregone conclusion. There exists a choice between an evolution that is basically a gradual withering away of that alliance through its instrumentalization, on the one hand, and on the other hand its reconstruction to retain such fundamental attributes as its transatlantic scope and its institutional framework of collective defense. The current disputes among members of the alliance, that is, between some European members and the United States, as well as among the Europeans themselves, threaten more the reorientation of NATO in a dangerous direction than tensions between the alliance and Russia. The principal threat to NATO at present is not the weakened Russia with its diminished economic and military power but the members of the alliance themselves.

The evolution toward a withering away through the instrumentalization of NATO has two aspects. The first is the anachronistic treatment of the alliance as chiefly an instrument for managing American-Russian relations in Europe. Such an approach appears from time to time in the actions of the Clinton Administration and, obviously, it is favored by President Yeltsin and his associates. Clinton's letter to Yeltsin on the occasion of the Moscow celebrations of the anniversary of V-E Day and concerning the future of NATO-Russia relations was sent without consulting the allies, and to Europeans this was an explicit and painful signal that the terms of the dialogue with Russia are dictated not by NATO but chiefly by the bilateral American-Russian alignment. A similar direction is followed by the proposals for instituting regular American-Russian consultations that would precede the formulation of a joint position by NATO member countries. These proposals are rather popular among security experts in Moscow and Washington. Signals of this kind offer a reminder that the old definition of NATO given by Colin S. Gray as "an organization concentrated on the nuclear issue and remaining at superpower disposal" remains operative.

Soon after Clinton's visit to Moscow, on 30 May in Noordwijk, NATO ministers of foreign affairs accepted a new formula for relations with Russia: "a broad, developed dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Russia outside the framework of the Partnership for Peace." At present the meaning of this formula is not clear in practice, but the lack of cohesiveness in NATO's political strategy is obvious. That is because on the one hand the alliance has assured Russia that it acknowledges its "special place and responsibility in creating a new European security order," also outside the framework of the Partnership for Peace, while on the other hand, American politicians are increasingly stressing the importance of the Partnership for Peace as the foundation for post-Cold War cooperation in the domain of security, including military security, in Europe.

This lack of cohesiveness should cause headaches to politicians, and not just in Central Europe. It is difficult to find a rationale as to why Europe—both Western and Central—should consent to a cosmetic redefinition of bilateral control that would preserve the old Cold War alignment. Consent to it would mean blocking for at least a decade Europe's chances of gaining relative autonomy in all the principal domains of foreign and security policy. That would probably entail a drastic decline in support for NATO in both parts of Europe, a return to the menacing utopia of (West) Europe as an anti-Atlantic "third force," the opening of political space in Central Europe for the realization of Russian ambitions, and an end to NATO as a significant organization.

Proposals for Reforming the European Union

From this standpoint, it is worthwhile to consider the proposals that have been offered by Germany for more than a year concerning a reform of the EU, and especially of the principles for pursuing a common foreign and defense policy. The proposals of CDU [Christian Democratic Union] parliament members presented a year ago in the position paper "Reflections on European Policy" were repeated (with some mild changes) on 13 June 1995 by CDU Secretary General Wolfgang Schaeuble with the blessing of Chancellor Kohl. Whatever one might think of these proposals, they are doubtless a serious attempt at redefining Europe by assuming that "the United States can no longer exercise its traditional role in the existing manner." Still, the fate of the discussion of the future of NATO and Atlantic relations will determine whether these proposals become part of the transatlantic landscape or turn into a desperate and partially one-sided attempt to fill the vacuum created by the shortage of political will and imagination on the part of the politicians on the Potomac, the Thames, and the Seine.

The other aspect of the instrumentalization of NATO is linked to Russian projects and ambitions. This "Russian variant" of the alliance's future also leads to the above-mentioned results, but much more rapidly. Yeltsin and Kozyrev view the current NATO as "a purely military bloc which will impede the trend to create one Europe." Russia may accept that alliance as an element of future Pan-European security only on the condition that it is transformed "from a military alliance to a political organization, with corresponding changes in the institutions and basic documents of NATO." This view of the Kremlin does not preclude a temporary acceptance of NATO as an instrument of Russian-American dialogue on the European security system, but from the standpoint of "special relations between Russia and NATO and the members of that alliance" (A. Kozyrev in Noordwijk).

These Russian projects are in accord—clearly for other reasons—with the voices of certain American experts. Professor Ronald Steel of the University of Southern California is not alone in claiming that the end of the Cold War means that we have no major adversaries and "we do not need allies." Open zones of influence, the Concert of the European Powers, and the military superiority of the United States protecting its "splendid isolation" [preceding two words in English] will suffice. It is obvious, however, that the transformation of NATO into yet another club for discussing security problems would mean a definite disintegration of transatlantic ties and institutions and the forfeiture of possibilities for rapid mobilization, i.e., of the factors for whose sake a majority of the Europeans are at present ready to support (and cofinance) NATO.

The crucial topic of the debate is how to define the special role of Russia in Europe and in its contacts with NATO and the United States. It is relatively easy to define the scope of special American-Russian relations on matters of global nuclear security and the proliferation of modern weapons systems (the traditional Cold War issues). It is much more difficult to define what would be Russia's special role in Europe. Do the proponents of that idea have in mind both the former zone of Soviet domination and West Europe? No great imagination is needed to see that when the special role of Russia in Europe is mentioned, Europe east of the German-Polish boundary is meant. Yet Michael Mandelbaum assumed the public lacks that imagination when in FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May-June 1995) he in the same breath opposed the eastward expansion of NATO (because "it is not Russia's destiny" to disturb peace in Europe) and argued in favor of preserving NATO in its existing form as a safeguard for Western Europe ("in the event that Russia resumes an imperialist foreign policy").

A recently published report, "Should NATO Expand?", drafted by a team of experts under the auspices of New York's Council on Foreign Relations, practices the same not-too-refined approach (it is thus not surprising that Henry Kissinger and Professor Samuel P. Huntington declined placing their signatures under the final version of that report, even though they took part in the team's work).

Questions About NATO's Future

The question of the future of NATO is a question about the scope of the transformation of European policy and the ways of exploiting the victory handed to the West's politicians practically on a silver platter by the democratic forces in Central and Eastern Europe. In the six years that have elapsed since the disintegration of the Communist bloc, the dominant logic has been that of a cautious and restrained savoring of the fruits of the disintegration of the Communist system. German Minister of Defense Volker Ruhe defined that logic very precisely: "The artificial division of Germany was overcome, but there still exists an artificial division of Europe." Former President of the United States Richard Nixon reasoned just as precisely when in mid-1991 (!) he appealed, "We shall never build a common transatlantic mansion if NATO forces the citizens of Eastern Europe to live outside the defensive walls of the alliance," and he demanded that the United States treat relations with the new Eastern Europe as "just as important as the traditional ties with Western Europe."

The logic of restrained savoring has suggested a solution based on two pillars: the rise of a united Germany controlled by NATO (and by special American-Russian relations), and the return to the concept, preceding the Cold War, of open and loosely controlled spheres of interest in Central Europe and the Balkans. By contrast, the logic of unrestrained savoring—a notion that has never been seriously discussed—presupposes pushing Russia as far as possible away from the center of Europe, expanding NATO rapidly, and providing strong support to the non-Russian republics, particularly to Ukraine, as elements of a new "cordon sanitaire."

There is room for compromise between these two options. Sergey Karaganov, a member of Yeltsin's Security Council, was right in declaring that, if they are to be concerned for the future, "the victors should not desire too much." There is no need for and no sense in backing present-day Russia against the wall. But a compromise will require a precise definition of its terms.

Above all, the formulas of the strategic role of American-Russian dialogue and of the special role of Russia in Europe require an explicit separation. With or without NATO, the dialogue between the United States and Russia will continue. The Gore-Chernomyrdin commission is not linked to NATO. Karaganov, a democrat, defines such a compromise fairly precisely as a kind of return to a Yalta not contaminated by Stalinism. He said that Russia will be happy if the present 1,500-km neutral zone between Russia and West Europe is maintained. He did not add that in practice this zone has already shrunk. Owing to the conclusion of the Treaty of Tashkent and agreements on common defense of CIS borders and on common air defense, Russia is present not only in the Kaliningrad Enclave but also on the Bug River, 600 km from Berlin, whereas NATO stays where it was.

In view of all this, we believe that linking the formulas for bilateral American-Russian dialogue to the special role of Russia in Europe is a misconception which is bound to result in mistaken political choices and bad decisions. The new Europe is by now too independent—especially in economic terms—and complex a subject of international relations to accept without resistance merely cosmetic changes in the Cold War system. Yet at the same time, owing to the Cold War, Europe is living through its infancy in the development of its identity in the domain of foreign and security policy. It therefore needs the presence of the United States on the continent (as a partner and not as "an invited empire" like in the 1950's). At the same time it needs room for its own growth. It also needs a Russia that does not pretend to play a role bigger than that determined by its actual potential. In a word, it needs answers to the questions asked jointly in 1949 by G. F. Kennan, H. Morgenthau, R. Niebuhr, and J. Oppenheimer—questions that allow for the consequences of the revolution of the years 1989-92: "In what geographical space and in what composition do we desire to attain the unity of Europe in the long run? How far do we actually desire to promote that process?"

[1 Aug p 6]

[FBIS Translated Text]

European Problems and Russia

The question of specifically Central European arguments over the future of NATO, including its expansion, is a rhetorical one. There are no such specifically European arguments. There are instead general European problems. The views of such Central European countries as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary on the main security issues basically do not differ from the program of the members of the European Union. Their perception of perils and opportunities is the same, and their assessment of Russian policy is identical, despite the noises made about it to the contrary. More importantly, this considerable convergence of views, fundamental to expanding the transatlantic security community, has been achieved in a situation in which the Central European countries still remain outside the system of collective defense.

Focusing attention on Central Europe and reducing the problem of reconstructing NATO to the issue of the costs and risk that are involved in admitting new members is a convenient way of evading the crucial problem. The game is played for much higher stakes than security comfort for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary; the stake is building a European security policy in cooperation with the United States—an objective that was not feasible during the Cold War period.

Building such a policy will be impossible unless NATO is transformed into a full-fledged transatlantic and European organization for collective defense, whose integral element would be an actual rather than a declarative common foreign and security policy, equipped with effective instruments of action. Its territorial scope should correspond on the whole to the territory of the expanded European Union. Such a renewal of NATO would mean demolishing the second—after the divided Germany—pillar of Yalta, namely, the special sphere of Soviet interests in Europe (the former "external empire"). It would also mean overcoming such a consequence of the Cold War as the political and defense-related absence of West Europe.

Without Russia's "Special Role"

Such a program implies, however, that outside the domain of special relations between Russia and the United States in selected fields of global policy, cooperation with Russia in Europe must be based on a "normal" partnership and not on acknowledgement of that country's "special role." Is such a premise realistic?

The boundaries of compromise with Russia and its role in Europe should be determined by reality, which means chiefly the fact of the disintegration of the USSR and the drastic decline in the economic potential of Russia (in both absolute and relative terms). Economically that country is not a major power. According to 1992-93 reports from the Russian Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, "in terms of most parameters (other than territorial size and nuclear potential) Russia belongs in the category of medium-sized powers." In Europe this category includes, according to the authors, France, Great Britain, and Italy.

Russia is at present in the throes of its postimperial birth. It is the heir of the principal part of the ruined empire and is barely an embryo of a modern major power—if its reforms succeed. What is more, its receding traditional major-power status is nowadays even more one-dimensional than it was before 1989, being reduced almost exclusively to the military factor. It is a fundamental fact that the Russian GDP in 1993 was lower than that of China and Brazil, let alone Germany, France, or Italy.

The Fancies of Generals

The one-dimensional nature of the new Russia was confirmed by the war in Chechnya. General Boris Gromov, the last commander of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, astutely termed it, in an interview granted to DIE WELT, "the war against one's own people," waged on the basis of "criminal orders." But the same Gromov criticized the aspirations of the Central European countries to membership in NATO as being motivated solely by their unwarranted fear of Russia. "After all, we live in new times," he said.

Looking for cohesiveness in the opinions of Russian generals would be an exercise in futility. But the issue, raised by Gromov, of the "promises" given by the West to the former USSR concerning the future structure of European security merits special consideration. This is particularly true since Gromov's argument is increasingly being cited by Russians, and not just by their generals. At the same time, Gromov was doubtless right in stating that Chechnya does not reflect the entire truth about the readiness and potential of the Russian Armed Forces. However, it illustrates to many of Russia's neighbors and to all of Europe the extent of the militarization of the system by which strategic decisions are made, and of a considerable area of Russia's political life.

Recently yet another political notion of the military has been circulating in the corridors of the General Staff: the nuclearization of the Kaliningrad Enclave as a response to the eventual expansion of NATO. Ever since the declaration made in the fall of 1993 of a new Russian political-military doctrine, ideas for a geopolitical exploitation of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, resembling the American concepts for offsetting the Soviet conventional potential in Europe in the early 1950's, have been proliferating in Moscow. The episode in Budyennovsk, which shook Russia, made it clear to Russians that their country is experiencing huge difficulties in reaching an accommodation with its own non-Russian citizens. Also readily perceivable is the Weimar disease of a major power that is incapable of accepting the consequences of the depreciation of its own actual status.

In such a situation, should Russia be guaranteed the maintenance, in a more civilized form, of the role in European policy that was formerly assured to the USSR by its militarized economy, by the presence of tanks in Berlin, and by the influence of Communists and their sympathizers in Rome and Paris? Are not at least some attempts to overvalue the importance of Russia (such as the recent G-7 summit) a misunderstanding, from this standpoint?

American Ambitions

Russia and Europe need mutual cooperation based on realities and common interests. Cooperation with Europe, which now is essential to Russia's balance of trade, should become the determining factor in that country's nonimperial future. But Europe will not cope with the problem of Russia so long as there are strong tendencies within the American political establishment to utilize Moscow to bring order into the European scene. The existence of such tendencies is, in turn, an invitation to the European powers to enter into a game of their own with Russia, by choice or by necessity.

For example, the history of the Contact Group is highly instructive when viewed not from the narrow standpoint of the war in Bosnia but as an example of Russia's masterly exploitation of the opportunities afforded it in the Balkans by Western Europe and the United States. We are witnessing the building of a community of interests whose more or less active participants are Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece. Bulgaria, whose foreign and security policy is coming increasingly closer to Russia's, is at the same time highly active in promoting contacts with Greece. In sum, disturbing things are happening on the southeastern flank of NATO.

Intra-European Rivalry Again?

The longer the impasse continues in the discussion of the North Atlantic alliance's future, the more difficult it will be for Europe to break out of the vicious circle of its historic legacy of the Cold War and impotence. In lieu of basic choices and decisions, vicarious problems and quasi-solutions appear. The Balladur Plan exemplified this with regard to Central Europe. It delayed, under the lofty slogan of combatting nationalism, the process of the integration of, e.g., Poland and the Czech Republic with the European Union, without contributing to the solution of the actual problems of nationalism and territorial disputes in the areas in which they occur in an acute form. Poles and Czechs, who had solved their problems with neighbors even before Balladur presented his plan, have had some difficulty in understanding, to put it diplomatically, "what it is all about."

In its turn, in Europe, the foundation of the European Union, which until recently had been thought to be the Franco-German understanding, is no longer so solid. The revival of the Paris-London axis, the offensive of Euro-skeptics in London, and the intensified activity of Paris in the south of Europe, are placing Germany in an odd situation. "Renationalization" is becoming more than just a theoretical concept. In sum, the rejection of thinking of Europe as a whole and of acting in the interest of Europe as a whole points in the direction of the old ruts of intra-European rivalries.

This menacing trend is, we wish to emphasize, only indirectly linked to Russia and its practical actions. Here Russia is merely a point of reference in the Western European dance, a kind of crooked mirror reflecting the dilemmas of the West. "Renationalization" may occur because someone else, though with less enthusiasm than before, will, if the need arises, keep Russia in check. What is more, a prerequisite for "renationalization" is the maintenance of the status quo in Central Europe, because such a solution postpones the need to genuinely focus on the question of European security and actually adopt an approach to the problem of "Russia in Europe."

The logic of such conduct also operates on the other side, in Russia. But we believe that there are no reasons for accepting the popular argument, offered by the opponents of NATO's expansion in Russia and in the West, that such an expansion would decisively affect the policy of Russia's democratization. The tanks that appeared on Moscow's streets in September and October 1993 did not appear owing to any plans for NATO's expansion, nor was that the reason why Zhirinovsky and other nationalist conservatives became members of the Russian parliament in December 1993. Nor is it because of the "bloc thinking" of the citizens of Central Europe (as Gen. Gromov put it) that the Russian Government has been violating the decisions of the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] by forming the 58th Army in the Northern Caucasus (its formation was reported on 1 June 1995 by the chief of the Russian Army General Staff, General Semyonov). The fragile Russian democracy can be destroyed only by the Russians themselves as a result of internal conflicts, rather than in response to any expansion of NATO.

Salvation in Integration

There is, however, a grain of truth in the belief that the expansion and reconstruction of NATO, interpreted as paying effective attention to the problem of European security and conclusively dismantling the remnants of the Cold War order, worries those Russians who are not reconciled to the fall of the Great Fatherland of the Proletariat. But it is not just they: Also looking on fearfully are some Russian democrats who deplore the dramatic shrinkage of the major-power potential of their homeland. Hence they too, in desperation, want to prove that a nuclear Russia remains predestined to play a "special role" in Europe—not in the future, but now.

Vladimir P. Lukin, while still Russian ambassador to the United States—and currently the influential chairman of the Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee—perceived such an opportunity for Russia in preserving the foundations of the Cold War order in Europe. He wrote, "Russia is opposed to the transformation of Europe into a closed economic system and a military-political union.... From the Russian standpoint it would be best to preserve the multipolar nature of European policy and the role of the United States in the region." Such proposals should be read with history in mind. Sir Michael Howard viewed as follows the nature of European policy when it was deformed by the Cold War during 1949-89: "The relations among the British, the French, and the Germans were determined by their relationship with the United States. All three countries functioned within the framework of an alliance dominated by the Americans."

An end to such projects, which reflect not innovation but inertia of strategic thought, may be put by a political, military, and economic integration of Central Europe with the existing Western Europe and the euro-atlantic structures. That will be the beginning, and not the end, of the building of genuine European security and long-term and peaceful cooperation with Russia as a partner in, and cocreator of, that security.

Opinions on NATO Reorganization, Expansion

95EP0141B Warsaw MYSL WOJSKOWA in Polish No 2, Mar-Apr 95 pp 17-28

[Article by Professor Julian Kaczmarek: "NATO and What Beyond?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is common knowledge that the North Atlantic Alliance came into being as a consequence of the postwar policy of the USSR. Its basic goal was and still is to maintain, perpetuate, and if need be, restore peace in the member countries.

The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact were seen as the main threat interfering with the achievement of this objective since the possibility was foreseen of their use to further a policy aimed at changes in the political system which was ultimately to bring about revolution and a victory of communism worldwide.

The situation changed radically in the early 1990's. To be sure, communist countries still exist (China, North Korea, Cuba). However, their transformation is assuming evolutionary forms and does not compel as intensive an armament process as previously. The restoration of the previous political system in some states or its appropriate modification is unlikely, although not impossible. The current extent of military threat is incomparably smaller and does not require that the quantitative and qualitative levels of armed forces be maintained which existed not only during the Cold War but also in the detente period that followed it.

This means that the objective for which NATO was established has diminished to such a degree that one can genuinely ponder the sense of the further existence of this alliance, or the need for its profound modification. This is why two basic questions should be considered vital:

Is NATO still necessary as a political-military organization?

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, in what way should this alliance be changed?

The purpose of the present article is to attempt to come up with answers to the two questions above.

My views in this matter are the result of research done over the last three years, familiarization with numerous publications and primary sources, and participation in many conferences (symposiums, seminars) held by organizations such as the European House, the German Union of Soldiers, and the Union of European Federalists, among others.

I believe that those politicians and scientists are undoubtedly right who maintain that in the early 1990's the situation in the area of broadly interpreted security has radically changed and at the same time become more complex, and that it continues to change and become more complex quickly. Moreover, nonmilitary threats (political, social, economic, ecological, and threats to public order and security) have not only failed to diminish but, in some areas and regions of the world, have on the contrary mounted. To be sure, generally the degree of so-called high-intensity military threat, including that involving the use of weapons of mass destruction, mainly nuclear, has diminished; however, such a threat has unfortunately not been entirely eliminated. At the same time, the threat of conventional conflict has intensified in some regions of the world which causes or may cause the outbreak of small-scale, low-intensity conventional wars. This state of affairs by no means suggests that conflicts of this nature can be neglected. Moreover, within very short periods of time such "small wars" may transform themselves into conflicts involving sizable areas, including our continent.

An assessment of the threats outlined above suggests two truths which have been pointed up by many scientists and politicians:

—the first truth is that the interdependence of states is becoming a worldwide rule;

—in turn, the second truth is that security has a global dimension.

The above truths suggest that, in order to achieve certain objectives, not only military means can now be employed (as has previously been the case in most instances) but also nonmilitary means. Moreover, the second mode is considered preferable. This brings about the military aspect beginning to be recognized as the "ultimate argument of kings."

These truths also suggest that no state, not even a superpower such as the United States, is completely self-sufficient from the security point of view; that is to say, security now has a far greater scope than before.

We should also note that various international organizations, mainly the United Nations, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and others, e.g. the conference of the seven (eight) richest states of the world, multinational corporations, etc., play an essential role in the security area in addition to great powers. It should be kept in mind, however, that these organizations are not any stronger than the collective will of the states which belong to them. They cannot accomplish anything by themselves. They are merely mechanisms through which states can cooperate with each other.

Since the collapse of the USSR as a world power we have been dealing with a unipolar world. Despite that the probability of this quite loose unipolar system may last for a historically short period of time, as J. Stefanowicz (Footnote 1. J. Stefanowicz, *The Republic's Field of Vision*, Warsaw, 1993) states, the duration of its existence may be long enough for security arrangements to be sought within it (it is assumed that it may last as long as until the middle of the next century).

As we analyze the strategic dimension of this problem which is of great significance for the purposes of the present article, we should conclude that we are proceeding toward a multipolar world. New world powers are increasingly emerging not only in the political and economic areas but also in the military area, such as Japan, China, and Russia, and in Europe, the European Union (perhaps the United States of Europe) or Germany. They will cause the current arrangement of a unipolar nature to possibly become a multipolar system in two, three, or more decades.

An analysis of available literature suggests that the heretofore prevalent reasoning which gave a preference to tendencies toward meeting needs militarily without restrictions, which I would conventionally call the philosophy of war, is being increasingly often crowded out by the trend to meet the needs in line with existing opportunities offered by peaceful activities which I would call, likewise conventionally, the philosophy of peace.

The acceptance of the philosophy of peace compels comprehensive problem resolution not only from the substantive, functional, and timing standpoints but also a preference for a continuous dialogue, persuasion, and compromises which, naturally, cannot be equated with unceasing concessions that result in negating the reasons for being of individual states.

Accepting this way of thinking and acting also changes the role and situation of individual states because none of them holds a dominant position which would allow it to become a decisionmaker ignoring the opinions of others. This means that states are increasingly becoming partners on an equal footing. However, we should note that this increases the dependence of individual states on majority views and on the states which, for various reasons, are acknowledged to be the main bearers of generally accepted democratic ideas. Nonetheless, the tendency to give preference to one's own objectives and tasks will continue to be of the essence but the objectives and tasks of other states will have to be taken into account.

We should also acknowledge as necessary for our subsequent considerations the statement that the rigorous dualism of the past era placed a corset over ethnic quarrels, disputes between neighbors and regional disputes (mainly ethnic and religious), and to a large degree also over the North-South conflict which has been smoldering since the time of decolonization. These very forces are now being set free because in the period of "bipolarity" and the Cold War everybody "had to" be content. At present, the international order is influenced primarily by the following:

—the awakening of consciousness of certain social groups;

—poverty, and in some regions outright starvation and privation;

—the development of armaments, especially in Third World countries;

—the remaining and still appearing new hotbeds of military conflicts;

—progressing pollution of the environment;

—increasingly limited opportunities to obtain supplies of raw materials which result in a situation fraught with conflicts even for the great powers.

As the analyzed literature suggests, the main risk is found in Third World states. For example, in Mozambique the per capita gross product comes to $60; poor countries are growing poorer. This cycle of poverty, on one hand, aggravates the threat condition while, on the other hand, forcing a gradual adjustment of previously used theories to the existing situation.

The analysis of literature reveals that Asia is beginning to awaken. Countries such as Japan, China, and India are beginning to get the upper hand in a rivalry with Europe. Japan and the so-called seven little tigers already amount to a huge economic force (economic growth in the years 1990-93 came to 44 percent in China, 38 percent in Thailand, 30 percent in South Korea, 28 percent in Indonesia, 27 percent in Taiwan, 23 percent in Pakistan, and 17 percent in India, but only 5 percent in the European Union). We should add to this Russia, whose Asian section has a great raw-material potential. This entire region (with the exception of Japan) is also a source of cheap labor which is capable of mining and processing the raw materials. This means that the Pacific rather than the Atlantic region is becoming a priority focus of superpower interests.

Besides, we must agree with the statement of Z. Brzezinski, who maintains that "international security in the post-Cold War era is likely to depend on the following:

"the degree to which Europe succeeds in both deepening its political and military unity and—without too much delay—widening its scope (at issue are the countries of Central and Eastern Europe—note by Julian Kaczmarek);

"the transformation of the Soviet Union into a loose and voluntary confederation;

"movement in the Far East toward a regional security accommodation that constructively engages Japan, China, the United States, and perhaps also the Soviet Union;

"efforts by the United States, as the decisive arbiter of Middle East security, to set in motion a regional peace process" (Footnote 2. Z. Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1991).

The implementation of the intentions outlined above is facilitated by the fact that the major states have recognized the aforementioned philosophy of peace. To be sure, basic needs have not changed: This is still about access to raw materials, free trade, and cheap labor. However, opportunities for meeting the needs have changed, primarily the forms and ways of meeting them. It is recognized that dialogue and persuasion bringing about partial or final compromises should be preferred.

A question needs to be asked: What brought about the current opportunity for advancing the concept of lasting peace bolstered by the appropriate potential, including military? The reasons for this state of affairs are undoubtedly many. For this reason, I will outline the ones I consider the most important.

First, thinking in totalitarian categories which is aimed, among other things, at gaining control of the world or just a continent through the use of force has already become an anachronism. The conviction has universally prevailed that in the foreseeable future there is no opportunity to cause and prosecute a large-scale war associated with the murder of people. Moreover, in many industrialized countries of the world the principle saying that war is a continuation of policy by different means has also lost significance because no long-term objective can be achieved in this manner (the division of Germany as a result of World War II is the case in point). To be sure, we are facing actions by people who are being wronged and who live in poverty, ethnic disputes and other phenomena which are fraught with conflict and which can bring about short-term, or even long-term—but perhaps low-intensity—military conflicts, naturally, unless preventive measures are taken in a timely manner, such as negotiations through which a sensible compromise is achieved, and a nonmilitary influence is brought to bear. The recently signed agreements in the Middle Eastern region can serve as an example, mainly the Palestinian-Israeli agreement.

We should also be aware that the major scourges of the contemporary world, such as terrorism, smuggling, organized crime, illegal trade transactions, or mass migrations of people cannot be eradicated through a "small-scale" or even "large-scale" war.

Second, the armed forces of individual states are shrinking, and the implementation of agreements in this area is increasingly under control. However, it should also be kept in mind that the quality of military materiel is improving which means, on one hand, that it is becoming increasingly expensive, and on the other, increasingly effective. Therefore, highly developed states which have automated weapons of the latest generation and modern electronic warfare assets have an advantage. However, in view of excellent intelligence, an ever decreasing proportion of the armed forces remains in a state of high combat readiness which causes the time needed to achieve full combat readiness to lengthen (this feature indicates the peacetime footing of the armed forces). It should also be noted that the armed forces are no longer associated with an ideology or a great leader but rather with a state and its constitution. In turn, exports of weapons and their proliferation are running into growing resistance and international restrictions. The above state of affairs, on one hand, makes it impossible to cause a war (in particular, a large-scale war) within a short period of time while, on the other hand, making it easier to discover preparations for a war. Therefore, the adversary has sufficient time to take appropriate measures which could be aimed at counteracting or repelling the planned aggression.

Third, the Cold War period has ended. A genuine detente is beginning to prevail over an increasingly large area of the globe. Individual states and international organizations can increasingly meet their needs without resorting to armed confrontations. Beyond the slightest doubt such actions are less costly and produce the expected results.

At present, an increasing number of international organizations and leading states (UN, OSCE, EU, the United States, and others) participate in the peaceful resolution of disputes; their activity is being increasingly supported by the North Atlantic Alliance.

Fourth, there is reason to believe that revolutionary changes in Europe will influence the evolution of new views of the individuals who decide the fate of societies. The process which began in the late 1980's is facilitating the enhancement of political detente and the acceleration of changes in Central and Eastern Europe of which the societies of this region approve.

Pessimists maintain that we should wait until it is ascertained whether the progressing changes are caused by a "new way of thinking," or merely a period of preparation for streamlining and regrouping forces after which the "old way of thinking" will be revisited. One can share such doubts but one cannot fail to notice that the end of the war in Vietnam, the withdrawal of Russians from Afghanistan and Western and Central Europe, as well as securing the consent for forming a Palestinian state are proof of the emergence of a new consciousness within societies and a new thinking by political leaders. This raises hopes for a lasting peace in Europe and throughout the world, although local wars are still underway and still new threats appear.

The above political and military situation in Europe and in the world resulted in the recognition of the need to develop basic directions for activities in the coming years by the North Atlantic Treaty summits in Rome (1991) and Brussels (1994) and the Maastricht summit of the European Union (1992).

It was stated that peace and freedom still remain the fundamental objective of these two organizations. These ideas should be binding on all countries of the continent which are building a system based on democracy, free markets, and respect for human rights. Translating into reality the image of a united Europe in which military threats do not exist and which recognizes a partnership with North America (this should be considered the basic scenario) was accepted to be the main effort in accomplishing this mission. As an expression of the above stance, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace in 1994 which are open to all former members of the Warsaw Treaty.

It was assumed that the states of Central Europe would be admitted to individual all-European organizations, although not to the same degree and not simultaneously, as democratic transformations progress and their civilizations develop. The admission of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in which democratic changes have been slower in coming was not ruled out either. Also taken into account was the possibility of the CIS creating a separate political and military structure or its breakup into smaller states which upon gaining full independence will be gradually admitted to individual West European organizations. Nor was the possibility ruled out of Central European countries building a democratic system over a longer period of time, without being actual members of West European organizations, although maintaining ties with them.

Finally, it was assumed that the communist system would continue to break up worldwide (China, Cuba, South Korea); this is borne out by the changes underway. The democratic system will become the fundamental force of the contemporary world.

It was recognized that religious fundamentalism would hold its own, and that various nationalist movements would come back to life.

Political, economic, social, and ecological aspects of security will become significant, along with public order and internal security.

It was recognized that the process of restricting and reducing armaments should be continued, and that efforts to influence Third World countries should begin.

Dialogue and cooperation will continue to play a fundamental role in the outlined activities while deterrence will be preserved but should not assume an aggressive nature.

Also assumed were far-reaching integration and cohesion of Western Europe and the development and appropriate transformation of all of its institutions and organizations. They should encompass not only the economy and finance but also politics and security.

It was accepted that in the period of transition which was beginning, the North Atlantic Alliance would continue to play a decisive role in the area of military security. Its objectives and tasks were precisely defined:

—in peacetime, the alliance is not only to observe but also to monitor compliance with disarmament agreements and participate in UN and CSCE peacekeeping missions, prevent conflicts and crises, and be active in confidence building;

—in a period of crisis, the alliance should reinforce the power of political impact and facilitate reductions in tensions;

—during the war, the alliance must repulse aggression and rebuild the territorial integrity of the commonwealth, as well as provide conditions for maintaining a dialogue and cooperation.

The absence of a genuine military threat has caused differing views to emerge and be publicized. This increases the role of political influence, and first of all economic, scientific, technical, and social influence, and necessitates integration and cooperation. In turn, this facilitates the peaceful resolution of issues in dispute.

The pessimistic scenario assumes that the United States will reduce its armed forces and influence in Europe below the required minimum because of budget constraints. Some European states will not be interested in accepting arrangements which will be established at successive European Union and NATO summits, for example, those concerning the federation of the member states of the union and the expansion of NATO's functions. For this reason, they will leave the commonwealth or will not remain aligned with it in accordance with prior commitments.

It is assumed that in the above situation it may come to a leadership rivalry between the great powers of Europe. It may be assumed with a high degree of probability that Germany (where, incidentally, nationalist forces may become increasingly influential) will be the winner.

It cannot be ruled out that Germany will forge a mutually beneficial alliance with the CIS or Russia alone. Germany will gain access to raw materials and a large market for sales in this manner whereas Russia will ensure its comprehensive development by using German technology, organization, and economic assistance, and will revert to superpower politics.

Intermediate scenarios may also become a reality in the future. One of them calls for the continuation of the presence of American forces and influence in Europe and the withdrawal of many states from the community. This could result in the relaxation of requirements for the remaining states which will be willing to associate with the European Union and NATO despite everything.

Various scenarios notwithstanding, we should assume that the first one of them will become a reality, perhaps with certain changes, restrictions, and difficulties. As it is, this scenario is the most favorable for the world, Europe, and our country from the strategic point of view. In the context of problems of concern to us, this means that NATO:

—will continue to exist as an organization providing military security for its members;

—will prepare to incorporate other countries in its structure in various organizational forms (the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Partnership for Peace, and others);

—will modify its organizational structure, technology, and strategy in keeping with the needs of the political and military situation in Europe and the world;

—after making the changes mentioned, will be prepared to accomplish the three groups of tasks outlined above.

However, we should be aware that over time the security of individual states and the continent will increasingly depend on solving problems associated with global threats. If we wish to preserve peace in Europe we will have to work on these problems to a considerably greater extent than before.

The Maastricht (European Union) and Rome (NATO) resolutions give direction to activities in the immediate future. Likewise, they guarantee stabilization and security of the member states at the current stage of European realignment. Besides, they secure this realignment in combination with the economic potential and political actions.

In principle, there is no doubt that at present, NATO plays the role of a guarantor of peace and stability in Europe and, in a sense, also on a global scale. However, in its current form it is not capable of guaranteeing security throughout the European continent, to say nothing about the globe. Therefore, it is necessary for NATO to develop further and be gradually transformed in an evolutionary manner. This is about NATO being endowed with adequate jurisdiction to accomplish the following tasks:

—internal (intra-European)—to this end, NATO should develop as a central institution ensuring the harmonious development of the armed forces and guaranteeing the transparency of arms planning and control, as well as confidence building;

—external (extra-European)—so that NATO can carry out, through the United Nations, undertakings against aggressive states in keeping with the resolutions of this organization or under its direct guidance. This also involves a ban on the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and up-to-date military technology.

This means that NATO should transform itself from a regional (European) organization into an international organization (in a global sense) in the security and disarmament area.

NATO should also fight international crime, primarily the drug trade and terrorism, and prevent the destruction of the environment and natural resources, and also reveal regional armaments, causes of conflicts, failures to uphold human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities, and be a restraining factor in the event of a mass flight by the population or its expulsion. It should also make it impossible for armament gangs to emerge and operate.

In the event of crimes on a global scale or an arising threat of a regional conflict with the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, NATO should have an opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of individual states (naturally, on a mandate from the UN Security Council).

In summation, this is about NATO supporting the political and economic activities of the UN in order to ensure peace and stabilization on a global scale.

As I outline the above proposal, I am fully aware that for now it should be considered utopian. A NATO wishing to assume the tasks outlined would have to transform itself radically into a completely different organization. Organizational structures, materiel and weaponry, the national composition, subordination, and even the name of the organization would have to be changed, too. It would also be necessary to change strategy and tactics. This is why the present proposal should be considered a long-term outlook (covering a period of three to five decades) from which we should proceed in designing transformations which this organization will certainly undergo.

Although the outlook presented cannot be translated into reality at present, even now it is possible to imagine that, in addition to the already permanent command (headquarters) and units ensuring its efficient operation (including reconnaissance and support units), this future NATO (which might be called the UN Armed Forces) could include combat units, for example, an international rapid reaction corps capable of immediate (or almost immediate) action in all regions of the globe and units from state-members of the UN Security Council, and even other states, which could be subordinated to the supreme command on a permanent basis or as needed.

Nor is there any doubt about the statement that the proposed outlook should be viewed globally. Therefore, we should also be aware of the changes which other organizations should undergo. In the area of interest to us, this means primarily changes which the European Union and the West European Union should undergo.

The findings of prognosticators envision the following stages for the transformation of the European Union into the United States of Europe (as one of the scenarios, to my mind the basic one) (Footnote 3. L. Souchon, *The Renaissance of Europe*, Berlin, 1994, pp 258-259):

—a period of "deepening" which involves the reinforcement of the institutions created. It is expected to last for about a decade;

—a period of "expansion" involving the gradual admission of new members from among the states of Central and Eastern Europe. One decade is also projected for the tasks of this period to be accomplished;

—a period of "unification" which will likely come in the middle of the next century. It involves the creation of a joint democratic state—the United States of Europe.

The armed forces of such United States of Europe should guarantee peace, security, and stabilization in Europe independently or with support from the NATO armed forces (UN armed forces). They could be established on the basis of the organizational structure of the West European Union (whose name could also be changed).

In addition to the United States of Europe which would integrate the states on our continent, we should welcome with satisfaction the processes of integration in America, Southeast Asia, and perhaps Central and Southwest Asia, as well as in Africa. The United States of America should continue to play a leading role in this process of integration.

Unfortunately, the proposed changes in the field of worldwide security, and primarily that of Europe, compel the existence of the armed forces with a view to ensuring:

—a foundation for peaceful life on Earth;

—the provision of conditions for humanitarian coexistence and welfare;

—economic cooperation;

—humanitarian aid for those who need it;

—a fair division of resources.

The following continue to be acknowledged as priority tasks on our planet: the preservation, perpetuation, and, if need be, restoration of peace, controlled consumption of raw materials and resources, and environmental protection. Both research activities and practical operations in this area should be intensified.

The changes and modifications outlined can play an important role in accomplishing the above tasks; these changes and modifications should be regarded as one of the possible scenarios for projected solutions. They make it possible to give direction to the proposals currently being made and the decisions made on their basis.

Slow-Paced Reform of Local Governments Criticized

95EP0145B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22 Jun 95 p 2

[Article by R.W.: "The Poland of the Capital City Is Oblivious to the Poland of Local Governments: National Dietine of Local Governments"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The creation of the second level of local governance—without clarifying whether this to be the powiat [county] or the autonomous voivodship—was supported by the participants of yesterday's (21 June) meeting of the General Assembly of the National Dietine of Local Governments. The dietine's Speaker Adam Struzik, declared that the Polish Peasant Party will soon offer for public discussion a draft of the law on the autonomous voivodship. President Lech Walesa criticized the government and the parliament for the absence of "assistive actions" on behalf of local governments and succumbing to "partisan alignments and power plays." His accusations were rejected by Prime Minister Oleksy.

Politicians in Eyeglasses

In Lech Walesa's opinion, the establishment of local governments in 1990 was the most successful "of all the reforms we are carrying out in the independent Poland." The president opposed local governments to politicians from the central government and parliament. "The former," he said, "are trying to focus attention on specific issues and feel personally responsible for the common good. In the central government and parliament, on the other hand, a different thinking prevails. Politicians are unable to put aside political alignments and power plays. They behave as if they were wearing eyeglasses with a special filter through which they view all problems in their political context alone." Walesa further declared that government bureaucrats are profligate spenders, because "they learned that everything can be balanced in the books and the cost can be charged to taxpayers."

According to the president, useful work continues at the "grassroots level," while ambition, envy, and partisan interests keep the pot boiling at the top. "The Poland of the capital city cannot or does not want to perceive the Poland of local governments." The legislative and executive branches of the state do not help the local communities and do not utilize their experience.

Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy claimed that the president's comments "need qualifying and are oversimplified." He argued, "If it is really true that only everything is evil and political games in Warsaw, then we would not be making any progress. Yet, the progress made in this country is evident; we can feel it, the world sees it, and things are getting better."

Discussion of Levels of Local Government Should Be Revived

Prime Minister Oleksy admitted that the work "on the further development of local governance" has halted. "Such criticism should be jointly accepted," he declared to the Assembly participants present in the Polish Senate room. He favored "activating the discussion of the second level of local governance" without defining whether it is to be the powiat or the autonomous voivodship. The prime minister said, "The disputes on this topic, which were rolling across the country, should not have died down."

President Lech Walesa, too, avoided defining which type of the second level of local governance he favors. "The name is unimportant. The need is for a reorganization of local governance and, in the future, for a third level. As for the details, let us leave them to the logic of events," he told the reporters.

The delegates incorporated a sentence on "the need to urgently develop a second level of local governance" in the declaration adopted by the General Assembly.

The Reform According to the PSL

"The PSL [Polish Peasant Party] is preparing a draft bill on the autonomous voivodship. In the next few days that draft will be presented for public discussion," the reporters were informed by Adam Struzik, the Speaker of the National Dietine of Local Governments (who is also the Speaker of the Polish Senate). The draft presupposes maintaining the current number of voivodships and establishing in the second stage, starting in 1992, 10 to 12 regions as the third level of local administration. Its framers intend it as an alternative to the introduction of powiats which Adam Struzik considers to be "archaic structures."

Increased Smuggling on Lithuanian Border Noted

95EP0145A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22 Jun 95 p 3

[Article by Zbigniew Lentowicz: "A Troubled 103-km Long Border: Crowded Border Crossings, Illegal Migration, Smuggling"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The common border is only 103 km long, but it is still far from normal," complain the Polish guards responsible for the security of the Polish-Lithuanian boundary. Lithuania is the only country to the east with which Poland does not have a boundary agreement regulating many practical questions ensuing from contiguity of borders. The immigration services of the Polish Republic also lack international readmission agreements on the handling of foreign nationals illegally crossing the green border as well as of illegal visitors who violate the laws of hospitality and should be deported back to their homeland as is being done elsewhere throughout Europe.

So said Stanislaw Firlej of the Podlasie Border Guards Detachment which "guards" on the Polish side the Lithuanian border, among others. He threw in some statistics: While last year typical border crimes declined in number in the west, south, and even east of the country, on the Polish-Lithuanian border they increased twofold.

The Refugees Come in Groups

The number of, especially, illegal immigrants has been growing in the last three or four years at a terrifying pace. Refugees from the poorer Asian countries, such as Hindus, Pakistanis, citizens of Sri Lanka, and Bangladeshis are transported through secret routes from Moscow and other places in the Russian interior to Mariampol, Vilna, and Kovno. In return for their illegal transit from Russia across Poland to Germany they are ready to pay $2,000-3,000 each.

Firlej said, "The highest going rate, according to the information provided by detainees, is 5,000 'greenbacks.'" Long since the organizers of cross-border "excursions" have noticed that the weakest link exists precisely on the Polish-Lithuanian border. This year so far, 16 groups of refugees were detained on the Polish side. Already in the first three months of 1995 95 refugees were detained and, according to the figures provided by the Border Guard, they accounted for one-half of all those detained during that period at the eastern boundary of the Polish Republic. Last year the undesired newcomers proceeded toward Poland chiefly in organized groups of which the seven largest numbered 30 to 36 persons each.

"So far we have detained 15 organizers of the illegal escapades; they were accompanied by at least 19 local assistants suspected of providing services for hire," I was told by Major Jaroslaw Zukowicz, the spokesman for the Commanding Officer of the Polish Border Guards. However, the border guards soon found how very difficult it is to prove anyone's participation in smuggling "live contraband." The owner of a bus full of Hindus and Afghans recently claimed that he had met his passengers by accident. They asked him for a ride and he lacked the heart to refuse, according to Firlej.

Low, Above the Treetops

Aside from one overflight by a Belarussian who landed in Bialowieza two years ago, aircraft carrying illegal passengers and cargo, most often aging Antonov planes, fly onto Polish territory exclusively from Lithuania. Last year observers reported 17 illegal flights and by the end of February this year as many as 13 piratical overflights were recorded. Alarmed, the Polish Air Force last March dispatched combat patrol helicopters to the country's northeastern region, and two radar stations were especially activated. One day in early May the pirates flew in at low altitudes, just above the treetops. This time the immigrants failed, despite the efforts of the flight organizers, to disperse in the Suwalki woods.

Cigarettes Worth Nearly 15 Billion Old Zlotys

In addition to the live contraband passing across the Polish-Lithuanian border there is the merchandise contraband. Last November contraband worth 14.5 billion old zlotys in the form of cigarettes, a record for Poland, was seized in Ogrodniki. Drugs, radioactive isotopes, alcohol, and stolen cars flow illegally in from that Baltic country. To be sure, in the last 15 or so months "unkosher" cars have been increasingly often smuggled in the direction of Kuznica Bialostocka and Belarus (at the Lithuanian border Polish guards seized this year 43 stolen cars, whereas in Kuznica they seized six times as many).

"Crime is rising, but the situation at the border crossings is slowly growing normal ever since the merchandise-clearance barriers have been raised at Budzisk and trains are cruising in Trakiszki, although unfortunately the overcrowding continues," said Major Zukowicz. "The acute tensions, the nervous shoving, and the incidents with the participation of Lithuanian order services at Ogrodniki, which as recently as several years ago angered everyone and fed the tensions, have not recurred. This year the mechanism of agreements at the level of the so-called border commissioners has begun to function."

Dialogue and Relaxation Set In

"Ever since regular meetings were instituted, things became more relaxed, more normal," Major Firlej confirmed. "Following nine visits at the level of Border Guards commanders, working contacts between watchtowers have broadened, at least 150 illegal border-crossers were returned, and current problems were resolved." Firlej was pleased to add, "Despite the absence of precise regulations, there is no problem with returning the 'illegals.'"

This is definite progress, although it is still difficult to speak of full openness and cordial cooperation.

Following the signing of the Polish-Lithuanian intergovernmental treaty, steps began to be taken to resolve thoroughly the border problems. On 10 March the heads of the border services of both countries met officially for the first time in Vilna: The Commanding Officer of the Border Guards Jan Wojcieszczuk and Stanislavas Stanczikas, director of the Border Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Lithuanian Republic. The talks were continued on 6 and 7 June in Warsaw. The most urgent problem was deemed to be reaching an agreement on cooperation between the border-guards services of both countries, as well as on cooperation in combatting illegal immigration. Working groups of experts from both countries are now developing specific regulations. Before the fall, for which the finalizing of the agreements is envisaged, there will also be a meeting between instructors from border-guards schools of both countries.

Trade European Style

Along with the interministerial contacts, cross-border cooperation in the key domain of trade has also been recently tackled by deputies from interparliamentary groups. Poland is by now ready to negotiate the principles of free trade between our countries, the more so considering that recently Lithuania has become anchored in European structures. A precondition for a rapid flow of goods in both directions would now be accelerating the work on standardizing customs documents and procedures (SAD) and defining the rules for determining the origin of merchandise (so as to make unhindered trade with the West possible while at the same time benefiting from specific preferences). "We await encouraging signals for the talks," said Bozena Rafalska of the Office for Cross-Border Cooperation under the Office of the Ministerial Council of the Polish Republic.

Iliescu Desires 'Special Relations' With U.S.

AU2609190495 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] An official meeting between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Romania's President Ion Iliescu took place in Washington today. At the end of the meeting, the Romanian head of state said in a statement made to the press that the discussion was very relaxed and friendly and that it represented a major political moment, which marks the United States' full opening toward Romania. He added that the common desire to develop relations of partnership and friendship between the two countries was expressed during the meeting, with both sides wanting to continue their dialogue, which proved to be useful and fertile.

President Iliescu also said that he reviewed, together with his U.S. counterpart, the progress made in the past two years in the political and military bilateral relations, particularly in the sphere of trade exchanges, which doubled in this period. In this respect, the Romanian head of state emphasized our country's interest in having the most-favored-nation clause granted to Romania made permanent, something which President Clinton warmly endorsed. As a matter of fact, the Romanian president said, the U.S. Administration has already taken the necessary steps in Congress, in this respect.

The Romanian head of state said that, during the talks, he mentioned Romania's determination to integrate itself in the European and euro-atlantic structures and the desire to develop special relations with the United States, in this framework. He also emphasized our country's interest in the outstanding role played by the United States in our region, aimed at ensuring stability and security and the nondiscriminatory approach to the issue of the NATO adherence of countries in our area.

President Iliescu added that he brought up the problem of the losses incurred by Romania's economy from observing the embargo imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that he also raised the issue of financial assistance granted by the relevant international institutions to our country, something which was well received by the chief of the U.S. executive branch. The Romanian President also valued the U.S. involvement, as a decisive factor, in finding a political solution to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

President Clinton appreciated the progress made by our country along the road to economic reform and democratization and the Romanian initiative on a historic reconciliation with Hungary, Romania's president also said.

During the talk, President Ion Iliescu renewed his invitation to the U.S. President to pay a visit to Romania.

UDMR Head Comments on Reconciliation Proposal

AU2609075495 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 21 Sep 95 p 3

[Report by Victor Ciutacu on a statement by UDMR leader Bela Marko: "The Ethnic Problem Is Tending To Become the Major Issue in the Electoral Campaigns"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The meeting held [on 14 September] at Cotroceni Palace by the head of state with leaders of the political parties represented in Parliament has been welcomed and appreciated by Bela Marko. However, he also presented their objections to the document produced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [on the "historic reconciliation" with Hungary], assessing that it "resembles a declaration of good intent rather than a political declaration." Concluding that "such declarations should not replace the basic treaty between Romania and Hungary," the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] president stressed the need to establish basic rules for the ethnic minorities and called for emphasis to be laid on "changing the rhetoric and eliminating nationalist extremist discourse." On this same issue, Marko expressed his concern over the "contradiction between everyday reality and good intentions," as well as his surprise at the "lack of analysis on behalf of the political parties."

After voicing his dissatisfaction that "as the elections draw nearer, the ethnic problem is tending to become the major issue of the electoral campaigns," the UDMR president condemned both the shift that had occurred lately in the stance of the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] and the imminent appointment of a PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] member to the post of Mures County prefect. Marko stated that "the PUNR had a significant role in kindling the tragic events that happened in Targu Mures [interethnic clashes in 1990] and, therefore, the UDMR leaders consider that this possible appointment (which they learned about from the BBC) runs counter to President Ion Iliescu's initiative."

At the conclusion of their meeting with the press, Chamber of Deputies member Arpad Marton [of the UDMR] criticized the alterations made to the Penal Code. Referring to Articles 205 and 206, the UDMR deputy stated that "ours is the only country in the world that has such stipulations in its penal code," wondering whether there was "genuine will to join Europe, if one can be sent to prison for hoisting other flags."

Parties' Objections

AU2509081995 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 16-17 Sep 95 p 5

[Article by Marcela Feraru: "Is It a Simple Coincidence That None of the Presidents of the Parties Allied With the Social Democracy Party of Romania Came to the Meeting With Ion Iliescu?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Ion Iliescu, assisted by Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, held a meeting with leaders of parliamentary parties at Cotroceni Palace on Thursday [14 September] night. The meeting, which took place at the president's request, aimed at holding consultations on the appeal to historic Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation.

The President Did Not Obtain Parties' Support for the Documents on Reconciliation With Hungary

In the morning, the parliamentary parties were given three diplomatic documents, currently being drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the political leaders had to express their opinions on these documents before they were to be presented to the Hungarian side.

While the group of the opposition was present at the meeting at the highest level—with the exception of Corneliu Coposu, who was represented by PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] first deputy president Ion Diaconescu—such as Nicolae Manolescu [Civic Alliance Party], Horia Rusu PL '93 [Liberal Party '93], Bela Marko [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], the allied parties were represented by the vice presidents of those parties! Present were Adrian Paunescu [Socialist Party of Labor], Iuliu Ioan Furo (Greater Romania Party), and Valeriu Suian [Romanian National Unity Party]. As far as the Democratic Party was concerned, that party was represented by Victor Bostinaru, because party leader Petre Roman was abroad.

The documents submitted to the attention of the political leaders were the Joint Romanian-Hungarian Declaration, which expresses the political will of the two sides to embark on the stages of rapprochement and national reconciliation, a draft Treaty of Good Neighborliness, and a Code of Conduct regarding cooperation between Romania and Hungary on the issue of national minorities.

The attempt to obtain the support of the political parties for the presented documents failed. The documents came under vehement criticism from a political point of view, as well as from the viewpoint of their judicial accuracy, and remained in the custody of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to be improved.

The Joint Romanian-Hungarian Declaration Proclaims "Reconciliation Between the Romanian and the Hungarian Peoples"

This wording was contested by the participants, the term "people" considered inadequate, and the term "state" considered much more adequate. While there were no contradictions on the point that refers to mutual support that the two states should grant each other in order to achieve integration in European and euro-atlantic structures, point 3 of the Declaration provoked a real storm. The quoted point refers to the commitment to respect international documents, "the two neighboring countries understanding to have mutual respect for territorial integrity and stating that they have no territorial claims from one another, now or in the future." Such a reference in an official document—the opposition leaders said—is bound to convey that currently there is such a problem, while international bodies no longer even approach this issue, because this is taken for granted.

However, the most contested point was the last one, which was interpreted as an attempt to shift the blame for the failure to the political leaders. The document states that "Each of the leaders of the two states will appeal to the political factors in their country to embark on the process of historic reconciliation between the two peoples." This point was even more difficult to accept because the leaders of the progovernment political parties did not show up at the Cotroceni meeting.

The Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Partnership Between Romania and Hungary Was Accused of Becoming a Substitute for the Basic Treaty With Hungary

The draft document stipulates that consultations should be held between the two governments on decisions regarding foreign policy issues, exchange of information on relations with Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East, exchange of economic information, and a possible economic integration in the area of agriculture, forestry, energy, banking, industry, transportation, telecommunications, and environmental protection. The envisaged areas are described in detail in the document.

The document also stipulates that cooperation in the area of education and culture should be encouraged, as well as in the area of defense, this last one going so far as to suggest mutual training of officers in national military institutions. The program is planned to benefit from the support of the heads of the two states, who will work out directives and will be coordinated by the two foreign ministers. According to the EU model, the ministers in charge of various areas will meet regularly.

Likewise, the document stipulates the establishment of an interministerial commission that will be in charge of overseeing cooperation and partnership issues.

The Code of Conduct Emphasizes the Principle of Local Autonomy

The Code of Conduct, which would govern this plan, stipulates among other things, that the two sides will implement in "the broadest possible manner the principle of local autonomy and decentralization of public services," and the international documents will be interpreted "with the understanding that they do not include the establishment of autonomous administration on ethnic criteria."

Prison Sentence for Hoisting Another State's Flag

AU2509223395 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 20 Sep 95 p 2

[MEDIAFAX report: "Prison Sentence for Hoisting the Flag or for Playing the Anthem of Another State in Public"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The deputies decided that hoisting the flag or other symbols and playing the anthem of another state in public (except for cases stipulated by Law No. 75), will be punishable by a six-month to three-year prison sentence. The UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] representatives tried to eliminate this new paragraph from Article 236 of the Penal Code, but the deputies' vote (nine abstained and three voted against) was decisive in favor of the Judicial Commission's variant. The UDMR's reason for its request, presented by Deputy Ervin Szekely, was that the flag and symbol of another country and the act of playing another country's anthem represent "decorative elements." The leader of the UDMR group in Parliament, Gyorgy Tokay, also spoke out in support of eliminating the new paragraph, and he recalled that the song "Desteapta-te Romane" [Wake Up Romanian—currently Romania's national anthem], that was banned at that time, was sung on 21 December 1989 in Arad and history has proved that this song "has triumphed." "We should not squabble about a song," Tokay said, but the plenum decided that the article should still be included in the Penal Code.

SRI Report Reveals Central Administration Flaws

AU2709074895 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 22 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by Irinel Radulescu: "The Report on the Romanian Intelligence Service Is Equivalent to a Censure Motion Against the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After reading the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] Report, the parliamentary commission supervising the country's main intelligence service reached the conclusion that the latest document, which was better written than the previous ones, can be viewed as a real (and particularly fundamental) censure motion against the government. The main argument in favor of this conclusion is the "information" incorporated in the "Economic Chapter" of the report, which shows that the subjugation of certain strategic economic sectors or other branches of national interest, economic espionage, and undermining of the national economy pose serious threats to our national security. What came as a big surprise was not the fact that intelligence gathering by foreign firms and companies was mainly responsible for this situation, but the fact that it was achieved with the cooperation of clerks at various state administration levels. The largest number of examples is of the "contracts concluded by foreign companies with Romanian companies, in conditions which are disadvantageous to our national economy." Thus, for the Cernavoda [nuclear power] station, Romania was obliged to import nuclear fuel at the end of 1994. Subsequent development showed that this could have been purchased in 1995, too. However, an even better solution would have been to allow Pitesti, which was capable of it, to produce the entire nuclear load required by the station's Unit Number One by May 1995. A similar situation occurred with the supply of heavy water. All of this "affair," coupled with failure to observe the commissioning timetable, led to a loss of $600,000 per day. Another weak point is "naval transportation," where there is the risk of Romania being excluded from this type of transportation market, due to the existence of some vested interests. As a matter of fact, the report mentions that only 20 percent remains of the famous Romanian fleet. Foreign trade and international economic cooperation ventures have also harmed the national wealth. Disadvantageous imports and exports were made, with advance money being paid to the foreign partners, never to be recovered afterward, and with failure to observe delivery or payment deadlines, all of which has led to the elimination of several Romanian companies from certain markets. As an example, the report mentions the four cargoes exported from the Turnu Severin shipyard, the rolled goods exported from Brasov, the processing and utilization of the oil products by SC Petrobrazi, and so forth. Similar things also happened in the agricultural and livestock sector. There where nothing could be done through contracts, "action" was taken through other means, mainly negligence. The mines, railways, and telecommunications were left to rot.

In view of all this, the SRI Commission is seriously considering the postponement of the debates on this report. According to Senator Vasile Vacaru, "all these aspects were mentioned in the information distributed by the SRI to the relevant ministers. The commission now wants to know why nothing has been done in this respect." Senator Vacaru did not exclude the possibility of massive dismissals at the central administration level.

Federal

Lilic Thanks Rybkin for Russian Support

LD2609142795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1145 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 26 Sep (TANJUG)—Zoran Lilic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], today received a top delegation of the State Duma of the Russian Federation headed by Duma chairman Ivan Rybkin, the FRY president's information service said today.

Rybkin stressed that the delegation he heads very much welcomes the Yugoslav federal and republican leadership view that peace can only be achieved by respecting the interests of all sides to the conflict, demanding for the Serbs in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina nothing more nor less than what applies to the Muslims and Croats.

The State Duma—this delegation includes representatives of 11 factions—Rybkin said, has never been more united in its attitude to the crisis in the area of the former Yugoslavia. Such increasing unity has been in evidence in recent months among all state organs in the Russian Federation. We all advocate a speedy restoration of peace as war leads nowhere and only brings about great suffering, Rybkin said.

President Lilic voiced gratitude for the Duma's resolute commitment to peace, adding that its commitment as well as that of the government and President Yeltsin have resulted in a more balanced attitude toward the sides involved in the conflict. There would have been no escalation of the war had it not been for the partiality of some factors in the international community.

Our priority, President Lilic explained, was to put an end to the NATO bombardment. It was only the Russian Federation and the Republic of Cyprus that raised their voices against this massive aggression from the air. The consequences are serious. The Croatian-Muslim offensives were made possible under this air force umbrella, thus creating huge columns of Serb refugees.

President Lilic also voiced appreciation for Russia's humanitarian aid and explained the serious humanitarian problem of caring for refugees particularly in the prewinter period: there are 750,000 refugees here and over 100,000 in Banja Luka.

In addition to resolving this problem, Lilic said, our main strategic goal is the resumption of political negotiations on an equal basis. We hope that the forthcoming tripartite ministerial meeting in New York will be successful and based on the results of the previous meeting in Geneva. We do not want to change our direction, we want to persevere on the path of peace, as we have done so far. We believe that the agreement on the setting up of a joint delegation representing the FRY and the Serb Republic is a great step forward on that path. We believe that peace will be just because only a just peace can be permanent. We also do not want to be pushed into a situation in which the limits of our patience and our preparedness for political talks would be tested. It is known that there are those who have been trying to achieve this since the beginning of the crisis.

Now it is absolutely necessary to focus our efforts on trying to extinguish the flames of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and any additional preconditions could only favor the war option in which case it is certain the war will escalate beyond its present borders, President Lilic said.

Our next important task is to rebuild our economy and to regain the position which belongs to us anyway—as a factor for stability and prosperity in the Balkans and Europe.

President Lilic expressed his gratitude to the chairman and deputies of the State Duma for their extensive political and economic aid which he he described as a great boost for the morale of our people at the crucial stage in their history. President Lilic reiterated that the contribution of the Russian Duma, the government, and President Yeltsin in securing equal status for all the warring sides represented the most important aid we could get in achieving our most important goal—peace.

The meeting was also attended by the Russian ambassador to the FRY, Gennadiy Shikin.

Bank Governor: 'Additional' Money Being Printed

AU2609155995 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23-24 Sep 95 p 1

[FONET report: "A Small Amount of Money Is Being Additionally Printed After All"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The night before last, Dragoslav Avramovic, governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, stated at a discussion forum at the University of Montenegro in Podgorica that additional amounts of money are being printed, although, as he said, this is not being done by the National Bank, MONTENA FAX reports.

Asked whether he held all the financial strings in his hands, Governor Avramovic stressed, "Power in this country lies in the hands of political leaders. For instance, the state takes money from the banks and later the banks demand that money from us. This is how some money leaks out, but this is not much," Avramovic said.

Country's Economy Losses Reduced by Two-Thirds

LD2609124195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1218 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept. 26 (TANJUG)—The losses suffered by the Yugoslav economy from Jan-June 1995 amount to about 3 billion dinars (2.2 billion dollars), which is two-thirds down on the same period last year.

Assistant General Manager of the Money Transfers Service Momcilo Graovac told TANJUG that the loss, resulting primarily from Yugoslavia's economic blockade, was reported by 18,026 firms, which is nearly every fourth firm. The firms employ about one million people.

The losses would probably have been much lower had the firms employed more than the 35-45 percent capacities now in use. This way, said Graovac, high fixed expenses overwhelmed the modest economic output.

Spendings were 2.1 billion dinars (about 1.5 billion dollars) greater than the total earnings.

The Yugoslav economy employed 1,684,837 people in the first half of this year, which is 0.6 percent less that in mid-1994. Net wages amounted to 267 dinars (about 140 U.S. dollars).

Viewed globally, the private sector operated successfully, as the profits were greater than the losses, which is not the case with the social sector, where losses exceeded profits three-fold.

The private sector, said Graovac, deals chiefly in trade, which is understandable economically, as investments are small, and the money spent is soon returned.

Half the firms that submitted accounts deal in wholesale. It is interesting to note, said Graovac, that as much as two-thirds of the turnover was made by a private wholesale trade network.

Agricultural Production Rises by 6 Percent

LD2709111595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1053 GMT 27 Sep 95

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept. 27 (TANJUG)—This year's agricultural production in Yugoslavia is higher in nearly all spheres so that experts believe that it will be 6 percent higher than the last year's.

The planned growth rate for this year is 2 percent.

The corn harvest that has just begun on about 1,400,000 hectares is expected to yield about 7 million tonnes of corn, which is about 30 percent higher than last year. In 1993, the yield was 4 million tonnes, while in 1992 the yield was 4.5 million tonnes.

This summer's wheat harvest has yielded slightly more than 3.2 million tonnes, which is 10 percent higher than last year. In 1993, the yield was 3 million tonnes, while in 1992 the yield was only 2.1 million tonnes.

The sunflower harvest that is in full progress is expected to yield about 360,000 tonnes, which is 5 percent higher than last year.

The soya harvest, which is also in full progress, is expected to yield 104,000 tonnes, which is 4 percent higher than last year.

The yield of sugar-beet is expected to be about 2 million tonnes which is slightly less than last year.

Agricultural experts, however, believe that this year's sugar-beet is of a slightly better quality so that the production of sugar should be the same as the last year's which was about 220,000 tonnes.

The yield of grapes is similar to the last year's which was about 400,000 tonnes, while plums have failed this year.

As regards vegetables, the potato yield is fairly good and in lowlands it is expected to be 890,000 tonnes, which is 5 percent higher than last year.

The yield of beans is expected to be about 68,000 tonnes, which is 10 percent higher than last year.

Serbia

Foreign Minister Milutinovic on New York Accord

Guarantees Serb State

AU2609212995 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 26 Sep 95

[Report by Borislav Lalic from New York]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Milan Milutinovic, Mate Granic, and Muhamed Sacirbegovic, foreign ministers of FRY, Croatia, and the Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina] government in Sarajevo respectively, have endorsed tonight in New York—with the mediation of the Contact Group—a document on the constitutional organization of the future Bosnian state, which will consist of two states as completely equal entities—the Muslim-Croatian [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Federation and the Serb Republic [Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina].

Today's agreement is extraordinarily important for the future of the peace process, FRY Foreign Minister Milan

Milutinovic said after this evening's meeting. According to Milutinovic, the endorsed constitutional arrangements guarantee an equal status of the Serb Republic in the future Bosnian state. [passage omitted]

Opens Up 'New Phase'

LD2609232095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2237 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] New York, 26 September (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Milan Milutinovic said this evening that today's negotiations in New York were opening up a new phase in the peace process for Bosnia.

"After what was agreed and achieved in New York today I am of the opinion that a new phase in the peace process for Bosnia is opening up, a phase in which the next step of equal importance and urgency could be an agreement on the cessation of hostilities and a cease-fire on the territory of the entire Bosnia," Milutinovic told TANJUG this evening. [passage omitted]

"After the meeting today it can almost be said that the continuity of the peace process has been secured and that it will be very difficult for anyone to stop it, or interrupt it," Milutinovic said.

According to Milutinovic, the most important thing that was achieved at the meeting today is that the Geneva fundamental principles were again confirmed. [passage omitted]

Russian Duma's Rybkin Views Bosnian Crisis

Praises Belgrade's 'Restraint'

AU2609203695 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 26 Sep 95

[Interview with Ivan Rybkin, chairman of the Russian Duma, by Dusan Cukic in Belgrade on 26 September—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cukic] Ivan Petrovich, we know what the Russian state Duma under your chairmanship is doing. You are now in Belgrade. How do you assess Belgrade's policy in regulating the Balkan crisis?

[Rybkin] I bow deeply in front of the restraint, as a man, in front of this political farsightedness that is now being demonstrated by Belgrade in the solution to this horrible conflict in the Balkans. I think that this restraint and this serenity, this aspiration toward compromise, has enabled progress in Geneva and I hope now in New York, too. All the issues will be resolved peacefully.

[Cukic] You have met President Slobodan Milosevic here in Belgrade.

[Rybkin] Yes, we held detailed talks with the participation of the chairmen of the assembly committees for defense, for security, for geopolitics, and many others, all our colleagues that represent various parliamentary groups in the state Duma. They could ask the president any direct question and they got convincing and well argued answers to all their questions. It is very, very important that such an aspiration toward peace exists. I hope that this is a guarantee that the situation will be resolved fortunately as soon as possible.

Of course, the wounds that have been inflicted on Yugoslavia will not be healed in just one year. The suffering of the people is immeasurable.

[Cukic] How do you assess future relations between Russia and the FRY?

[Rybkin] The centuries-old cooperation between us and life side by side speaks in favor of us continuing to live together, as should our children, and our grandchildren, and our great-grandchildren.

Calls For Air Strikes

AU2609192395 Paris AFP in English 1841 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept 26 (AFP)—If Sarajevo does not sign a peace deal in New York, NATO should resume bombing, "but this time against the Moslems [Bosnia-Herzegovina Government]," Russian parliamentary speaker Ivan Rybkin said Tuesday [26 September], winding up a two-day visit here.

"If the Moslem party does not sign, France, the United States and Britain will have to act as they did before (against the Serbs), but this time against the Moslems," he told a press conference.

The Bosnian, Croatian and rump Yugoslav foreign ministers opened U.S.-mediated talks in New York on Tuesday to discuss a proposed accord to end nearly four years of war in Bosnia.

If one of the parties now refuses the September 8 Geneva accords on Bosnia, "it will have to be punished, notably by NATO. ... I think that in that case, we will have to have an immediate lifting of sanctions against (rump) Yugoslavia. There is no other logic," he said.

Article Says 'Cleansing' of Officials Planned

AU2709100795 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 20 Sep 95 pp 8-9

[Article by Djoko Kesic and Gradisa Katic: "Minister Sokolovic Goes as Ambassador in Bucharest, Professor Ratko Markovic or Policeman Rade Markovic Will

Take His Place, and the Heads of the State and Public Security, Stojicic and Stanisic, Will Be Removed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Don't applaud me, because very soon many of you will no longer be in your places," Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic said recently, ending a meeting of the leadership of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], at which the decision on the removal of Milorad Vucelic [former general director of Radio Television Serbia] was made. "After this announcement by President Milosevic, everybody is anxious, from the Federal Government to the heads of the police in a small towns," a high official of the State Security of Serbia, who wishes to remain anonymous, told TELEGRAF. "In certain state structures of Serbia, expedited preparations for the realization of Milosevic's promise have started. The reconstruction of the Government of Serbia has been announced, but the first personnel, and I believe also crucial, changes will start in the Serbian Interior Ministry. It is quite certain that the present minister, Zoran Sokolovic, will go to Bucharest as the ambassador of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to replace Desimir Jeftic. Sokolic's present deputy, the head of the public security, Radovan Stojicic Badza, will also be given another job. He will be appointed the dean of the Police Academy in Belgrade," a reliable source of TELEGRAF claims.

Serious changes in the Interior Ministry of Serbia, as our source claims, could take place as soon as at the end of this month. It is expected that there will be a "cleansing" of all important positions in the police, all participants and witnesses of certain war events will be removed, traces of the numerous murders of businessmen must be "washed away"—the businessmen who, working on various import ventures for the state, transgressed the agreement and did something to line their own pockets as well, for which they paid with their heads.

Somewhat later, when the sanctions are lifted and peace comes to the region of former Yugoslavia, there will be changes in the State Security, which, as our source claims, is, at the moment, even more powerful than President Milosevic himself. However, the State Security still has a number of confidential tasks to perform, related to the status of Sandzak, Kosovo, eastern Slavonia, and Vojvodina, namely the autonomy of the Vojvodina Hungarians.

According to the information our source has, Sokolovic will most probably be replaced by Ratko Markovic, professor at the Law School in Belgrade and vice president of the Serbian Government, whereas his potential deputy, but also the man who has some chance of becoming interior minister, is Rade Markovic. Markovic was the head of the Belgrade Police and, after the demonstrations and the arrest of Vuk Draskovic [leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement], was promoted to the post of one of the two assistants to the first man in the Serbian police. In police circles, Markovic is considered to be an experienced policeman (20 years of work), so appointing him as the new minister would be the best thing for the police.

The announced changes in the police, but also in other state institutions, are associated with the new international and domestic circumstances, and the expected lifting of sanctions and arrival of foreign capital; a peaceful policy requires a policy that will be able to guarantee security both to our own citizens and to foreigners at all times.

Until now, organized crime has controlled a part of the police force, and the police have not exposed any of the organized murders or suchlike, which must not be allowed to happen in future. Of course, the first on the list for departure from important state functions are those policemen who participated the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia in any way. Some policemen, together with Mafia experts, did some work for the state, which the state could not legally do because of the sanctions, and many of these jobs were well rewarded. Who earned how much money illegally will only be known in some new constellation of power. For the time being, it is certain that all these people will be removed as possible witnesses—our source in the State Security claims.

As for other personnel changes in the Interior Ministry, our interlocutor expects the present city secretary Petar Zekovic, to be promoted to deputy minister, when Rade Markovic leaves that post. And the new first man of the Belgrade Police should be Mirko Simatovic, presently head of the 2d Department, the Criminal Department of the Interior Ministry of Belgrade.

In the second phase, which might follow in several months, there should be big changes in the state security as well. The frequent public appearances of the first man of the secret police, Jovica Stanisic, is a certain sign of his imminent departure. Franko Frenki Simatovic, the man who was responsible for guarding and firing the famous "Luna" type rockets when the Croatian Army attacked the Republic of Serb Krajina [the rocket assault on Zagreb], and whose last task was to conduct the reintegration of eastern Slavonia within the internationally recognized borders of Croatia, will go together with him Stanisic. It is supposed that Stanisic will also be appointed ambassador, to Greece or some other friendly country. That will not happen only if foreign secret services have collected data on possible war crimes committed by our first secret policemen.

Simultaneously with these changes, a new department is expected to be formed in the Interior Ministry. That is the so-called secret police, which would conduct the fight against the mafia, starting from the underground criminals, to the economic and political mafia. Like similar services in other countries, they would have special authorizations and they could, without a special authorization, arrest anybody at any time, even including ministers.

As our anonymous source claims, this special police will be formed in three months' time at the latest. He supposes that, in that time, all ministers and high state officials who became very rich during the war thanks to their positions will be removed from the republic government. Our source also claims that a former Belgrade policeman with an exceptional reputation in Serbia will be appointed as the head of the special police, with enormous powers.

Kosovo

Belgrade Efforts at 'Serbianizing' Province Seen

AU2609175795 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 25 Sep 95

[Telephone report by Mehmet Haziri from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the main Belgrade regime aims about colonists from Croatia is to accommodate them in areas populated by an absolute majority of Albanians. Serbian authorities further continue to keep secret the number of colonists who have so far been settled in Albanian dwellings in Kosovo. However, it is clear that their aims are to bring as many colonists as possible here and convince them, even through violence, to live permanently in Kosovo.

The Kosovo Information Center has recently released data focusing more on the aims of the Serbian power rather than the number of undesired arrivals in Kosovar communes.

It is known that over 200 colonists from Croatia have so far been settled in the Skenderaj commune and have been accommodated in the Culture House and the high schools' center in the city. Skenderaj is a commune absolutely populated by Albanians and with a very low level of economic development. However, the Serbs installed here have promised 100 jobs for colonists. Despite the fact that the majority of colonists from Croatia, settled in this commune, have expressed their dissatisfaction over the conditions offered and have attempted to turn back, the newspaper JEDINSTVO reports that they have willingly decided to live in Skenderaj.

After the violent usurpation of the buildings of the Rilindja Publishing House and the formation of the phantom enterprise Panorama, with the aim of Serbianizing it, the Serbian usurpers have currently started to employ Serb colonists in the jobs that Albanian workers were previously dismissed from.

The Kosovo Information Center reports that 20 Serbs coming from Knin have been employed in this enterprise, some of whom reporters, although they lack adequate qualification. It is reported that one of the colonists, who had worked as a shoemaker in Croatia, suddenly became a journalist. Thus, the aim of the Serbian regime is to settle these colonists in Kosovo forever, while their school and professional education is of no importance.

Serb 'Engineered' Trials Against Albanians Viewed

AU1609181595

[FBIS Editorial Report] Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No 702 and 703 on 12 and 13 September and Tirana TVSh Television Network in Albanian at 1635 GMT on 15 September carry several reports on Serbian "engineered" trials against ethnic Albanians in Gnjilane and Prizren.

Report No 702 on 12 September notes that another "Serbian-engineered trial" against four ethnic Albanians, former municipal officers and the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) activists in Kamenica, commenced at the Serb-run District Court in Gnjilane on 11 September. The four Albanians are "facing Serbian regime charges of having allegedly been involved in hostile activity" and having "jeopardized the territorial integrity of the self-styled Yugoslavia." According to the Serbian regime's indictment, "the four Albanians had established so-called headquarter of territorial defense in Kamenica and had aspired to set up a military force in Kosova." BUJKU reports that the first two defendants offered their testimonies at court, "denying in whole charges brought against them" and revealing "inhumane torture they had been subjected to during the investigative proceedings."

Reports also recall that "last week, ten ethnic Albanians from Kacanik, facing similar charges, were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six months to 2.5 years at the Serb-run District Court in Prishtina."

Report No 702 also notes that "the Serbian military court in Nis (Serbia) has recently sentenced a Kosova Albanian youth" from Balinc village in Vucitrn to 1,250 dinars (approximately 500 German marks) for "having refused to join the Serbian Army." Sources in Vucitrn say that the youth "was recently arrested by the Serbian police" and "sent to the military jail in Nis."

Report No 703 on 13 September says that "the Serbian engineered trial" against 44 former employees of the Kosova police force, former municipal officials in Prizren, Suva Reka, and Orahovac, and against Prizren-based Turkish Popular Party Chairman Sezair Shaipi, resumed at the Serb-run District Court in Prizren on 12 September. Over the past four months, in the trial hearings the defendants have "offered their testimonies," all of them "denying in whole charges against them" and speaking of "inhumane torture they had been subjected to throughout the investigative proceedings."

The Pristina-based BUJKU reports that the court's Serbian chairman "announced that the court has altered indictment against several defendants," namely "due to lack of evidence," thus "acquitting charges against three defendants." The court also "altered the indictment against 14 other defendants," who were "initially facing criminal charges pursuant to Article 136, Paragraph 1, of the Yugoslav/Serb Penal Code." They are currently facing "charges pursuant to Article 136 Paragraph 2 of the same Code, which envisages that the defendants may be released from detention on appeal." The defendants reiterated on 12 September that "throughout the trial the Court has not offered corroborative evidence in support of the indictment." A defending lawyer told the court "the indictment was based in assumptions and imputations" and that "the alleged involvement of defendants in hostile activity has never been proved before the court." The lawyer also called the trial "a political farce aimed at discrediting the peaceful policies the Kosova Albanians have been pursuing."

Tirana TVSh Television Network in Albanian at 1635 GMT on 15 September carries a telephone report from correspondent Ramadan Mucolli from Pristina, providing wide coverage on the same "staged" trial held in Prizren. Correspondent Mucolli reports that during a hearing held on 14 September, which was the "34th in succession," the main trial inquiry concluded.

Citing BUJKU, the correspondent says that the defense lawyers presented their final statements at the hearing, assessing that "the indictment is a farce" and a "product of the Serbian daily policy set up on violence, torture, and police threats, which resemble those of the medieval times." The correspondent notes that other defendants "turned down the indictment." At the end of the hearing, the court decided to "make a small change" and "abolish custody for 14 defendants, and for one charged on the basis of Serbian Law on Arms and Ammunition."

Commenting this "marathon trial," Mucolli says that "this trial, which lasted almost five months, cannot be assessed otherwise but as part of the current policy of the Serbian regime, which aims at incriminating the peaceful policy of Albanians and hampering the activity of all Albanian subjects and associations in Kosova. As such, it cannot be treated otherwise but as a political trial."

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